Praising Yemen’s Transition as a Good Model Misses Facts

Soldiers Patrol a Street in Sana'a. Photo by Yahya Arhab/EPA

The National 

Sama’a Al Hamdani

February 26, 2014 

Last week, Yemenis simultaneously celebrated and protested to mark the third anniversary of the 2011 revolution. The country was then on the brink, but today it is applauded for having completed a “peaceful” transition. It is popularly portrayed as having undergone an ideal shift from dictatorship to democracy. The realities on the ground, however, tell a much different story. Whether the focus is on the nation’s extreme failures or exaggerated success, most of the narratives on Yemen are based on false assumptions. 

Many of the actual atrocities happening in Yemen are untold, and thousands traumatised by violence continue to tolerate severe injustices. Since August, Yemenis have stomached a whirlwind of new disasters seemingly synchronised with water and electricity outages. New sources of turmoil are materialising far more traumatic than bombs and the occasional exchange of gunfire.

During the revolution, Sanaa was divided into boroughs controlled by three main tribal figures who filled the void left by a fractured system of governance on the verge of dissolution. As a result of the transition’s mismanagement, the balance of power has shifted: other new players are successfully contesting state power.

In one month, a military hospital was targeted by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, killing 52. Most of these individuals were civilian doctors and patients. In that time, a drone strike attacked a wedding convoy killing 17, three political figures were executed, prominent scholars have been threatened for their rhetoric, a liquefied natural gas site was attacked with rocket-propelled explosives, an influential Southern sheikh was gunned down at a military checkpoint, a car bomb exploded in the heart of Sanaa, and artillery shells hit a funeral for a Southern separatist in Ad-Dhale province.

Yemen is witnessing a deterioration of its already fragile social fabric, compounded by a breakdown of tribal norms. Foreigners are no longer the sole targets of kidnapping: children of notable businessmen are abducted, members of the national dialogue are held hostage and, more recently, women from prominent families are snatched to shame men.

Most governmental operations are interrupted, and airports and seaports are subject to random shutdowns due to protests.

In the “democratic model” that has become Yemen, everyday life comes with a penalty.

In light of the clear absence of rule of law and the lack of accountability, Yemen has become the perfect realisation of Immanuel Kant’s “State of Barbarism”, a country managed and run by several guerrilla groups and individual leaders under the cover of government.

The message being sent, and understood, is that human life is cheap and victims are mere numbers. At any moment, anyone can be caught in a gun battle, and be considered collateral damage and no one will be held accountable.

Today, Yemenis are divided by faith, geography, ethnicity, political ideology and tribal affiliation – but they collectively suffer from anxiety, irritability, insecurity and depression. Yemenis are being pushed to the limit. Their silence and tolerance is docile.

Thousands of unemployed youth are sleep deprived, seeking refuge in mindless hours of qat-chewing to numb the reality of everyday hardship. Many wonder who will be killed in the future, and whether the frequency of random mindless will allow them to see another day. These thoughts are kept private while Yemenis attempt to live as normally as possible.

Those able to leave the country often claim they can “finally just breathe” or that they were ignorant of the “burdens” they carry. These fears are destroying Yemen’s psyche, and citizens are using them as justification to seek other forms of security in the absence of the rule of law.

There is a clear contrast between the marketed achievements signed behind closed doors, and the realities on the ground. Between these false narratives and the population’s unique case of surrender, things will get a lot worse before they get better. With several separatist movements, the strongest in the South, and the war in the North over authority and religious ideology, the population is at high risk of radicalisation.

Those who fought for a peaceful civil state in 2011 may use violence to revive the state.

Throughout the transition, the international community endorsed theoretical solutions prematurely in the pursuit of democracy. The sanctions that the UN Security Council produced yesterday could be a gamble during this critical period. Rather than deterring figures who are impeding the political transition, Charter VI can further promote chaos and overshadow non-political grievances.

Yet, there is hope: the world must recognise that Yemenis have legitimate aspirations. Yemenis need to separate themselves from the despair lingering from previous failures, and believe in self-determination. The government must be pressured, nationally and internationally, into providing justice to those who were victimised.

Real solutions will only emerge when the realities on the ground are managed rather than provoked.

