Showing posts with label Yemen's military. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Yemen's military. Show all posts

Sunday, April 14, 2013

Hadi’s Gamble: Yemen’s Military Restructuring and its Impact on the Future

My latest Op-Ed for The National

On April 10, Yemen's President Abdrabu Mansur Hadi boldly issued a decree to restructure the nation's military. The most notable achievements of this decree was dismantling former president Ali Abdullah Saleh's grip on the military by sending many of his relatives abroad as diplomats.

The decision reinforced Mr Hadi's previous military decrees to abolish the First Armoured Division led by Gen Ali Mohsen Al Ahmar, and the Republican Guard, led by Mr Saleh's eldest son, Ahmed. These two units stirred the most controversy.

Still, the decree is a major gamble by Mr Hadi, who is looking to ease the tensions that have paralysed Yemen for the past two years. This move is aimed to define the function of the new military, but it will likely increase tensions in the long run rather than solve them.

The military structure is made up of three different powers: From the north, Gen Mohsen, who defected from the former regime, was named the chief military adviser to the president. As such, he will have major influence on the military. Together with the Islah party the main opposition party in Yemen, they control almost half of the military.

Mr Hadi, who hails from the south, controls the second large portion of the country's forces. The last component of the military belongs to the remnants of Mr Saleh's regime.

Based on these divisions, it is apparent that the military wasn't able to shake off former tribal influences, which leads to the conclusion that three main struggles are likely to arise due to geographical and ideological differences.

First, the northern powers of Gen Mohsen and Islah could threaten the Houthis, who control a largely autonomous area on the border with Saudi Arabia. Second, the southern powers of Mr Hadi could try to curb Hirak's separatist influence in the south. But th real struggle will manifest within the military, between the components as they strive for power and dominance.

In the past decade, the Yemeni government has fought an on­again, off­again guerrilla war against the Houthis, a Shia revivalist group. All of the six wars were spearheaded by Gen Mohsen under Saleh's regime. But, once Mr Saleh agreed to step down in late 2011, the conflict took on more of a sectarian character, as the Houthis increasingly clashed with tribal and religious militias linked Islah. These two strands of anti­Houthi resistance are now coming together.

Gen Mohsen may have lost his armoured division, but he remains a key military figure in the new order. More importantly, two of hi allies have been named regional commanders in the areas bordering the Houthis' stronghold in the north. As expected, the Houthi have marched against Mr Hadi's military reshuffling, believing that their enemies are looking to surround them and destroy them.

The threat to the Houthis is highly dangerous, particularly since the Houthis tend to lash out whenever they feel cornered. 


In the south, the rest of the military will be occupied with a different conflict. The leadership of Hirak, the southern movement pushin for secession, has refused to join the National Dialogue which is now underway. Almost all of the south's leadership, including Mr Hadi himself, belonged at some point to Yemen's Socialist Party.

Today, these leaders are divided between those who support the president, and in turn unity, and those who do not. Personal vendettas and long-standing feuds still colour much of the interaction in the south.

Two scenarios are possible: First, as is the case in the past, mysterious assassinations could begin between these opposing forces. Or, the conflict could morph into several regional conflicts.

Ultimately, the lives of separatists will be in danger. The military will always support the home region of the president, Abyan, and Islahis will not hesitate to involve their militias and their hold on the military to gain control over southern territories.

Yet the most important struggle will be the one within the military itself. The two dominating powers of the military, Gen Mohsen and Islah on the one hand and Mr Hadi's forces on the other, could easily result in a typical north-south regional schism. But it could also take on a more ideological flavour between those aligned with Islah and those who oppose the conservative religious party. Islah is looking to rule and Mr Hadi, at some point, will have to seriously consider joining forces with them.

That leaves Mr Saleh's allies, the vulnerable component of the military, to seek new alliances outside of the military. It is likely that they will collaborate with the Houthis and Hirak.

The new military decree suggests that Mr Hadi is unlikely to step down in 2014, or even 2016 for that matter. Through the military, Mr Hadi is finally establishing his authority and if he leaves in the near future, the balance of power in Yemen will be skewed. Yemenis will continue to battle over political, ideological and regional influence.

The military restructuring doesn't solve Yemen's infighting. Rather, it could exacerbate it at a time when the country has more pressing issues. Within this military reshuffle are the seeds of years of future conflicts.

