NDC: An exchange of Ideas

This post is a bit lengthy but is beneficial to those who are curious about Yemen's National Dialogue. In response to an article I wrote in regards to transparency in the National Dialogue, I received comments from Samira Ali BinDaair, who holds a Masters in Education from the University of Manchester,U.K. She is a lecturer and has worked with UNFPA, OxfamGB, UNIFEM and IPEC. She has several publications on Education. The following exchange occurred:

Dear Sama'a, 

It was nice seeing you and talking to you and a pleasure to see the little girl I once knew blossom in to a beautiful and smart young lady. 

I agree with some of the points you raised about the NDC but here I would like to clarify to you as to why the dialogue is as it is  but also to make a general comment on the dialogue.

First of all, about the dialogue being too fast I do not agree….On the contrary, the majority of Yemenis think it is dragging on and on and this fact is not to the advantage of the dialogue.The Yemeni public is getting impatient and the initial enthusiasm for the dialogue is beginning to wan, especially seeing that the talks have not been accompanied with the implementation of transitional justice and restitution of the loss of people's rights.

I agree with you that the NDC suffers from a lot of flaws but are all these shortcomings due to the points you raised... lack of transparency choice of attendees outside political parties etc. 

I would like to argue that the stage had already been set for either the success or failure of the NDC and goes beyond these logistics.  I think most of the reasons that may stand in the way of its success are structural and lie within the socio-political structure of yemen that goes back to decades. The power centers in yemen that have prevailed since the revolution of 1962 in north yemen and independence in south yemen are difficult to dislodge even at this stage (after the spring)  and even Abdurabo Mansur would not have survived to oversee the process of the NDC had he attempted not to include them as the major players in the NDC. The whole purpose of the NDC is to get these power centers to dialogue and accept the concept of power sharing  and diffuse the underlying dynamite to start with. It would be naïve to expect more than that at this stage in yemen. The civil state that we dream of is going to take time and will need a lot of hard work in the near future and despite the bleak outlook at the moment there is hope . The rewriting of the Constitution may be an important step but in the end it is a piece of paper that may lack credibility if mechanisms for implementing the different clauses are not effectively defined. Therefore we need to look beyond it and as to how we can achieve social justice.

Revolution is a process not an event and the best type of change is change that starts from the bottom up and is gradual not drastic change that leads to social upheavals. Therefore we have to accept some of the negative aspects in order to lead to the positive in future. (We cannot afford armed confrontation in yemen)  These power centers will gradually filter away and outdate themselves if they do not do their homework if we are to believe the lessons of history.. As Ibn Khuldoon says in his Preface about  the reasons for the rise and fall of empires as  prevailing from within (ie internal flaws). People have woken up and become aware and we cannot go back to the past since the chains of silence have been   broken. Indeed what is the alternative to dialogue imperfect as it may be? I have yet to see anyone delineate this alternative…. if I were to conduct a random survey about what should have been done at this stage within the prevailing circumstances in yemen I doubt I would get a convincing answer. I notice that we Yemenis or Arabs in general (and this is not about your article Samaa) tend to make sweeping statements about everything without focusing on a specific issue or criticizing a specific point about a phenomenon. I have heard people who are involved in the NDC make statements like "we don’t know what is happening it is all a mess" etc etc. Surely all this effort that has been made for people to sit on the table and discuss issues is not all negative? The reason why there is dialogue is because there are many differences of opinion which is inevitable in any society.

To come back to your points  regarding transparency etc….some of the proceedings were shown on yemen tv but I do not think it would be in the interest of the dialogue to show the different actors thrashing out the issues when the process is incomplete that might lead to more loss of confidence in the dialogue within the general public. Isn't it better to publicise results once synthesized? We should not compare yemen with western countries which have experimented with democracy for decades and built institutions that support it. The variables here are different and we cannot jump stages in the process.

About the Yemeni public being made aware of the assistance from the world bank you said etc….what is the significance of that and in what way will it contribute to the success of the dialogue or achieve transparency? In fact it could work in the opposite direction because people are already disenchanted with the US due to many reasons one of them being the unmanned drones that cause havoc to civilians. The world bank /IMF are at the moment pressurizing the Yemeni gov. to remove subsidies from petrol and gas thus putting the govt in a very awkward situation considering the suffering of the people at present from high rates of inflation. Thus it will further antagonize the public to know about the involvement of the world bank in the dialogue. Honestly I have yet to read a complete success story about the structural adjustment package of the WB/IMF in any third world country.  Yemen is in a weak position at the moment and all these regional and international forces dictate their terms. Where is the money that the "friends of yemen" promised to get us out of the economic emergency situation? The answer for yemen lies in attracting investment as partners in future to get us out of this position of "beggars" that the regime has got us into for the last three decades.

