Hadi’s Gamble: Yemen’s Military Restructuring and its Impact on the Future

My latest Op-Ed for The National

On April 10, Yemen's President Abdrabu Mansur Hadi boldly issued a decree to restructure the nation's military. The most notable achievements of this decree was dismantling former president Ali Abdullah Saleh's grip on the military by sending many of his relatives abroad as diplomats.

The decision reinforced Mr Hadi's previous military decrees to abolish the First Armoured Division led by Gen Ali Mohsen Al Ahmar, and the Republican Guard, led by Mr Saleh's eldest son, Ahmed. These two units stirred the most controversy.

Still, the decree is a major gamble by Mr Hadi, who is looking to ease the tensions that have paralysed Yemen for the past two years. This move is aimed to define the function of the new military, but it will likely increase tensions in the long run rather than solve them.

The military structure is made up of three different powers: From the north, Gen Mohsen, who defected from the former regime, was named the chief military adviser to the president. As such, he will have major influence on the military. Together with the Islah party the main opposition party in Yemen, they control almost half of the military.

Mr Hadi, who hails from the south, controls the second large portion of the country's forces. The last component of the military belongs to the remnants of Mr Saleh's regime.

Based on these divisions, it is apparent that the military wasn't able to shake off former tribal influences, which leads to the conclusion that three main struggles are likely to arise due to geographical and ideological differences.

First, the northern powers of Gen Mohsen and Islah could threaten the Houthis, who control a largely autonomous area on the border with Saudi Arabia. Second, the southern powers of Mr Hadi could try to curb Hirak's separatist influence in the south. But th real struggle will manifest within the military, between the components as they strive for power and dominance.

In the past decade, the Yemeni government has fought an on­again, off­again guerrilla war against the Houthis, a Shia revivalist group. All of the six wars were spearheaded by Gen Mohsen under Saleh's regime. But, once Mr Saleh agreed to step down in late 2011, the conflict took on more of a sectarian character, as the Houthis increasingly clashed with tribal and religious militias linked Islah. These two strands of anti­Houthi resistance are now coming together.

Gen Mohsen may have lost his armoured division, but he remains a key military figure in the new order. More importantly, two of hi allies have been named regional commanders in the areas bordering the Houthis' stronghold in the north. As expected, the Houthi have marched against Mr Hadi's military reshuffling, believing that their enemies are looking to surround them and destroy them.

The threat to the Houthis is highly dangerous, particularly since the Houthis tend to lash out whenever they feel cornered. 

In the south, the rest of the military will be occupied with a different conflict. The leadership of Hirak, the southern movement pushin for secession, has refused to join the National Dialogue which is now underway. Almost all of the south's leadership, including Mr Hadi himself, belonged at some point to Yemen's Socialist Party.

Today, these leaders are divided between those who support the president, and in turn unity, and those who do not. Personal vendettas and long-standing feuds still colour much of the interaction in the south.

Two scenarios are possible: First, as is the case in the past, mysterious assassinations could begin between these opposing forces. Or, the conflict could morph into several regional conflicts.

Ultimately, the lives of separatists will be in danger. The military will always support the home region of the president, Abyan, and Islahis will not hesitate to involve their militias and their hold on the military to gain control over southern territories.

Yet the most important struggle will be the one within the military itself. The two dominating powers of the military, Gen Mohsen and Islah on the one hand and Mr Hadi's forces on the other, could easily result in a typical north-south regional schism. But it could also take on a more ideological flavour between those aligned with Islah and those who oppose the conservative religious party. Islah is looking to rule and Mr Hadi, at some point, will have to seriously consider joining forces with them.

That leaves Mr Saleh's allies, the vulnerable component of the military, to seek new alliances outside of the military. It is likely that they will collaborate with the Houthis and Hirak.

The new military decree suggests that Mr Hadi is unlikely to step down in 2014, or even 2016 for that matter. Through the military, Mr Hadi is finally establishing his authority and if he leaves in the near future, the balance of power in Yemen will be skewed. Yemenis will continue to battle over political, ideological and regional influence.

The military restructuring doesn't solve Yemen's infighting. Rather, it could exacerbate it at a time when the country has more pressing issues. Within this military reshuffle are the seeds of years of future conflicts.