Friday, April 12, 2013

Military Restructuring in Yemen: Exploring Transformation

President Hadi's decree no. 16 for 2013 on military restructuring has been dubbed "historical" and "unprecedented". It was welcomed by most media outlets. On Yemen's ground, the news received mixed reviews: those who protest Saleh's immunity are upset that these appointments "reward criminals", while those who are skeptical of the transitional period are relieved to see many of Saleh's men transferred outside of the country. It is a chance for stability. Like Yemenis say, Le Kol Hadethen Hadeeth, For each occasion its own conversation.  So, in today's post, Yemeniaty examines the focal points of the new appointments and whether it is really historical. 

The New Military 

The previous chart reveals the new power distribution based on governorates/region. The regions colored in white didn't gain any influence. Conversations on military restructuring can prove confusing; however, one must remember these key points: 

1) Mohsen's First Armor Division and Saleh's Republican Guard are dissolved. 
2) Regional Military Commanders are independent from local military units. 
3) The Military reserve now follows the Ministry of Defense and no longer the President. 
4) Military divisons are now based on tasks and each have designated weapons (Yes, it was a mess!).
5) The Military will be composed of seven commands based on geographical divisions. However these commands will be labeled numerically rather than regionally. (Note Hadi's Southern Mentality: after independence from British Colonialism, Southerners referred to governorates by numbers rather than by their traditional names).

The seven regional divisions are as follows: Regional Division 1 (Sayoun), Regional Division 2 (Al-Mukalla), Regional Division 3 (Marib), Regional Division 4 (Aden), Regional Division 5 (Al- Hodaydah), Regional Division 6 ('Amran), and finally Regional Division 7 (Dhamar). 

The New Power Struggle 

The main distribution of military power reveals three key players. First, it is important to note that Saleh's power is not entirely gone as he did rule the country for 33 years.Thus, one of the key players is (what is left of) his regime. Out of the new seven military commands, Saleh's allies still have two.

The two other key players are relatively new: in the North there is Ali Mohsen and Al-Islah and in the South there is Hadi. 
In the North, Ali Mohsen came out on top while Al-Ahmar's family, still belonging to Islah, did not really get what they want. Colonel Hashem Al-Ahmar was sent away as part of Saleh's men to Saudi Arabia to hold the position of Defense Attaché. Carefully, Islah is strengthening its relationship with Ali Mohsen. Under Mohsen's direct influence are Major General Al-Sawmali, First Regional Military Commander (Region Sayoun), Major General Al-Maqdashi, Sixth Regional Military Commander (Region 'Amran), and Brigadier General Shamiri, Commander of the 27th Mechanized Brigade. Islah's most influence is on Brigadier General Muthana, Seventh Regional Military Commander (Region Dhamar). The combined Northern powers control almost half of the seven military commands. 

As for the South, Hadi distributed a generous amount of positions for people who were once members of the former YSP. Recalling Al-Toghmah and Al-Zomrah YSP divisons, one might be pleasantly surprised to know that Hadi, a Zomrah himself, appointed 13 Al-Toghmah members. Some might, wrongfully, consider it a peace offering to the Southern Hirak. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Those specific Toghmah individuals abandoned their former allies and are now loyal to Hadi. Furthermore, all of the Toghmah individuals were secondary commanders to begin with. 

Not to mention that Hadi is using a familiar tactic. Saleh previously appointed people from his town/village in important positions and now Hadi is following suit. Take Major General Mhanaf, the new Chief of the Intelligence Bureau; he replaced the Southern Al-Yafi'i, mainly because Mhanaf is from the same part of Abbyan as Hadi. Not to mention that the New Minister of Defense, Brigadier General Hujairi, and the Assistant Secretary of Denfense for Human Resources, Major General Ben Fareed, are all Hadi's men. Assertively, Hadi positioned his authority as the new kid on the block. The new military is in the hands of Mohsen and Islah in the North and Hadi in the South. 

Farewell Saleh? 

Every time we begin to forget former President Saleh's name, a news article here or there reminds us of his presence. Whether is it news over his health, an opening of a "Saleh museum", or delivering a speech about freedom, he somehow reappears. Saleh would have been forgotten a lot quicker if it wasn't for his carefully formulated central authority. He spent years positioning those who are near and dear to him in powerful positions.  Just when Yemenis were giving up hope, President Hadi decided to play scramble with his men. Hadi, diplomatically, gave them ambassadorial and consular positions. 

