Yemeni Artists Commemorate Victims of Suicide Attacks

Murad Subay paints graffiti depicting a grenade on a street in Sanaa, Jan. 9, 2014. The piece is part of a graffiti campaign against armed conflicts in Yemen. (photo by REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah)

Almonitor by Sama'a Al-Hamdani

Posted March 19, 2014

The majority of the world remains unaware of the terrorist attack that rocked Sana'a last Dec. 5, beginning at 9 a.m. It targeted the al-Ourthi military hospital, on the grounds of the Ministry of Defense. This heinous act left 56 people dead, the majority of them doctors, nurses and civilians. Thirty minutes after the attack, early footage of it was televised. Several hours and explosions later, news broke of Nelson Mandela's death, and the rest was forgotten to history. 

The next 24 hours were taxing. The public was left uninformed until the Supreme Security Committee (SSC) announced the findings of its investigation. It revealed that 12 suicide bombers, most of them Saudi nationals, had committed a “terrorist act,” wounding 215 on top of those killed. The government hastily attempted to assuage the unnerved masses. First, it televised a five-minute, edited video of the attack. The images, as one might expect, generated collective terror and panic. They also created enough backlash to halt future replays. Second, it declared a nationwide minute of silence. Sadly, silence has been the symbolic and literal response of the government ever since.

Several months later, and in light of the government’s seeming lack of concern, a group of young Yemeni artists decided to commemorate the victims by drawing their faces and names on the walls of the al-Ourthi hospital. They collected 31 photos and 55 names at their own initiative. Two victims were never conclusively identified. To this day, there is no official record list of the names of all the victims. According to the artists who spoke to Al-Monitor, the Ministry of Defense declined their request to paint at the site of the attack just a day before the scheduled event. “Victims are everywhere,” they were told.

Undeterred, on March 6, the volunteers found a new location for their concept, which they named the 8th Hour. “Due to the absence of memorials, the 8th Hour is a kind of protest,” Murad Subay, a graffiti artist, informed Al-Monitor. In 2013, he launched the 12 Hour Campaign, a project to show through illustrations 12 major obstacles, or “hours,” in the path of Yemenis. At the time, he did not anticipate that terrorism would be one of them.

After the Yemeni uprisings of 2011, the grip of the government on the state had continued to weaken. Exploiting the new state’s frailty, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) expanded its operations. Not only did the government fail to curb the group's influence, it repeatedly neglected to address the worries of the people.

On May 21, 2012, the first suicide bombing in Sanaa took place and was dubbed the Sabeen massacre. The assassin targeted a rehearsal for a military parade, wounding 167 and killing more than 86 soldiers, 50 of whom died instantly. President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi immediately fired two generals, but the government then failed to develop a follow-up mechanism. No officials publicly commented on the event. The president spoke to the people through a TV anchor.

The president’s response after the 2013 hospital attack was almost indistinguishable from the one in 2012. This time, however, his silence was perceived from the start as a lack of concern, especially because he was rumored to have been at the hospital during the time of the attack. The government's inaction gave a wide berth to conspiracy theories. To this day, some people believe the al-Ourthi attack was a mere extension of the Houthi-Salafi war in the north.

Independent journalist Mohammed al-Absi took matters into his own hands and dedicated laborious hours to collecting evidence, photographs and accounts of survival from al-Ourthi. His reporting revealed that the Counterterrorism Unit, which responded to the attack, had been unaware that suicide bombers had dispersed themselves throughout the building. Even though the unit used excessive force, including six hours of tank fire, in the hope of killing the last terrorist standing, Absi found that the last bomber killed himself at 4 a.m. the next day.

Some of the details in Absi's expose on the government's inadequacy conflicted with the SSC’s investigation. He reported that nine suicide bombers had committed the crime rather than the 12 cited by the SSC. An official AQAP statement eventually confirmed the number provided by Absi. Moreover, Absi indicated that the SSC report had misidentified three victims as terrorists, further highlighting problems with the government's fieldwork.