Military Restructuring in Yemen: Exploring Transformation

President Hadi's decree no. 16 for 2013 on military restructuring has been dubbed "historical" and "unprecedented". It was welcomed by most media outlets. On Yemen's ground, the news received mixed reviews: those who protest Saleh's immunity are upset that these appointments "reward criminals", while those who are skeptical of the transitional period are relieved to see many of Saleh's men transferred outside of the country. It is a chance for stability. Like Yemenis say, Le Kol Hadethen Hadeeth, For each occasion its own conversation.  So, in today's post, Yemeniaty examines the focal points of the new appointments and whether it is really historical. 

The New Military 

The previous chart reveals the new power distribution based on governorates/region. The regions colored in white didn't gain any influence. Conversations on military restructuring can prove confusing; however, one must remember these key points: 

1) Mohsen's First Armor Division and Saleh's Republican Guard are dissolved. 
2) Regional Military Commanders are independent from local military units. 
3) The Military reserve now follows the Ministry of Defense and no longer the President. 
4) Military divisons are now based on tasks and each have designated weapons (Yes, it was a mess!).
5) The Military will be composed of seven commands based on geographical divisions. However these commands will be labeled numerically rather than regionally. (Note Hadi's Southern Mentality: after independence from British Colonialism, Southerners referred to governorates by numbers rather than by their traditional names).

The seven regional divisions are as follows: Regional Division 1 (Sayoun), Regional Division 2 (Al-Mukalla), Regional Division 3 (Marib), Regional Division 4 (Aden), Regional Division 5 (Al- Hodaydah), Regional Division 6 ('Amran), and finally Regional Division 7 (Dhamar). 

The New Power Struggle 

The main distribution of military power reveals three key players. First, it is important to note that Saleh's power is not entirely gone as he did rule the country for 33 years.Thus, one of the key players is (what is left of) his regime. Out of the new seven military commands, Saleh's allies still have two.

The two other key players are relatively new: in the North there is Ali Mohsen and Al-Islah and in the South there is Hadi. 

In the North, Ali Mohsen came out on top while Al-Ahmar's family, still belonging to Islah, did not really get what they want. Colonel Hashem Al-Ahmar was sent away as part of Saleh's men to Saudi Arabia to hold the position of Defense Attaché. Carefully, Islah is strengthening its relationship with Ali Mohsen. Under Mohsen's direct influence are Major General Al-Sawmali, First Regional Military Commander (Region Sayoun), Major General Al-Maqdashi, Sixth Regional Military Commander (Region 'Amran), and Brigadier General Shamiri, Commander of the 27th Mechanized Brigade. Islah's most influence is on Brigadier General Muthana, Seventh Regional Military Commander (Region Dhamar). The combined Northern powers control almost half of the seven military commands. 

As for the South, Hadi distributed a generous amount of positions for people who were once members of the former YSP. Recalling Al-Toghmah and Al-Zomrah YSP divisons, one might be pleasantly surprised to know that Hadi, a Zomrah himself, appointed 13 Al-Toghmah members. Some might, wrongfully, consider it a peace offering to the Southern Hirak. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Those specific Toghmah individuals abandoned their former allies and are now loyal to Hadi. Furthermore, all of the Toghmah individuals were secondary commanders to begin with. 

Not to mention that Hadi is using a familiar tactic. Saleh previously appointed people from his town/village in important positions and now Hadi is following suit. Take Major General Mhanaf, the new Chief of the Intelligence Bureau; he replaced the Southern Al-Yafi'i, mainly because Mhanaf is from the same part of Abbyan as Hadi. Not to mention that the New Minister of Defense, Brigadier General Hujairi, and the Assistant Secretary of Denfense for Human Resources, Major General Ben Fareed, are all Hadi's men. Assertively, Hadi positioned his authority as the new kid on the block. The new military is in the hands of Mohsen and Islah in the North and Hadi in the South. 

Farewell Saleh? 

Every time we begin to forget former President Saleh's name, a news article here or there reminds us of his presence. Whether is it news over his health, an opening of a "Saleh museum", or delivering a speech about freedom, he somehow reappears. Saleh would have been forgotten a lot quicker if it wasn't for his carefully formulated central authority. He spent years positioning those who are near and dear to him in powerful positions.  Just when Yemenis were giving up hope, President Hadi decided to play scramble with his men. Hadi, diplomatically, gave them ambassadorial and consular positions. 