In a twist of fate, this move, applied on Saleh's allies, was utilized by Saleh himself. For years, he sent individuals inconvenient to his authority into the foreign service program. For instance he sent  the three following men to Washington DC as Ambassadors: Yehya Al-Mutawakkil, Mohammed Al-Eryani and Mohsen Al-'Aini. Now, it is Hadi's time. 

Hadi began with Ahmed Ali Saleh, previously expected to inherit Yemen's presidency. Saleh the son will settle for the position of Ambassador in the United Arab Emirates. There, he can join other members of his family who settled in Abu Dhabi over the past two years. He is guaranteed to live in luxury and to relax for the rest of his diplomatic career.  As for the rest of Saleh's family and allies, they were appointed as Defense Attachés to the following countries: Qatar, Egypt, Germany, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia. 

The Rise of Ali Mohsen

Major General Ali Mohsen is from the same city as Saleh, Sanhan. Ali Mohsen served as Saleh's right hand man for decades as the president's Chief Military Advisor. Some called him "the second most powerful man in Yemen" and others who knew him more closely called him "the most powerful man in Yemen". In December of 2012, some thought that Mohsen's glory was coming to an end since his First Armoured Division was terminated. However, in April 2013, and according to Hadi's decree, Mohsen is once more a presidential Military Advisor. 

The rise of Ali Mohsen was expected, and in fact slower than anticipated. Ali Mohsen's defection in March of 2011 from Saleh was the catalyst that encouraged 
those who were loyal to the former president to oppose him publicly. Mohsen abandoned his life long friend after rumored disagreements on Ahmed Ali Saleh's (Saleh's oldest son) growing influence in Yemen. In this power struggle, Mohsen came out on top. Shortly after Mohsen declaration of "supporting and protecting the revolutionaries" Islah welcomed Mohsen as a freedom fighter, forgiving all his past sins. On the other hand, independent revolutionaries considered his role in the revolution as a clear indication that Yemen's revolution was hijacked and doomed. Realistically, it would be near impossible to dispose of Mohsen. His influence couldn't be shaken and now he is part of the new system. So today, we have the "March 21st Garden" in Mathbah (Sana'a) as a park for Yemenis in place of Mohsen's former First Armor Division. 

Thursday, January 24, 2013

Yemen’s National Dialogue: The Country’s Critical Test for Stability

My latest piece published on Fikra Forum, January 17, 2013. 

On November 23, 2011, Yemen’s revolution subsided with an agreement brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), enacting a two-year transitional government led by President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi. According to this agreement, a national dialogue is scheduled to take place by the end of February or the beginning of March to decide the formation of the new government and its constitution. However, the transition appears to be dawdling, causing many Yemenis to lose faith. Delays can be attributed to Yemen’s complex ethnic and tribal affiliations and interests, a deteriorating security situation, and Hadi's meticulous oversight, with a careful intent to avoid aggressive backlash and to maintain the nation's stability. Nevertheless, the national dialogue is progressing, the success of which will be critical in determining the future stability of the country.

Planning the National Dialogue

In July 2012, a technical committee was chosen to determine the overall nature and logistics of the dialogue. From August to December 2012, the technical committee, led by Yemen’s former Prime Minister, Dr. Abdulkarim al-Eryani, held 65 meetings, each followed by a press release and updates to the official Facebook page. The committee concluded its meetings with a report that was presented to President Hadi.

As a result of the technical committee’s report, the dialogue will have a total of 565 members. Around 40% of these seats are designated to political parties (not including new parties), while 35 seats are dedicated to Houthis, and 85 to Hirak Southern Separatist Movement members. The political parties must select their delegates according to the following stipulations: 50% of their seats must be assigned to people from the South of Yemen, 30% to women, and 23% to the youth. Furthermore, 160 seats are allocated to non-partisan groups: 40 for independent youth, 40 for independent women, and 80 for civil society organizations (2 members from each organization). Each category will be selected by seven technical committee members. The deadline for non-partisan applications is January 19. Overall, the aim of the committee is to host a dialogue that will be equally divided between Northern and Southern Yemenis.

Complicating matters further, the final list of the national dialogue attendees must include Yemen's tribal leaders, jurists, religious minorities, businessmen and women, young or new political parties, and those with special needs. The selection process for these groups remains unclear, though President Hadi has the right to nominate these individuals or create a special committee that will select them.

The moderator of the dialogue is still undecided, but two options are available. Either the president and the technical committee will appoint a person, or the national dialogue members will recommend individuals and vote. The national dialogue will most likely be held in Sana, however, the technical committee agreed that if security permits, other meetings should be held in Aden. Working teams will also operate in the following cities: Aden, Taizz, al-Mukalla, Sadah, and al-Hudaydah.