In the age of technology, the Sabeen and the al-Ourthi attacks were of course videotaped, leaving authorities little room to conceal their incompetence. In 2012, Mutee Dammaj, a member of Yemen’s Socialist Party, and several others demanded the creation of a telecast showcasing the humanitarian side of the deceased soldiers, Dammaj told Al-Monitor. Tawfeeq al-Sharabi, a national television filmmaker, ultimately produced a series on the lives of the deceased soldiers as recalled by their families. The show was canceled after one broadcast. A few months later, al-Sharabi quit his job.

In 2014, similar scenarios played out. While the government broadcast no more than a few minutes of al-Ourthi attack footage, Absi gathered 30 clips from 250 cameras available at the scene. He had hoped to produce a revealing documentary about the details of the attack, but, Absi told Al-Monitor, he was turned down by several channels due to a lack of funding or interest. He therefore uploaded the footage to YouTube as a preview of what he aspires to document.

The Yemeni government has still failed to generate a public response to terrorism aside from an aggressive drone policy. It has also shown little interest in exposing the operations of its declared enemy. Worst of all, the current government wasted significant leadership opportunities by simply relinquishing responsibility during such a critical period.

While the public remains ignorant or passive in the face of the uncertainty engendered by terrorism, the apathy and incompetence displayed by the government has created a space for an earnest and dynamic group of civil activists to publicly dissect this paramount issue. Today, the task of remembering and honoring hundreds of wasted lives lies solely on the shoulders of the citizens. The 8th Hour is a glimpse of hope in a bleak reality. It is a positive sign that Yemenis are not ready to yield to terror and social chaos.

Threatened Unity: Understanding the Tihaman Hirak

Tihama is a coastal region extending from Hijaz to Hodaidah*. Part of Tihama now belongs to Saudi Arabia (since the Taif Treaty), when Talking about the Yemeni Tihaman Hirak, we are talking about the regions that belong to Tihama within the Yemen Border.

Background:

Prior to 1941, the region of Tihama was occupied by the Ottomans (twice), their ports were completely destroyed by the Italians during the Italian-Ottoman War and then controlled by the British.  Parts of Tihama were ruled by  the Idrissi Emirate, and then the Zaydi Imamate (under Imam Yehaya). The Tihamans track their first revolution to 1918 (against the corrupt Ottoman rule). Their most famous tribal confederation is the Zaraniq - from Bait Al Faqih - who fought against the Zaydi Imamate. Tihama has several other tribes (like Al-Monasirah, Al-Ma'azibah, Al-Wa'eriyah, Al-Mazahirah, Al-Masa'eed, and Al-'Aqiriah to name a few), but they are all weak today. 

Tihama has the majority of Yemen's valleys - including Wadi Moor which is the biggest in Yemen - and fisheries, as well as several farmlands. Between the area of Bora' and Al Sokhnah is a forest (3-5km long) protected by UNESCO. Also, the region of Tihama is wealthy in historical artifacts, many of which are traced back to the Himyarite Kingdom. 

Their Grievances:

The tribes of Tihama weakened significantly since 1920. Many of the people in Tihama practiced trade and embraced civilian life long ago. Unlike other parts of Northern Yemen, the people there are rarely armed. Many of the Tihaman lands do not belong to them. Security forces are absent from the area - they are present in the mountains but not on the coast -  and poverty levels continue to soar.  

Due to Tihama's location near the Red Sea, the region is rarely at peace. For instance, there are many passing refugees from Somalia and Ethiopia. Moreover, Tihaman fishermen are constantly targeted by pirates who steal their boats and imprison their workers. The area is also used for all kinds of smuggling (weapons, drugs, human trafficking, child trafficking, diesel & petrol, and illegal pesticides).

Logo of the Peaceful Tihaman Hirak 

Since the early 1970s, the standards of living have not improved and the centralized government oppressed the people. Historically, Tihama had fertile farmlands, fisheries and valleys, yet they remain poverty-stricken. Some of the lands have parched due to the lack of management/maintenance. Other Fertile farmlands are managed and owned by powerful individuals outside of Tihama. Fisheries are monopolized by people in the former government and some who are still in the current government. 

