Yemeni Artists Commemorate Victims of Suicide Attacks

Murad Subay paints graffiti depicting a grenade on a street in Sanaa, Jan. 9, 2014. The piece is part of a graffiti campaign against armed conflicts in Yemen. (photo by REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah)

Almonitor by Sama'a Al-Hamdani

Posted March 19, 2014

The majority of the world remains unaware of the terrorist attack that rocked Sana'a last Dec. 5, beginning at 9 a.m. It targeted the al-Ourthi military hospital, on the grounds of the Ministry of Defense. This heinous act left 56 people dead, the majority of them doctors, nurses and civilians. Thirty minutes after the attack, early footage of it was televised. Several hours and explosions later, news broke of Nelson Mandela's death, and the rest was forgotten to history. 

The next 24 hours were taxing. The public was left uninformed until the Supreme Security Committee (SSC) announced the findings of its investigation. It revealed that 12 suicide bombers, most of them Saudi nationals, had committed a “terrorist act,” wounding 215 on top of those killed. The government hastily attempted to assuage the unnerved masses. First, it televised a five-minute, edited video of the attack. The images, as one might expect, generated collective terror and panic. They also created enough backlash to halt future replays. Second, it declared a nationwide minute of silence. Sadly, silence has been the symbolic and literal response of the government ever since.

Several months later, and in light of the government’s seeming lack of concern, a group of young Yemeni artists decided to commemorate the victims by drawing their faces and names on the walls of the al-Ourthi hospital. They collected 31 photos and 55 names at their own initiative. Two victims were never conclusively identified. To this day, there is no official record list of the names of all the victims. According to the artists who spoke to Al-Monitor, the Ministry of Defense declined their request to paint at the site of the attack just a day before the scheduled event. “Victims are everywhere,” they were told.

Undeterred, on March 6, the volunteers found a new location for their concept, which they named the 8th Hour. “Due to the absence of memorials, the 8th Hour is a kind of protest,” Murad Subay, a graffiti artist, informed Al-Monitor. In 2013, he launched the 12 Hour Campaign, a project to show through illustrations 12 major obstacles, or “hours,” in the path of Yemenis. At the time, he did not anticipate that terrorism would be one of them.

After the Yemeni uprisings of 2011, the grip of the government on the state had continued to weaken. Exploiting the new state’s frailty, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) expanded its operations. Not only did the government fail to curb the group's influence, it repeatedly neglected to address the worries of the people.

On May 21, 2012, the first suicide bombing in Sanaa took place and was dubbed the Sabeen massacre. The assassin targeted a rehearsal for a military parade, wounding 167 and killing more than 86 soldiers, 50 of whom died instantly. President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi immediately fired two generals, but the government then failed to develop a follow-up mechanism. No officials publicly commented on the event. The president spoke to the people through a TV anchor.

The president’s response after the 2013 hospital attack was almost indistinguishable from the one in 2012. This time, however, his silence was perceived from the start as a lack of concern, especially because he was rumored to have been at the hospital during the time of the attack. The government's inaction gave a wide berth to conspiracy theories. To this day, some people believe the al-Ourthi attack was a mere extension of the Houthi-Salafi war in the north.

Independent journalist Mohammed al-Absi took matters into his own hands and dedicated laborious hours to collecting evidence, photographs and accounts of survival from al-Ourthi. His reporting revealed that the Counterterrorism Unit, which responded to the attack, had been unaware that suicide bombers had dispersed themselves throughout the building. Even though the unit used excessive force, including six hours of tank fire, in the hope of killing the last terrorist standing, Absi found that the last bomber killed himself at 4 a.m. the next day.

Some of the details in Absi's expose on the government's inadequacy conflicted with the SSC’s investigation. He reported that nine suicide bombers had committed the crime rather than the 12 cited by the SSC. An official AQAP statement eventually confirmed the number provided by Absi. Moreover, Absi indicated that the SSC report had misidentified three victims as terrorists, further highlighting problems with the government's fieldwork.

In the age of technology, the Sabeen and the al-Ourthi attacks were of course videotaped, leaving authorities little room to conceal their incompetence. In 2012, Mutee Dammaj, a member of Yemen’s Socialist Party, and several others demanded the creation of a telecast showcasing the humanitarian side of the deceased soldiers, Dammaj told Al-Monitor. Tawfeeq al-Sharabi, a national television filmmaker, ultimately produced a series on the lives of the deceased soldiers as recalled by their families. The show was canceled after one broadcast. A few months later, al-Sharabi quit his job.