In a twist of fate, this move, applied on Saleh's allies, was utilized by Saleh himself. For years, he sent individuals inconvenient to his authority into the foreign service program. For instance he sent  the three following men to Washington DC as Ambassadors: Yehya Al-Mutawakkil, Mohammed Al-Eryani and Mohsen Al-'Aini. Now, it is Hadi's time. 

Hadi began with Ahmed Ali Saleh, previously expected to inherit Yemen's presidency. Saleh the son will settle for the position of Ambassador in the United Arab Emirates. There, he can join other members of his family who settled in Abu Dhabi over the past two years. He is guaranteed to live in luxury and to relax for the rest of his diplomatic career.  As for the rest of Saleh's family and allies, they were appointed as Defense Attachés to the following countries: Qatar, Egypt, Germany, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia. 

The Rise of Ali Mohsen

Major General Ali Mohsen is from the same city as Saleh, Sanhan. Ali Mohsen served as Saleh's right hand man for decades as the president's Chief Military Advisor. Some called him "the second most powerful man in Yemen" and others who knew him more closely called him "the most powerful man in Yemen". In December of 2012, some thought that Mohsen's glory was coming to an end since his First Armoured Division was terminated. However, in April 2013, and according to Hadi's decree, Mohsen is once more a presidential Military Advisor. 

The rise of Ali Mohsen was expected, and in fact slower than anticipated. Ali Mohsen's defection in March of 2011 from Saleh was the catalyst that encouraged 
those who were loyal to the former president to oppose him publicly. Mohsen abandoned his life long friend after rumored disagreements on Ahmed Ali Saleh's (Saleh's oldest son) growing influence in Yemen. In this power struggle, Mohsen came out on top. Shortly after Mohsen declaration of "supporting and protecting the revolutionaries" Islah welcomed Mohsen as a freedom fighter, forgiving all his past sins. On the other hand, independent revolutionaries considered his role in the revolution as a clear indication that Yemen's revolution was hijacked and doomed. Realistically, it would be near impossible to dispose of Mohsen. His influence couldn't be shaken and now he is part of the new system. So today, we have the "March 21st Garden" in Mathbah (Sana'a) as a park for Yemenis in place of Mohsen's former First Armor Division. 

Secession for South Yemen would Lead to Catastrophe

Article Published in The National, you can read it here.


Yemen's "national dialogue" finally began one week ago today, after several deferrals. The agenda is dominated by the "southern issue", the question of southern secession.

The Southern Movement, commonly referred to as Hirak, is already expressing its dissatisfaction with the dialogue. Hirak has 85 seats in the dialogue assembly, but several factions within the movement said in a joint statement on March 21 that those 85 representatives do not properly delineate Hirak's demands.

Any scenario other than full Hirak participation in the talks will threaten the nation's security and will ultimately cost many Yemenis their lives. The national dialogue will be squandered if Hirak's entire leadership is not on board.

Last month alone the government reported four deaths due to clashes between the Hirak and local authorities in the South.

On February 23 the president, Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi - originally from Dhakeen, a southern village - made his first visit to Aden, to acknowledge Hirak's grievances.

After the 1994 civil war, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh consistently overlooked the concerns of the South, as a form of revenge. There was talk of secession even then, and the movement gained momentum from 2007 to 2011, but was never unified enough to pose a real threat to Yemen's unity.

But now Hirak's fragmented leadership is a problem for national unity: if the factions cannot speak and act together, the dialogue will dissolve and chaos will follow.

Secession would not provide Hirak's divided factions with the independence they seek; rather, it would result in the creation of several weak regional regimes, in constant conflict with each other.

Yemen's government should have addressed legitimate southern concerns long ago. Now the issue will not be settled easily or quickly.

The present weak agreement among Hirak factions is the product of an interim alliance. The only thing uniting all of them is their common goal of secession, and their common enemy, the central government. Hirak members consider the South to be under occupation.

The southern proverb "he removes an onion, and grows garlic" refers to an apparent change that actually yields the same results. Southern power struggles have persisted through deceptive leadership changes, and this pattern is a good indicator of what the future would hold after secession.

The South has been divided since the days of the British occupation, which saw power struggles in Hadhramout, Abyan and Lahj. These internal rivalries continued after independence in 1967.