Flag of the Tihama Region

When it comes to governance, the area has been mostly managed by the General's People Congress (GPC) from 1982-2011. Many of the politicians and traders in Tihama are publicly allied with GPC; however, some have financial ties to Islah. Tihamans have been completely absent from the political arena. President Hadi visited the area about three months ago (after his trip to Moscow). The locals complained about the absence of a local economy. As a result of this visit, a deal between the government and the wealthy traders (allied with international corporations) was nullified. To date, nothing on the ground was implemented. 

The Movement/Hirak: 

In February 2011 (Yemeni Revolution), the people of Tihama finally had the courage to speak up about their oppression. The Tihaman Hirak is a massive movement that is not limited to a specific group and is open to all its directorates (see map below). They have thousands of members. A few individuals belonging to this movement call for armed resistance. 

The Tihaman Hirak has influential members from different political parties and some independents. The independents in the Tihaman Hirak lack a unified ideology or leadership; however, they put the interests of Tihama first. From this group, there is Mr. Mohammed Mo'men and Mr. Muhammed Al Dohni (who runs a cultural forum). Other members are from the Islah party, like Mr. Ismael Abdul Bari. From the GPC there is Qadi Ishaq Salah, from Yemen's Socialist Party there is Dr. Tibah Barakat, and Amal Maknoon (member in NDC), and from the Nasserite party there is Mr. Hassan Harad and his brother Taha Harad. Other members representing the Tihaman Hirak are 'Izzi Shuwaim and Khaled Abdullah Khalil, who are in the NDC. 

Directorates of the Tihama Region

Their Demands: 

The people of Tihama, like other Yemenis, demand improvements in services. The lack of medical services caused the return of "old diseases" like malaria, smallpox and other similar epidemics. Even though Tihama constitutes a large portion of Yemen, they are not involved in the decision making process and demand political participation. So far, in the National dialogue, their needs are not heard because they are considered a weak minority, even though there are several individuals representing their demands. 

Tihamans want relative autonomy in a Federal Yemen. When it comes to financial matters, they demand that more revenues be allocated to their region. They demand that some of their own resources be dedicated solely to the people of Tihama. Also, they demand the government's assistance in purchasing agricultural equipments in order to revive what once used to be fertile farmlands. 

Challenges: 

The biggest challenge facing the Tihaman Hirak is maintaining its peaceful operations. According to several Tihaman activists, they feel that powerful Sheikhs  - who have interests in keeping the people weak-  try to instigate trouble in order to drag the Tihaman people into armed conflict. They struggle to reject radicalism especially since they are very angry.

Another challenge is the politicization of the Hirak members, which can result in deep divisions within the movement. Moreover, Tihama, like other parts of Yemen, is witnessing an increase in sectarian divides between the people. New labels are being paraded around to divide the diverse Tihaman population. Finally, their voices remain faint in Yemen and outside of Yemen, especially in comparison to other oppressed groups. 

*Map from Dr. AbdulWadoud Moqashr PhD Thesis: (Tihaman Resistance and Opposition Movements from 1918 to 1962).

- Special Thanks to Mr. Abdul Bary Taher, Secretary General of the 'Afif Cultural Institution and Mr. Khaled Abdullah Khalil member of the Transitional Justice Committee in the NDC. 

It Wasn't Me: Yemen's Conspiracy Theories (1/2)

Part 1 of 2

As Arabs, we love conspiracy theories. Everything is far more exciting if there is a mysterious plot to unravel. Not to mention, it's easier to abandon all responsibilities if it there a “scheme” in place and a "mastermind" behind it. In Yemen's conspiracy theories, we are the victims, the injured party, the biggest loser, and the subject of all interest. Despite being inherently realists, we exhibit bursts of borderline personality and a hint of narcissistic tendencies. When it comes to conspiracy narratives, some are outright outrageous, others are meticulously constructed (and over time become self-fulling prophecies), and only a handful are fathomable explanations.

This blog post lists some of the “conspiracy theories” circulating in Yemen. It has no interest in debunking them nor in unraveling the truth that lies behind them.

• About a year ago, right after the NASA Rover landed on Mars, Yemeni media outlets published one of the most dangerous theories yet. Our (Yemeni) high-tech investigative techniques revealed that NASA was hiding a big secret from us. We were told that NASA had physical proof, for years, that Lailat al Qadar exists and they shamelessly hid it from us. Apparently NASA, a US agency responsible for aerospace research invested a load of their time and money to trackback this day with technology as advanced as the space Rovers. The biggest shock was that the article assumed that Yemenis needed NASA to prove it...   