In 2014, similar scenarios played out. While the government broadcast no more than a few minutes of al-Ourthi attack footage, Absi gathered 30 clips from 250 cameras available at the scene. He had hoped to produce a revealing documentary about the details of the attack, but, Absi told Al-Monitor, he was turned down by several channels due to a lack of funding or interest. He therefore uploaded the footage to YouTube as a preview of what he aspires to document.

The Yemeni government has still failed to generate a public response to terrorism aside from an aggressive drone policy. It has also shown little interest in exposing the operations of its declared enemy. Worst of all, the current government wasted significant leadership opportunities by simply relinquishing responsibility during such a critical period.

While the public remains ignorant or passive in the face of the uncertainty engendered by terrorism, the apathy and incompetence displayed by the government has created a space for an earnest and dynamic group of civil activists to publicly dissect this paramount issue. Today, the task of remembering and honoring hundreds of wasted lives lies solely on the shoulders of the citizens. The 8th Hour is a glimpse of hope in a bleak reality. It is a positive sign that Yemenis are not ready to yield to terror and social chaos.

On Drones: Yemeni Americans, Yemenis and Americans

This Monday, Aljazeera Stream held a conversation with journalist Jeremy Scahill to discuss his latest book, "Dirty Wars: the World is a Battlefield". The book is over 615 pages and "focuses on America's expanding covert wars and the White House claiming the legal authority to kill U.S. citizens". Anwar Al-Awlaki, an American/Yemeni clerk, was killed in a drone strike in Yemen and is a central figure in Scahill's book. He is the third American killed in Yemen by a drone, the other two are: Samir Khan and Abdulrahman Al-Awlaki, Anwar's 16 year old son.

After our conversation, it became apparent that the US has no intention of "capturing enemies" because they wouldn't know what to do with them. It is now a war of drones. Evan Cinq-Mars, a fellow speaker on the Stream, asked how this war will end. This is the question that everyone needs to be asking, because the use of drones is only helping AQAP recruit sympathizers which will lead to the use of more drones, and so on...

                                 

From left to right: Al-Awlaki's cousin, Activist Bushra Al Maqtari, and Rabyaah

There are obvious consequences to this policy (death, terror, etc) but, there is unrecognizable damage that could lead to sustained nonphysical conflict. There is a clash of cultures and Yemeni Americans are in the midst of it. They are rejected by association; in the US for being Arabs and maybe "terrorists" and in Yemen for being Western and for supporting "terrorists". The struggle within them is a reflection of the increasing tensions between the two countries.

The US and increasing tensions:

Due to the current economic recession, the US is only able to focus on anti-terrorism/security efforts in Yemen. The diplomats at the American Embassy in Yemen are restricted in movement to a small portion of Sana'a where they don't actually meet the real/average Yemeni. It is understandable why Americans would be cautious, especially after the shameful attacks on the US Embassy in Libya and the resulting assassination of the Ambassador there. However, the primary role of embassies is to practice diplomacy and with so many restrictions, it is illogical to expect sincere communication between the two countries.

Prior to 1990, the US was primarily focused on its security. Its foreign policy included countering the former USSR (the South of Yemen, a separate country prior to 1990, was Marxist and an ally of USSR). After unification in 1990, the US focused on some development and educational/cultural exchange programs. There are two challenges facing US-Yemeni relations.

First, the development programs were concentrated on the Northern parts of Yemen while the majority of the drone strikes and AQAP activity is carried out in the South. The role of the US prior to the Arab Spring focused on supporting leaders in the Middle East who, in Yemen's case, weren't interested in the overall welfare of their people. To Southern separatists, former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, is an ally of the US but the main enemy. Currently, Southern separatist leaders are snubbed by the Yemeni government and the drone strikes carried out by the US in Southern regions of Yemen exacerbate the tensions.

It appears to some Yemenis that the US continues to support regimes rather than the people. To make matters worse, the US educational exchange programs haven't increased and their efforts are upstaged by several other countries who are providing better opportunities to Yemenis. Furthermore, it is near impossible for Yemenis to obtain visas for travel to the US. Every male over the age of 18 is treated like a suspect and until proven innocent, he will remain in Yemen.