Further on in your article you rightly criticized the involvement of foreign experts and the money being wasted on them…..but then considering the fact that the gulf initiative has been transacted by the gulf the UN and the foreign partners this is inevitable. All these international partners are waiting for a pretext to demonize yemen…..and as the Arabic saying goes:"if your hand is under a huge stone remove it gently lest you break it"Much as we resent their interference we have to know the rules of the game and play it right. Moreover publicizing the nitty gritty of daily expenditures of the NDC will not necessarily set a precedent for accountability to the public but publicizing the returns from oil and gas and gov. expenditure and how budgets are spent is going to achieve that starting from now. I believe civil society organizations and the general public should demand that from the government.

You mention engaging the Yemeni public or the lack of it ….but how do we do this beyond the field teams that are supposed to have gauged opinion limited as it may be? I agree that to some extent the NDC has excluded some important independents but then in the end how many people can be included in a dialogue without it turning into a circus? I think it might be a good idea to find a way of including peoples opinions and presenting results of research of experts to the NDC to be included in the final draft of the working groups. I think Dr.Waheeba Fare has tried to do this through her academic group of experts but a way has to be found to effectively transmit this to the NDC before it is too late. There may be other forums who may also be doing this and I am sure that in future there will be a lot of opportunities for expressing public opinion on different matters.  In the past this was not possible and even if youth inclusion in the dialogue has been limited in future I believe they will make the changes for better or for worse. Social movements take time to grow and mature and create leadership and this will happen slow as it may be. There are many  smart young people like yourself in whom we have hope for the future. We have to be positive and we need some idealism that will spring people into action and believe the picture is not all negative. It is healthy to criticize provided we are objective and offer alternatives.

Abdurabo Mansur is in an unenviable position and considering many facts about the present situation which we all know he has managed to achieve some results even if slowly but there are so many challenges to contend with and the old regime is not letting go yet and is doing everything to disrupt the process of rapprochement and national stability. The main mistake he made was to ignore the southern issue and not go there sooner to dialogue with the southern movement and thus the vacuum has led to the forces inside and outside yemen to capitalize on this state of affairs  and incite the more rigid section of the Hiraak to create the explosive situation prevailing in the south. The southern issue is a core issue and will determine the nature of the future state and it has to be taken very seriously and secession is not at all to the interest of yemen. However there are genuine demands that have to be met before this is done.

Unfortunately yemen has suffered from too many armed confrontations in the past….in the north the educated and good leaders like abdulrahman aliryani,Abdullah salaal and alhamdy did not last long and since Ali took over we have not seen much progress and with all the outside assistance should yemen have the lowest human indicators in the region next to Somalia? But people have short turn memories and want him back some from sheer ignorance and others with vested interests. This is a transitional stage and we cant have miracles overnight.  In the south too the good leaders like Qahtan Alshaaby and Salim Rubaya ali were knocked off by the more extremist socialists and armed conflict also has led to the destruction of the country and alienating some of the best people who could have made a difference. Now we need to move forward and start creating the stage for a different yemen and how we will do that depends very much on keeping our heads above water and think of solutions to different problems rather than drown in the sea of troubles and become paralysed  negative and defeatist and repeat platitudes like it’s a big mess and we are heading for disaster nothing can prevent it. Maybe I am one of the lucky few who always see the silver lining in the cloud and half the glass as full rather empty. I would suggest looking at some of the positive things in yemen and remain optimistic and take it from there. 

 I know I have not entirely focused on your article and have digressed but all these issues are interrelated.I do hope however I have managed to clarify some of your doubts even if you are not convinced I am ready to be convinced by you when we meet and discuss.

Have a good day and keep up the good work.         

In response, I wrote: 

I am thrilled to see such a response! Thank you for sharing all of these points. I agree with several points you make but first, I want to let you know that I am restricted in my writing (especially when I have a 1500 word limit). I need to focus on a specific topic. In this article it was transparency.
It's hard to present my entire opinion on the dialogue in one article. So, I write on specific topics in little doses. Second, I really enjoyed the points that you raised and I would like to share it in my blog with your permission of course. Unfortunately when we met, we did not have a chance to speak longer. I appreciate that you took the time to write this and I delighted to see that you mentioned Ibn khaldun and use Yemeni quotes. I am one of those who fully understand that Yemen is not part of the West.

Now, I stand by what I wrote in regards to transparency. I think we tend to underestimate the Yemeni people. While many are illiterate, they deserve to know what is happening in the dialogue. Especially when it was promised to them. Perhaps the only way to get the dialogue participants to respect the transitional process and their duties is to publicize their irresponsible behaviors. Since the number of participants is very big, cutting participants out (who are not working towards a resolution) would solve two problems: 1) members who are not serious and are there to play can be removed and 2) the dialogue would look more credible because it is not tolerating child play. I know this will never happen and I am being idealistic here but it's unfortunate to see that we like to fool and undermine the worth of the average Yemeni citizen. The original flaw lies in the selection process but now it is too late to fix.