Lailat al Qadr, literally translates to Night of Destiny, and is the night that the first verses of the Quran were revealed to the prophet Muhammed when he encountered the angel Jibreel (Gabriel). Traditionally, it is believed to be on one of the last nights of Ramadan and there is no specific date for it.

• Israel, one of the most notorious countries in the Middle East, is always the subject of several conspiracy theories. Overtime, it became very convenient to blame anything on them. Once the Arab Spring started, former President Saleh gave a statement that attributed the Arab Spring to a vague Israeli/American blueprint to destroy the Middle East. While many Yemenis are innately susceptible to these kind of theories, unfortunately for Saleh, it was just too little too late!  
• Accompanying Saleh’s long shot, an article surfaced that Israel finally devised a weapon more catastrophic than any nuclear bomb. They finally succeeded in creating a special gas that can be inserted into a bomb. The secret is once the bomb is dropped in any part of the world, the gas only kills Muslims. (not to mention the Israeli belts distributed all over Yemen to make our men infertile)

• Speaking about gas, fellow tweeter Ibrahim Muthana once wrote that a taxi driver tried to explain his lethargy. The taxi driver revealed that the US has been actively spraying Yemenis with a secret gas to keep us tired and unproductive... (Qat and malnutrition didn't come to mind..)

• While Yemen witnessed (and continues to witness) several campaigns against women, one of the most important issues that Yemenis continue to worry about is the term “gender”.  Most Yemenis (men and women) continue to misuse the term and substitute it for “equality”. Regardless of this lack of understanding, a university dropout warned us about the dangers of “gender”. If “gender” succeeds in being a component of the National Dialogue, then it will only legalize homosexuality and adultery. At first, it is easy to dismiss such ramblings; but after serious pondering, you begin to see the light. Why? Of course! Enhancing Women’s access to education is about enlightenment... and enlightenment makes us think of the Italian Renaissance... and the renaissance is about rebirth...rebirth coincided with secularism...Therefore, if women are educated then it must mean that Yemenis will abandon their faith . Just think about it! all these literate women... reading about adultery...how gay!

• Just when you think that most conspiracy theories are generated by fundamentalists, I have to end this streak with another Arab Spring Theory. It is not a secret that the protests in Tunisia inspired the rest of the Middle East nor is it a secret that for at least a decade most Arabs living under repressive/authoritarian regimes preferred Islamist parties over other political parties for their political organization and service delivery. When the structured Islamist parties began winning votes across the Arab world, and most notably when the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) won the elections in Egypt, it became apparent to liberals everywhere that the Arab Spring is an Islamist ploy to secure power. The truth is; Islamists got bored of waiting for their turn to rule. For months, even years, men from all over the Arab World gathered (perhaps in London?) to plan a revolt that would lead to the world domination. The protests in Turkey may appear contradictory to this theory, but rest assured, it is part of a bigger plan...

• Yemen witnesses blackouts on a daily basis. Once in a blue moon, the electricity stays on. Rather than enjoying the 260 year old technology, we worry about the consequences of this abrupt reward. While electricity blackouts are not a laughing matter, many Yemenis feel better blaming such misfortune on 'Afash. Yes, it is all the fault of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Even the tribes and AQAP agree. It's all him. He always left Yemenis in the dark, literally.

• The radical branch of the Southern secessionists in Yemen blamed the downfall of YSP on a few Northern individuals in 1986. While these radical thinkers refuse to join the National Dialogue, the Northerners are worried about something far worse: Payback. 

President Hadi is from Abyan (South of Yemen) and the Majority of his government and Military appointments were for fellow Southerners. Unfortunately, a southern majority government didn't contain Hirak but it sure worried Northerners. They believe that - and Journalist Adam Baron describes it - president Hadi is a "closet separatist". Yemen is in a mess right now and just when everything gets worse (hard to imagine), president Hadi and his government will smoothly transition to rule the South. The Southerners would enjoy heaven (Aden) and the Northerners will be abandoned without any leadership or resources.