To be a Yemeni in America: 

Some Yemenis live in communities, close to each other and maintain a traditional lifestyle, but others, like me, like to integrate into American society. Over the past seven years, I have come to love this country. Throughout several interactions, it became clear that many Americans don't know anything about Yemen but that the country harbors terrorists. I have been examined carefully because I look and behave in a similar manner. Some would say: "You don't look like a Yemeni!" but since they don't know much about the country, no Yemeni will look like one.

Yemeni-Americans have to challenge the "terrorist" stereotype on a daily basis. This stereotype is harsh and Yemenis in the US are burdened with the responsibility of representing all Yemenis, not just themselves. When disaster strikes in the US, Yemenis across the world, but more specifically in the US pray that the attacker is not Yemeni, nor has ties to Yemen. Yemenis in the US don't need that kind of attention. So we spend our lives telling Americans about our architecture, our coffee, our sky-rises and our queens. But all of that doesn't matter when an event like the Boston Marathon bombing takes place. Reporting on the incident, Chris Matthews proves that stereotypes persist:

"To be blunt and not be into political profiling or racial profiling but when you look at a picture that we’re looking at now are there people in the FBI in the investigative world that can look at the picture, study it ethnographically and figure what the odds are on a fellow like that being from different parts of the world say YEMEN…”

While Yemenis are offended and angry, it is not an option to be so. They have to restrain their anger and accept it for the sake of their heritage. As Americans they love America and don't want it to get hurt. Finally, Yemenis in America, like other Americans, are just as terrified of AQAP.

The Role of Yemen:

In the early 1990s, the Yemeni government promised to care for its people. Prior to that, and after only a few years of ruling in the North, former President Saleh had the key to remain in power for what seemed like a lifetime. Democracy and free elections continued to be a notion that Yemenis talk about but not really experience especially since none of the neighboring countries were democracies (mostly monarchies or dictatorships).

With globalization and the advancement of technology, many things in Yemen changed. Regardless, Saleh continued to rule. The Yemeni government took responsibility for the first drones used against AQAP; not to make the US look good, but rather because Saleh knew that he was betraying his own people. Some accuse Saleh's regime of fostering terrorist groups in order to fill his pockets. Others accuse him of feeding Americans false intelligence in order to attack his own rivals. While these accusations may or may not be true, the fact was that the government was no longer responsible for what goes on in its own land with its own people.

Today, President Abdurabbu Mansour Hadi is expected to meet the demands of the Yemeni people. While he needs to deal with the economic recession, poverty, famine, lack of security, etc. He is still expected to protest the excessive use of drones in Yemen (at least against signature strikes). In a separate conversation, a fellow Yemeni pointed out that president Hadi doesn't have a lot of leverage with the US because they are his main "backers", leaving his hands tied. Still, Scahill's statement resonates with me: "We need to hold our own government accountable"...

To be an American in Yemen:

My last trip to Yemen was in August of 2012 and anti-American sentiments were at an all time high. It was clear that the majority of Yemenis felt let down by their own government but even clearer that they were more so by the US. To them, liberal voices in the United States are silent on the killings carried out by drones on innocent lives. In turn, the liberals in Yemen, abandoned their American counterpart.

When Yemeni-Americans go back to Yemen, they become responsible for representing the values of America in Yemen. In his testimony on drones before congress, Farea' Al-Muslimi states:

"I went to the U.S. as an ambassador for Yemen. I came back to Yemen as an ambassador of the U.S."

When Yemeni-Americans are in Yemen, they feel the need to represent America well. They explain to Yemenis that what they see is a product of fear. Yemenis need to realize that these reactions do not reflect the sentiments of the American people. What Yemenis view as the US is nothing more than the implementation of a policy decided by branch within the US government: not even the entirety of the US government agree on it. However, these facts become harder to swallow as the heedless use of drones continues to increase.

The solution:

American Diplomats in Yemen are in a tough place. President Hadi is in a tough place. People in the US are scared of terrorism and Yemenis are scared of drones. 

No one can predict the end of this "war". The current tactics are futile; they are short term responses that postpone a real solution. To end these conflicts, we need to suspend militaristic realism, and we need to employ empathy and communication to foster amity in the long term. Finally, I have endless gratitude for Yemeni-Americans and Americans in Yemen who inspire peace rather than promote fear.