I recently started to hear about the work of dr. Wahiba Farea. While her process is not officially adopted by the national dialogue, it seems to be operating better. She selected academics who are capable of drafting solutions and I look forward to exploring this process further soon. Again, this process and similar parallel processes highlight the flaw in the selection process of the NDC: giving seats to please and occupy all of Yemen's influential figures.

As for the process of reconciliation, this is the subject of my next/current project. Without it, the dialogue would not be able to produce long term solutions. I look forward it sharing it with you soon.

As for the speed of the conference, It is possible that the transitional process seems slow to you because the dialogue has failed to move according to plan because its not managed well. Moreover, so many people outside of the dialogue are continuing to make other plans (like separatists, Islamists, etc), it is in the interest of Yemen to reach solutions soon. There is pressure building inside the dialogue and I sympathize with all of the participants who are pouring their hearts and souls into this process. That being said, the only way to calm the Yemeni people is to provide them with services like water, electricity, etc. This would relieve them of their anguish and foster trust in the future Yemeni government. The dialogue failed in providing a temporary economic solution to Yemen. The NDC process is purely political. On the bright side, it succeeded in providing temporary jobs to 565 individuals.

Each transitional process needs to be custom made to the country undergoing transformation and in Yemen's case, the structure of the dialogue could be described as "too sophisticated". At times the structure of the 9 committees and the large number of participants created an obstacle in the path of political progression. Many of the subjects intersect and the second general plenary meeting failed to achieve anything. All our hopes are now in the hands of the final and third plenary meeting.

I definitely agree that the decisions that the committees come up with will need implementation. Without it, all of this hard work would go to waste (& this is a possibility).

Finally, my argument on the subject of transparency is based on the fact that the NDC promised something that they didn't deliver. I was just following through. Also, It is hard for a single person like me to provide solutions to such grave problems. I think my criticism in this particular article is just a cry for better transparency so people like me, who are not members of the dialogue, can feel that we are somehow included.  At the moment, I am still waiting to get my badge to go to the NDC. I think I will have a better picture then

Thank you for reading what i wrote, for sharing your thoughts and for your encouragement.

Best,
Sama'a

She then added: 

In addition to what I wrote you yesterday (as I said I couldnt type long from my fon with one finger its so slow thus I couldnt reply to all your points I am more comfortable now using my laptop) I forgot to mention to you that I hope my point about the yemeni public not following every little point of the dialogue did not indicate my considering the fact that they are illiterate that they cannot understand whats going on.....that would be terribly patronizing  what I meant is that as it is there is so much frustration that this will only add to their frustration which is not to the advantage of the NDC because the reaction from the public could be really fierce .We cant afford whats happening in egypt right now and added to the fact that yemenis are armed to the teeth. Transparency could be achieved by transmitting the outcome of the discussions at different stages of the talks which I think is being done from what I read in the papers and also on yemen tv and radio. I think a list of people who left the talks and people who were replaced has also been publisized if I am not mistaken .

On the contrary yemenis are very politicised and very aware and as I said in my article "Yemeni spring nipped in the bud - where do we go from here" it does not take a university degree to know that one is dispossessed of one's most basic rights. I believe my grandmother had far more wisdom and awareness than a lot of Ph.D holders who may be qualified in a specific field  but not necessarily aware.....I had also pointed out the process that Paulo Freire the latin american educator had undertaken in raising the consciousness of the oppressed in his revolutionary adult education programme.(Pedagogy of the Oppressed)  This is also possible in yemen but not through the NDC....I still maintain that the NDC is not the panacea to resolving all the problems in yemen....on the contrary it has quite a limited function which as I said before is to get these power centers to agree as a first step because whether we like it or not they wont let go at this stage and   their lack of agreement could be threatening to yemen. We also hope some of the good people(I am sure there are many despite our doubts) in the dialogue would also act as a neutralizer in some way. I think the real work of nation building will start when the NDC ends and then the role of the people will come in. I have heard people say that once the NDC is over and the big guys concoct the articles of the new constitution their own way  then the game is over. This is not true because there are technical experts who have given their input and are still doing so and whats more important is the nature of lines of accountability that will be established where officials are concerned including the President and the type of political system i.e. parliamentary (the way it is now) and how will decision making powers be delineated between cabinet parliament and president . I am sure you know that there are many types of sytems where the president could be a figure head and prime minister have more power or like the old regime president is the be all and end all of yemens existence and so on and so forth. Let me give you an example about the old constitution which clearly stated matters concerning human rights, women's rights, etc but did we have the mechanisms for ensuring its implementation and define the checks and balances. I agree that once things are in the constitution they are binding but still we  have to go beyond this formality to the more important issue of specifying all these other matters and I think a kind of opinion poll needs to be done before it is concluded. There could be many other mechanisms for ensuring public opinion is included in the process but the most critical issue at stake at the moment is resolving the southern issue and understanding the demands of the houthis and other forces which might threaten the very stability of yemen and turn the country into small warring factions and provinces. I am not saying we need to compromise to save the country but there are some serious issues  that we have to take into consideration  since the situation in yemen is not idealand not to demand the impossible so as to pave the way for the possibilities in future.. The spring has achieved something but it will take time and effort to achieve all the aspirations of those who initiated the process and the rest of the public. I sincerely hope that we will have more honest people in future who will run the country and who will put the interests of yemen and the people before their own. Now that the public is more aware they will be more proactive in keeping a watchful eye and expressing their opinions on issues that concern the welfare of the yemeni people.