Over the next two decades, the South, as its own state, cycled through six presidents. Some transfers were peaceful while others were bloody, but all of them, while disguised as ideological or political, were driven by tribal politics and personal ambition.

In June 1969, a peaceful coup led to the removal of military leaders but also changed the regional balance of high-office-holders. And in January 1986, when internal "ideological" divisions occurred within Yemen's Socialist Party (YSP), several regions associated with the losing faction suffered losses; other regions gained influence based on their tribal loyalties.

These divisions still exist. Most current Hirak leaders were members of the YSP in the old southern People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. For these men the YSP served as a vehicle to power, and now Hirak does the same thing.

Personal conflicts still boil under the surface, damaging Hirak's leadership. No one in Hirak is capable of producing a transitional plan that can win wide support.

If secession occurs and the northern government is out of the way, a few southern leaders would opt for the creation of smaller political units, rather than consolidating the South.

Individuals such as the southern Islamist leader Tariq Al Fadhli would hope to restore their former reigns. For them, secession would be a golden opportunity.

Some within Hirak openly yearn for a return to "the old days", while others are still speaking in vague terms.

It is only a matter of time before individuals from powerful families claim authority based on their genealogy, especially if they manage to secede.

Beyond the old sultanates, there are some who would prefer a tribal emirate, another form of dynasty. And in the past few years, political Islam has gained momentum. Those who identify the most with their religious ideology are likely to demand the creation of Islamic caliphates or strict implementation of Islamic Shariah.

With a central government out of the picture, AQAP and Ansar Al Shariah could grip parts of the South.

The southern population is culturally diverse. New villages have sprung up, and older ones have expanded. Distinct identities do not exist anymore. But there are many who want distinct areas to control.

Taken together, all this means that after secession the South would have several inefficient micro-states, some of them strongly divided by prejudice and class distinctions.

Mr Hadi's government may still convince the remainder of southern Hirak to join the dialogue. Given the flexible nature of the talks, more seats can be assigned to other Hirak factions. But at the same time all elements of Hirak must consider their options and participate in the dialogue if they truly seek genuine "liberation".

For the South's sake, Hirak must submit to the dialogue and reach a settlement. The idea that secession will solve the South's problems is nothing but an illusion maintained by a few who seek power for themselves.

Secession would bring catastrophe. Participating in the national dialogue guarantees nothing, but it is the best alternative.




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The Southern Hirak (2007-2013)

Part 2

By 2013, the Southern Hirak became a movement that no one can ignore, even though the government was trying to do just that. Lives were lost before President Hadi went to visit the South (where he is originally from); his first visit since assuming the presidency. As of February 26, 2013, the majority of Hirak leaders are refusing to participate in the national dialogue which is only a few weeks away.

Image via Hona Hadhramout

The expanding movement in the South first used the title, Al Hirak Al Janoubi Al Silmi (Peaceful Southern Movement), in 2007. Then it was a simple movement with a distinct leadership. Presently, the Southern Hirak has too many leaders to keep track of; however, two main figures stand out; Ali Al-Beidh and Hassan Ba'oum. Ali Salim Al-Beidh is the main leader of Hirak residing outside of Yemen, and Hassan Ba'oum, Mohammed Ali Ahmed, and Nasser Al-Noubah are the main figures inside of Yemen. The problem is that these leaders do not see eye to eye. They all consider themselves the founders of the movement but the truth is some were there before others. 

Also, the leaders inside of Yemen seem a lot more legitimate since the majority of the Hirak leaders outside of Yemen were highly influential in the PDRY and in ROY (Republic of Yemen) until the Civil War of 1994. As though their interest in Hirak is aimed at restoring their glory. 

Much like the Yemeni Revolution of 2011, the Southern Hirak movement is mobilizing the youth. Ironically, none of the principal leaders are actually from that age group. 

In line with the obvious Southern discord, Southern Hirak is not the only group claiming to defend the "Southern Cause". Over the past few years, many new factions were created or evolved from previous movements. 

The problem is that many people can use the term Southern Hirak. While some maintain their peaceful standpoint, there are many radicals who are waiting for the right time to start an armed conflict. 