Why Abyan? and What to do?

Watch Al Qaeda in Yemen on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

Image via Ibtimes

Image via Yemen Online

In the waning days of Saleh's regime, unconfirmed reports claim that military leaders purposefully withdrew their forces in order to destabilize the region. Within weeks, the governorate of Abyan fell under the control of Ansar Al Shari'ah (Al-Qaeda affiliated group). Their control over Abyan lasted from March 2011 to June 2012. During this time, it was declared an "Islamic Empire".



After Ansar Al Shari'a were forced out, on June 19, 2012, U.S. officials including the US ambassador, Gerald Feierstein, and USAID administrator, Rajiv Shah, visited the war ravaged areas of Abyan. In September, they released this assessment. In this trip, USAID pledged to provide an extra 52$ million dollars of assistance to Yemen. Some humanitarian assistance began in Abyan; however, no concrete reforms can be felt.

Before Ansar Al Shair'ah, Abyan had high unemployment rates, poor educational opportunities and was economically deprived. Government presence there was almost nonexistent. Now, not much has changed. Since 2012, there are tribal popular committees that were instrumental in evicting Ansar Al Shariah from the region much like Al-Sahwah tribal committees in the Anbar province in Iraq who helped end the war in Iraq. Government presence is still weak. The return of Ansar Al-Shariah is still a possibility as they are hiding in the neighboring regions. Ironically, some claim that a few members of the tribal popular committees are in fact members of Ansar Al Shariah. The question that comes to mind is why Abyan? and what to do?

Abyan is a vast lawless area with a harsh terrain that lacks government authority and institutions.  Low levels of education made the area ripe for extremist infiltration. Prior to the unification of Yemen, and in the context of the cold war,  Saudi Arabia and the US supported Islamic extremists (Mujahidins) to combat the spread of communism in Afghanistan and in the South of Yemen. When Osama Bin Laden visited Yemen in 1989 (his only vist there), he brought Jihadis from Afghanistan to Southern Yemen. Also, Yemen was one of the few countries they could go. In the brief Civil War of 1994, former president Saleh used these returning warriors to help him win the war against those who declared secession. It was part of Saleh's strategy to spread the Jihadi, Salafi and Muslim Brotherhood movement in the South. 

Historically, Abyan is known for adopting radical thoughts (for example; the Qarmatian movement (which is a Shi'i Ismaili group lead by Ali ben Fadhl Al Qormoti started in Jabal Khanfar in Ji'ar, Abyan. Also, Sufi extremist groups flourished there). Furthermore, in the past 20 years, most political and ideological movements in Abyan failed miserably  So, the community felt that the "return to religion" is the only option to combat the problems facing them. The Jihadi/Salafi ideology is one that revolves around the concept of life after death, where things could be better. 

Although people in Abyan are primarily considered Shafi'i, Sunni. In the past 20 years, Salafism (Jihadi- Wahhabism in particular) dominated Abbyan. In 1994, Abyan was the first area to convert a movie theater into a mosque. Also, in 1998, the first attack on tourists in Yemen was committed by Jaish Adan Al Islami (Aden-Abyan's Religious Army). This "army" was created in 1992 and participated in the previously mentioned Civil War with Saleh. They hold the messianic belief that their role in the Arabian Peninsula will bring Yom Al-Qiyamah (day of resurrection), based on the following hadith: 

"An army of twelve-thousand will come out of Aden-Abyan. They will give victory to Allah and His messenger; they are the best between myself and them".

The Aden-Abyan army wants to reinstate Islam as it was during the times of the Prophet Muhammed (PBUH). However, as we saw in their seize of Abyan, they were authoritarian and demanded absolute obedience. AQAP has become a rallying cry to many, but not out of conviction. Many people are not fond of Al-Qaeda, but like the saying "the enemy of my enemy is my friend"; because AQAP stands up to the government that neglected them, they follow suit.  

Currently, conditions in Yemen are substandard, and almost each region needs its own transitional plan. People in Abbyan need special attention (like other governorates) in order to revive their economy. Unfortunately, without any felt improvements, fighting jihad in order to go to heaven seems like a feasible venting method. Right now, people in Abyan are distressed and life is gruesome. The goal in Abyan is to lower the distress of these human beings. So what is needed is good governance and economic assistance in order for us to observe any real transformation in the region.