Sama’a Al Hamdani is a Yemeni researcher who lives in Washington DC and blogs at yemeniaty.com

Yemeni Artists Commemorate Victims of Suicide Attacks

Murad Subay paints graffiti depicting a grenade on a street in Sanaa, Jan. 9, 2014. The piece is part of a graffiti campaign against armed conflicts in Yemen. (photo by REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah)

Almonitor by Sama'a Al-Hamdani

Posted March 19, 2014

The majority of the world remains unaware of the terrorist attack that rocked Sana'a last Dec. 5, beginning at 9 a.m. It targeted the al-Ourthi military hospital, on the grounds of the Ministry of Defense. This heinous act left 56 people dead, the majority of them doctors, nurses and civilians. Thirty minutes after the attack, early footage of it was televised. Several hours and explosions later, news broke of Nelson Mandela's death, and the rest was forgotten to history. 

The next 24 hours were taxing. The public was left uninformed until the Supreme Security Committee (SSC) announced the findings of its investigation. It revealed that 12 suicide bombers, most of them Saudi nationals, had committed a “terrorist act,” wounding 215 on top of those killed. The government hastily attempted to assuage the unnerved masses. First, it televised a five-minute, edited video of the attack. The images, as one might expect, generated collective terror and panic. They also created enough backlash to halt future replays. Second, it declared a nationwide minute of silence. Sadly, silence has been the symbolic and literal response of the government ever since.

Several months later, and in light of the government’s seeming lack of concern, a group of young Yemeni artists decided to commemorate the victims by drawing their faces and names on the walls of the al-Ourthi hospital. They collected 31 photos and 55 names at their own initiative. Two victims were never conclusively identified. To this day, there is no official record list of the names of all the victims. According to the artists who spoke to Al-Monitor, the Ministry of Defense declined their request to paint at the site of the attack just a day before the scheduled event. “Victims are everywhere,” they were told.

Undeterred, on March 6, the volunteers found a new location for their concept, which they named the 8th Hour. “Due to the absence of memorials, the 8th Hour is a kind of protest,” Murad Subay, a graffiti artist, informed Al-Monitor. In 2013, he launched the 12 Hour Campaign, a project to show through illustrations 12 major obstacles, or “hours,” in the path of Yemenis. At the time, he did not anticipate that terrorism would be one of them.

After the Yemeni uprisings of 2011, the grip of the government on the state had continued to weaken. Exploiting the new state’s frailty, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) expanded its operations. Not only did the government fail to curb the group's influence, it repeatedly neglected to address the worries of the people.

On May 21, 2012, the first suicide bombing in Sanaa took place and was dubbed the Sabeen massacre. The assassin targeted a rehearsal for a military parade, wounding 167 and killing more than 86 soldiers, 50 of whom died instantly. President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi immediately fired two generals, but the government then failed to develop a follow-up mechanism. No officials publicly commented on the event. The president spoke to the people through a TV anchor.

The president’s response after the 2013 hospital attack was almost indistinguishable from the one in 2012. This time, however, his silence was perceived from the start as a lack of concern, especially because he was rumored to have been at the hospital during the time of the attack. The government's inaction gave a wide berth to conspiracy theories. To this day, some people believe the al-Ourthi attack was a mere extension of the Houthi-Salafi war in the north.

Independent journalist Mohammed al-Absi took matters into his own hands and dedicated laborious hours to collecting evidence, photographs and accounts of survival from al-Ourthi. His reporting revealed that the Counterterrorism Unit, which responded to the attack, had been unaware that suicide bombers had dispersed themselves throughout the building. Even though the unit used excessive force, including six hours of tank fire, in the hope of killing the last terrorist standing, Absi found that the last bomber killed himself at 4 a.m. the next day.

Some of the details in Absi's expose on the government's inadequacy conflicted with the SSC’s investigation. He reported that nine suicide bombers had committed the crime rather than the 12 cited by the SSC. An official AQAP statement eventually confirmed the number provided by Absi. Moreover, Absi indicated that the SSC report had misidentified three victims as terrorists, further highlighting problems with the government's fieldwork.

In the age of technology, the Sabeen and the al-Ourthi attacks were of course videotaped, leaving authorities little room to conceal their incompetence. In 2012, Mutee Dammaj, a member of Yemen’s Socialist Party, and several others demanded the creation of a telecast showcasing the humanitarian side of the deceased soldiers, Dammaj told Al-Monitor. Tawfeeq al-Sharabi, a national television filmmaker, ultimately produced a series on the lives of the deceased soldiers as recalled by their families. The show was canceled after one broadcast. A few months later, al-Sharabi quit his job.