To understand the diversity of Hirak, one must understand that its members adhere to a wide range convections. At one end are the radicals (which includes the militants) and the other end are the moderates. The radicals are exclusivists; meaning that they reject any person with a Northern last name even if they lived in the South for decades, fought alongside the Southerners or called the South their home. As a matter of fact, some of the Northerners in the South are thought to have been spies and part of Sana'a's regime in the South. They would not accept to engage in dialogue at any cost because secession is the only viable option. In this category, the individuals are dogmatists who view the South under the full occupation of an authoritarian Northern rule. They would like to call the South of Yemen Al Janoub Al-'Arabi (The Arabian South), completely rejecting a Yemeni identity.

Within this radical branch of Hirak are several operating militias (it is also worth noting that the South is witnessing an increase in militias not affiliated with Hirak or the Southern Movement). Keeping in mind that the more radical the group, the bigger the conspiracy theory and the greater the need for armed resistance. 

At the other end of this spectrum are the moderates, who are willing to engage in dialogue. Many of them realized that the South witnessed a dramatic transformation since unity was established. Their life-styles changed, literally, over-night and only got worse after 1994. With Saleh gone, these moderates understand that some Northerners are living in the same appalling conditions as the Southerners, but they fear that South will continue to be ignored. 

The majority of the Southerners identify somewhere between these two divergent views. The Southern Hirak is becoming their cause and the more the world dismisses their grievances and the Yemeni government delays reconciliation, the worse it becomes. 

Threatened Unity: Understanding the Southern Hirak

Part 1

Image via Islamopediaonline

The Southern Movement (Al Hirak Al Janoubi) is frequently explained as a Southern separatist movement that started after Yemen's Civil War of 1994 and reinforced in 2007 when the Assembly of the People of Radfan (Jam'iyat Abna'a Radfan) proposed unifying a number of southern separatist movements to strengthen their unified goal of secession. Today, the Southern Movement is a term that fuses heterogeneous Southern factions by their intent to secede. 

The Southern Hirak members believe that they are the victims of a Northern conspiracy since the second half of the 1960s. Although the southern secessioners present their argument as an accumulation of frustrations from the past, in reality, it is a reaction to Yemen's Civil War of 1994. History reveals that many Yemenis, in the North and the South, dreamed about unity prior 1990. Songs from 1977 reveal that Yemenis coveted unity for generations. Song writer Abdulrahman Mouraid wrote;

The ancestors dream, today became certain                         حلم الجدود اليوم اصبح مؤكد
Unity, Hurray and a thousand welcome                                بالوحدة ياهلا وألف سهلا

The Southern Movement is nothing but a consequence of a faulty unification. Saleh's implemented unity became the antithesis of the unity that Yemenis longed for; instead of bringing Yemenis together, it segregated them. Since Yemen's revolution of 2011, this movement has gained momentum, however, experts are reluctant to discuss its impact on Yemen's National Dialogue that is set to take place on March 18, 2013. 

Taking a Closer Look: 
Generally, when we refer to the Southern Hirak, we mean the governorates that belonged to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Many of those in the West assume that the Hirak (or demands for secession) is a recent phenomenon in Yemen that intensified with the Arab Spring. Unlike many of the Arab Spring countries, the idea of secession in the South of Yemen couldn't handle four years of unity. 

In the diagram below, I trace the most important movements that shaped the Southern Hirak as we know it today. 

As you see, the demands of the Southerners weren't born in a vacuum. Over time, the demands of these separatists evolved and they eventually claimed that they are "occupied" by the North. They protested the "Yemeni identity" as one that was forced on them. 

The year of 2006 was a pivotal year in the Southern Hirak movement. That year, a Southern man named Shamlan ran for presidency against Saleh and lost by a wide margin. Perhaps the Southerners understood that Saleh wasn't planning on changing anything soon. Saleh, being a savvy politician, picked up on that and tactfully made a spectacle of assigning a special committee to investigate the problem of the Southern lands. 

After the Civil War of 1994, some elites and officials treated the South as part of their spoils of victory. For example, prime real estate was confiscated and divided amongst them. Only in 2007, a committee made up of six people including notable members Yehya Al-Shuaibi, Saleh Ba'sourah, and Abdul Qadir Hilal concluded that at least 56 officials own illegal properties in the South. Saleh made sure to publicize that the investigation was taking place, but when he received the 500 page report, it was inexplicably disregarded. 

In Part 2: Understanding the Southern Hirak from 2007- 2013