End of Part 1, more in Part 2

Hadi’s Gamble: Yemen’s Military Restructuring and its Impact on the Future

My latest Op-Ed for The National

On April 10, Yemen's President Abdrabu Mansur Hadi boldly issued a decree to restructure the nation's military. The most notable achievements of this decree was dismantling former president Ali Abdullah Saleh's grip on the military by sending many of his relatives abroad as diplomats.

The decision reinforced Mr Hadi's previous military decrees to abolish the First Armoured Division led by Gen Ali Mohsen Al Ahmar, and the Republican Guard, led by Mr Saleh's eldest son, Ahmed. These two units stirred the most controversy.

Still, the decree is a major gamble by Mr Hadi, who is looking to ease the tensions that have paralysed Yemen for the past two years. This move is aimed to define the function of the new military, but it will likely increase tensions in the long run rather than solve them.

The military structure is made up of three different powers: From the north, Gen Mohsen, who defected from the former regime, was named the chief military adviser to the president. As such, he will have major influence on the military. Together with the Islah party the main opposition party in Yemen, they control almost half of the military.

Mr Hadi, who hails from the south, controls the second large portion of the country's forces. The last component of the military belongs to the remnants of Mr Saleh's regime.

Based on these divisions, it is apparent that the military wasn't able to shake off former tribal influences, which leads to the conclusion that three main struggles are likely to arise due to geographical and ideological differences.

First, the northern powers of Gen Mohsen and Islah could threaten the Houthis, who control a largely autonomous area on the border with Saudi Arabia. Second, the southern powers of Mr Hadi could try to curb Hirak's separatist influence in the south. But th real struggle will manifest within the military, between the components as they strive for power and dominance.

In the past decade, the Yemeni government has fought an on­again, off­again guerrilla war against the Houthis, a Shia revivalist group. All of the six wars were spearheaded by Gen Mohsen under Saleh's regime. But, once Mr Saleh agreed to step down in late 2011, the conflict took on more of a sectarian character, as the Houthis increasingly clashed with tribal and religious militias linked Islah. These two strands of anti­Houthi resistance are now coming together.

Gen Mohsen may have lost his armoured division, but he remains a key military figure in the new order. More importantly, two of hi allies have been named regional commanders in the areas bordering the Houthis' stronghold in the north. As expected, the Houthi have marched against Mr Hadi's military reshuffling, believing that their enemies are looking to surround them and destroy them.

The threat to the Houthis is highly dangerous, particularly since the Houthis tend to lash out whenever they feel cornered. 

In the south, the rest of the military will be occupied with a different conflict. The leadership of Hirak, the southern movement pushin for secession, has refused to join the National Dialogue which is now underway. Almost all of the south's leadership, including Mr Hadi himself, belonged at some point to Yemen's Socialist Party.

Today, these leaders are divided between those who support the president, and in turn unity, and those who do not. Personal vendettas and long-standing feuds still colour much of the interaction in the south.

Two scenarios are possible: First, as is the case in the past, mysterious assassinations could begin between these opposing forces. Or, the conflict could morph into several regional conflicts.

Ultimately, the lives of separatists will be in danger. The military will always support the home region of the president, Abyan, and Islahis will not hesitate to involve their militias and their hold on the military to gain control over southern territories.

Yet the most important struggle will be the one within the military itself. The two dominating powers of the military, Gen Mohsen and Islah on the one hand and Mr Hadi's forces on the other, could easily result in a typical north-south regional schism. But it could also take on a more ideological flavour between those aligned with Islah and those who oppose the conservative religious party. Islah is looking to rule and Mr Hadi, at some point, will have to seriously consider joining forces with them.

That leaves Mr Saleh's allies, the vulnerable component of the military, to seek new alliances outside of the military. It is likely that they will collaborate with the Houthis and Hirak.

The new military decree suggests that Mr Hadi is unlikely to step down in 2014, or even 2016 for that matter. Through the military, Mr Hadi is finally establishing his authority and if he leaves in the near future, the balance of power in Yemen will be skewed. Yemenis will continue to battle over political, ideological and regional influence.

The military restructuring doesn't solve Yemen's infighting. Rather, it could exacerbate it at a time when the country has more pressing issues. Within this military reshuffle are the seeds of years of future conflicts.