In 2014, similar scenarios played out. While the government broadcast no more than a few minutes of al-Ourthi attack footage, Absi gathered 30 clips from 250 cameras available at the scene. He had hoped to produce a revealing documentary about the details of the attack, but, Absi told Al-Monitor, he was turned down by several channels due to a lack of funding or interest. He therefore uploaded the footage to YouTube as a preview of what he aspires to document.

The Yemeni government has still failed to generate a public response to terrorism aside from an aggressive drone policy. It has also shown little interest in exposing the operations of its declared enemy. Worst of all, the current government wasted significant leadership opportunities by simply relinquishing responsibility during such a critical period.

While the public remains ignorant or passive in the face of the uncertainty engendered by terrorism, the apathy and incompetence displayed by the government has created a space for an earnest and dynamic group of civil activists to publicly dissect this paramount issue. Today, the task of remembering and honoring hundreds of wasted lives lies solely on the shoulders of the citizens. The 8th Hour is a glimpse of hope in a bleak reality. It is a positive sign that Yemenis are not ready to yield to terror and social chaos.

On Yemen and Terror with Gregory Johnsen

Gregory Johnsen, a native of Nebraska, wrote a book called The Last Refuge: Yemen, Al-Qaeda and America's War in Arabia. The book is divided into three main sections describing the presence of Yemenis in AlQaeda; first, in the war against the Soviets, followed by a phase of "Forgetting" then finally, the rise of a true Yemeni AlQaeda movement. The book just came out recently so it includes the developments that occurred during the Yemeni revolution. You can find the book here.

Johnsen writes the blog Waq-al-Waq and has spoken in various events as a leading expert on AlQaeda in Yemen. He also writes for Foreign Policy, the New York Times and  is a frequent contributor on NPR.  Furthermore, he is a PhD candidate at princeton university. 

In one of his many visits to DC, we spoke about Yemen:

Questions for Ambassador Barbara Bodine: What's next for Yemen?

These questions were directed to Ambassador Barbara Bodine following the NCUSAR event (read more about it below). The following day, on June 27, ambassador Bodine was one of the experts who signed a letter directed to president Barack Obama urging him to change US policy towards Yemen. You can read the letter here.

*Ambassador Bodine's Biography is attached at the end of the interview. 

Q. Ambassador Bodine, you have signed a letter addressed to President Obama on June 25, 2012 urging him to change US policy towards Yemen. Yemeni pessimists believe that this letter would not change anything. Do you believe that US policy will change towards Yemen if Obama remains as president? If in a few months former governor Romney wins the vote, will policy towards Yemen change? Also, the letter mentioned recommendations that suggested an increase in foreign aid however how would the US insure that the aid is going to the right place or people? 

I don’t think any of those involved with the letter believe that it will, in and of itself, change policy. It is not that simple.  Nor do we believe the views and recommendations are at great variance with the views and recommendations of some, at least, within the Administration. We do hope that by adding our voices to the debate we can help shape it over the long term. A second audience for the letter is also the American people who have a rather narrow view of US interests in, policy toward and options on Yemen, given the media’s tendency to cover only the most dramatic of events and security issue.

Policy toward Yemen has changed already over the past few years from almost entirely security-centric to security-dominated but clear efforts to broaden the scope.  The US is active in the Friends of Yemen and has significantly increased its economic and other assistance as evidenced by US Agency for International Development Administrator Shah’s recent visit. This increased assistance has however come at the same time as a sharp increase in the use of drones,  expanded authority on targeting  and other steps. The letter recommends that efforts toward recalibrating the focus and attention of US policy and programs be strengthened and expanded.

I would not presume to predict what further changes might be possible during the last months of or a second term for President Obama, which will be driven both by events on the ground and non-military resources available. Similarly, I could not presume to know what a President Romney might do.  Much may depend on his views on economic and governance assistance, development assistance and the use of diplomacy in the furtherance of US policy.