The national dialogue budget is 7.7 billion rials, none of which is provided by the Yemeni government. The technical committee’s report concludes that a portion of the budget will provide transportation, housing, and food during the expected dialogue period of six months. Finally, a special television channel and radio will be dedicated to broadcasting all of the national dialogue events. While the money has been pledged to Yemen by GCC countries, it has yet to be received, revealing the GCC’s lack of confidence in Yemen’s decision-making.

What to expect

A recent meeting on January 14 between President Hadi and those involved in the transitional phase (the national dialogue technical committee, political figures, and ten foreign ambassadors) is revealing as to the intricacy of Yemen’s current situation. Though the dialogue is supposedly “national,” international agencies and actors are heavily involved in supervision. The Houthi representative, Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, refused to attend the meeting because the U.S. Ambassador was present. This is an indicator of what could happen during the dialogue if international actors attempt to partake rather than observe.

All Yemenis, regardless of their political opinions, must be represented in this dialogue; otherwise, the dialogue will fail and the country will be paralyzed. So far, the Southern Hirak has not released their party list and independent applicants from the South are hesitant to apply, seemingly discouraged to join. Recently, in a first step toward transitional and restorative justice, Hadi assigned two committees to address land disputes and forcible job expulsions that occurred in Yemen’s southern provinces of following the 1994 civil war. If this effort fails, the southerners will continue to feel persecuted and will demand secession.

The deteriorating security condition in Yemen makes it nearly impossible for the national dialogue to operate in various cities. Even in Sana, there are major security concerns. On December 22, 2012, three westerners were kidnapped in the heart of Sana and have yet to be released. Earlier this week, an AQAP cell was discovered in the capital. Aware of these security challenges, the technical committee, now called the preparatory committee, has dedicated a portion of the national dialogue budget toward special security.

Other important issues relating to security remain unanswered. Currently, a committee has been tasked with restructuring Yemen's Ministry of Interior. The goal is to mimic the structure of Jordan's Ministry of Interior, but the transformation will not be easy. In the next month, President Hadi is expected to announce the names of the commanders assigned to the seven armed forces that were newly reformed through his December 19 decree calling for the restructuring of the military. As long as this effort remains unrealized, security will be a constant threat to Yemen's successful transition.

Following President Hadi’s decree, many wonder what will happen to Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, former leader of the First Armored Division. Mohsen, though demoted, remains an influential military figure, and may participate as an advisor to the tribal members of the dialogue. Meanwhile, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh is still considered the president of the General People’s Congress (GPC) party, though he is sick and needs medical treatment. The national dialogue technical committee did not specify any restrictions against Saleh’s attendance, but if Saleh decides to attend, the majority of participants will withdraw, ruining any real chance of dialogue.

The remaining influential figures worth noting are Hamid al-Ahmar, a businessman and leader of the Islah party, and Abdulkader Hilal, mayor of Sana. Al-Ahmar is a powerful man, with many loyalties among the Salafis, and even jihadis. He will likely attend the dialogue and he might even run for presidency int 2014. Hilal has also been rumored to be a presidential candidate. Like Mohsen and Saleh, he is from Sanhan, and he is a military man. On December 12, 2012, he successfully led a clean up campaign called “Sharik” to fix Sana’s streets, winning him much public acclaim.

The role of the U.S.

The U.S. government’s policy toward Yemen has been primarily concerned with counterterrorism. The American Ambassador in Yemen has been criticized in the past for not listening to the demands of the Yemeni people.  Yet, the ambassador meets with Hadi, Mohsen and al-Ahmar regularly. As previously mentioned, the Houthis are not happy with the presence of the U.S. Ambassador in national meetings. Therefore, during the dialogue, it is best that the international community observes and advises the national dialogue rather than partake in it.

Over the past two years, the increase in drone attacks has led directly to an increase in anti-American sentiment. For the first time in Yemen, the average Yemeni citizen views America as an adversary rather than a friend. However, cooperation between the Yemeni government and the U.S. is at an all-time high. This is mainly due to the fact that the U.S. and the international community are at the backbone of Hadi's strength in Yemen.

The best strategy toward tackling this newfound hostility is to adopt a different policy in Yemen, one that is not solely based on counterterrorism, and to listen to the demands of the Yemeni people. Furthermore, public recognition of the progress toward peaceful transition in Yemen will show support and encourage other non-violent transformations.
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