How assistance is programmed must be done in cooperation with the Yemeni government, concerned and appropriate NGOs, and other partner states and organizations. One assumption I do want to clarify – assistance is not a check presented to the government, any government. Assistance is done through programs, projects and activities. Regrettably, there will never be a level of assistance great enough to match Yemen’s needs and there will be places and issues that are underfunded if funded at all.  That is why working toward sustainable economy is  better goal.

Q. At the NCUSAR event, you emphasize the importance of using Aden's port as an international trade point. As a professor at Princeton University, you have worked with a group of students on a Development Plan for Greater Aden. This plan depends on stability. When do you think this plan will take place? who would be in charge of this effort? There are coordinations pending with the Aden Development Council, but when will the plan be public? 

The plan for Greater Aden was developed by a group of graduate students last year.  “Plan” may be too strong a word. It is more a proposal or an outline, not a blueprint or a timeline.  It does not including funding estimates, a critical element but beyond the scope of the students’ work.

Of course implementation depends on a level of stability, as well as Yemeni political will and international involvement, both donor and private sector. But just as development requires stability, stability requires development. The trick is how to advance on one in support of the other.  The proposal had no timelines but in sketching out a structure strongly recommends that the Yemeni government – both the central government and the Aden government in partnership – be in charge. It includes a structure provisionally called “The Aden Development Council” but I am not aware of any steps taken so far to establish the Council.  I would caution against the assumption that the students prepared a detailed blueprint ready for immediate implementation.

Q. You are a firm believer that Aden is capable of becoming an important economic center with a free zone. The port will gain benefit from the transportations to and from the Suez Canal with Bab-al-Mandab as a main source. Can you please elaborate more on this idea? Also, due to Aden's proximity to Africa, many of the refugees enter Yemen through Aden, how does the problem of refugees pose a threat to this project. Furthermore, is it possible that this port be hijacked by AQAP in the future if their strength proves to be more durable? Talking about spoilers, how do you make sure that corruption, which is prevalent in Yemen, does not take over this project? 

There are a lot of questions here.  The basis of the proposal refers back to Aden’s once pre-eminent position as a major shipping hub, a tradition that pre-dates the British in fact. The fundamentals remain, most significantly one of the best natural harbors in the world at an ideal location. Other advantages are land suitable for urban growth, the beginnings of a Free Zone, potential to handle containers, cargo and fuel, an existing airport and a large labor force.  The downsides are a lack of sustained and coordinated investment in infrastructure – the port, the free zone and the international airport; lack of a trained workforce; inadequate water and electricity and security.  While those downsides are significant, none are insurmountable.  Labor can be trained; water can be desalinated; electricity can be generated; and, security can be enhanced, for example through an expanded Yemeni Coast Guard.

There is the theoretical risk that AQAP could take over the port, but this development proposal is a long term effort. If AQAP threatens the port area, it could derail efforts at any stage, just as the 2000 attack on the USS Cole set back efforts to develop the port. That potential however need not stop detailed planning on what will be a long term, incremental and staged effort.

This is a proposal to do more than expand the current container port. The broader vision is the development proposal is for the greater Aden area.  If it were successful, if it were able to provide employment and economic stability, that would also help blunt the appeal of groups like AQAP.

Finally, this is a comprehensive proposal. It includes a look at governance issues, judicial frameworks and obviously the question of corruption. Corruption is not, regrettably unique to Yemen nor limited to Aden. A concerted plan to control corruption is needed more broadly in Yemen.  However, planning and initial steps toward comprehensive regional development need not wait, and could in fact help fuel governance reform. 

Q. "Yemen has a large number of workers however they are not skilled": in NCUSAR, you briefly mentioned that due to unemployment, it is easy to find employees who are willing to work, but they lack skills. How easy would it be to train them? how long will it take? 

Yemen has a large and underutilized work force that lacks many of the skills needed.  Training need not be lengthy or complicated, depending on the task required. One model used in a number of countries, both developing and developed, is a partnership among private sector investors, both Yemeni and international, and  training providers.  Brazil has been particularly successful at this.  Training of mid and upper level managers as well as skilled labor force is also needed.  While reform of the education system may be necessary and worthy, we do not need to start with current 5 year olds in creating a skilled workforce.  There are unemployed young Yemenis – some without basic skills, some with experience abroad, and some with higher education – all of whom can be trained in relatively short time to take on new tasks.  The key is be sure there is a link between the training provided and the skills needed.

Q. When expert Charles Schmitz mentioned that the US needs to pressure the Gulf and Saudi Arabia into accepting Yemeni laborers as a way to fix Yemen's economy and increase remittances, you shook your head briefly. Can you tell us why? what is the best way to improve Yemen's economy (some people can argue that because Yemen has the 2nd most growing population in the world, no matter how much the economy improves in Yemen, it will never be able to absorb all of the population)?

I do not think that it is realistic to depend on a return to the days of massive expatriate labor in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia to solve Yemen’s economic problems.   First, Yemen labor was critical to the construction of the Kingdom and the Gulf states, but the labor tended to be unskilled or semi-skilled. The labor requirements now a more sophisticated. Yemeni workers need the correct skill sets to be competitive.  Second, major projects in the Gulf states won by Chinese, Indian, Korean or other firms often include as part of the package the provision of labor, recruited by the company or a subcontractor, a broker, housed and managed by the same, and then returned to their country of origin when the project is complete. Finally, while I agree that any measure that relieves the unemployment pressures and increases the remittance levels in Yemen is good, remittances can create another form of “rentierism” – unearned and unproductive income.  While remittances do help raise the standard of living of family members and can drive the consumer goods sector, they are often not available or used to create productive infrastructure, enterprises and employment.  Thank back to Yemen’s own experience with the return of workers in the early 1990s.

Q. You mentioned briefly the importance of preventing a proxy war in Yemen between Saudi Arabia and Iran. To some, this war is already in play. How much worse can it get? Could this situation in any way be similar to the proxy war that occurred between Saudi Arabia and Egypt in Yemen? Is it possible that the US would support Saudi Arabia in this war considering that Iran is a common opponent? 

This has yet risen to the level of a proxy war commensurate with Saudi Arabia and Egypt in Yemen in the 1960s and do not think it helpful to theorize on what steps the US would take should the level of competition raise to that level. The first priority, however, would be the integrity and survival of Yemen as a state, as it was in 1994.

Q. What would you recommend be Yemen's main short-term, mid-term and long term goals? what should Yemen do about other non-terrorism or economy related needs like child marriages, famine, displacement, etc?

It is for the Yemeni government and Yemeni people to decide on short, medium and long term goals and how best to get there.  You have alluded to many goals I assume are widely shared just in the nature of your questions and the nature and goals of the uprising over the past 18 months – a stable, responsive and legitimate government, a sustainable economy and a reasonable level of personal and state security. Those are the goals of virtually any peoples in the world. The challenge is prioritization and sequencing…and patience that does not slip to passivity and commitment that does not slip to dogma.

Biography

The President announced on September 2, 1997 his intention to nominate Barbara K. Bodine, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen. She was confirmed on November 5, 1997.

After initial tours in Hong Kong and Bangkok, Ambassador Bodine has spent her career working primarily on Southwest Asia and the Arabian Peninsula. She has twice served in the Bureau of Near East Affairs' Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, first as Country Officer for the Yemenis, then as Political-Military officer for the peninsula. She later served as Deputy Office Director. Ambassador Bodine has also had assignments as Deputy Principal Officer in Baghdad, Iraq, and as Deputy Chief of Mission in Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion and occupation in 1990. She was awarded the Secretary of State's Award for Valor for her work in occupied Kuwait.

Following Kuwait, Ambassador Bodine was the Associate Coordinator for Operations and later served as the Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism. She went on to serve as the Dean of Professional Studies at the Department's Foreign Service Institute. She has worked on the secretariat staff of Secretaries Kissinger and Vance, and as a Congressional Fellow in the office of Senator Robert Dole. Most recently, Ms. Bodine spent a year as the Director of East African Affairs.

Ambassador Bodine was born in 1948 in St. Louis, Missouri. She earned her B.A. in Political Science and Asian Studies, and graduated magna cum laude from the University of California at Santa Barbara. She received her Master's degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Massachusetts. She also studied at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Department of State's Language Training Field Schools in Taiwan and Tunisia. She is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and serves on the Board of Directors of the UCSB Alumni Association and on the Advisory Council to the Program on Southwest Asian and Islamic Civilization Studies at the Fletcher School. She was the recipient of the UC Santa Barbara Distinguished Alumni Award in 1991. 

Appointment Date:  11/07/97
Oath of Office:  12/10/97