As it says in the Holy Qoran"
فأما الزبد فيذهب جفاءاً و أما ما ينفع الناس فيمكث في الأرض

So I am hoping that what is now not obvious to the eye all the precious jewels of yemeni wisdom and goodness the people who are the unknown soldiers ...the independents if you like or call them whatever you will ....all those who did not have a voice will have it soon.....it does take time for things to crystallize institutions to be built and institutionalised corruption to be purged but what is two years in the life of the nation. I think we have made a start and the process will continue.

Female Agency in the Yemeni Transition

This is published in the International Training Programme for Conflict Management (ITPCM) and can be found online here.

For the first time since unity in 1990, Yemeni women are challenging tradition. Breaking curfews, participating in political activities after nightfall, reciting folkloric poetry and shouting revolutionary slogans became common during and after the Revolution. For women, the Revolution was truly exceptional. They participated in sit-ins and addressed mixed crowds. The decoration of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Tawakkul Karman underscored the activism of Yemeni women around the world. Yemeni women were featured in numerous magazines, websites and newspapers as champions of civil society. During the uprising, women were equally as influential as men. In essence, women initiated a revolution within a revolution. The presence of Arab women in the public sphere during the Arab Spring misled many observers to believe that a women’s right movement was underway. Others were skeptical, warning that once political regimes began to collapse, the status quo would be restored. Only a few bothered to ask: what do women want from their Revolution? Yemeni women cannot uniformly answer this question because their experiences are not monolithic. The political dichotomy of the North and South produced alternate realities for women, especially as the North is more conservative and tribal than the South. After the unity in 1990, these realities continued to change based on the location, affluence and heritage of a woman’s family. Coupled with Yemen’s patriarchal and conservative culture, it was difficult to establish a unanimous movement for women. The current transitional government has three women Ministers out of 35. The Technical Preparatory Committee (TPC)[1] for the National Dialogue was composed of 19% women. One female out of 301 members is a parliamentarian and two women are members of the Shura Council. These political positions, none of which are decision-making, give the impression that women in Yemen have a greater role in the executive branch. The term “feminism” in itself remains controversial, and gender issues must be handled with care. In a system that is discriminatory in its legislation[2] against women, “feminist” objectives can be sidelined. Since women’s freedoms were restricted after Saleh’s fall, it became apparent that some of the women who participated in the uprisings were merely pawns for opposition parties. Despite these setbacks, there have been minor improvements to women’s political participation. On March 18, the National Dialogue began, leaving the fate of Yemen’s entire female population in the hands of a few women from various political backgrounds. Their goal is to simultaneously advocate on behalf of their parties and organizations, as well as women more broadly. As of now, existing accommodations made for women are insufficient, making it difficult for the National Dialogue to facilitate gender equality. Women must lobby for their rights outside of politics, and approach the problem from a different perspective to see results. As Feminists or as Politicians at the National Dialogue?

Current president, Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, made a point of advocating a 30% female quota in the National Dialogue. The conference will separate members into nine working committees.[3] Members have submitted their committee choice to the President[4] of the dialogue and his six deputies, none of which are women. Soon, these committees will begin their deliberations. Even though women’s issues deserve broader representation across the board, the topic will be examined under the eighth committee, “Rights and Freedoms”. Constitutional reform will be discussed in a separate committee, “Good Governance”. The structure of the dialogue does not support wholesale changes to the status of women’s rights, and it is not evident that discussion of women’s issues will make it into questions concerning constitutional reform. The status of women and their inability to affect change through the Dialogue are exacerbated by two problems. First, some of the women selected to participate are at a crossroads: are they feminists or politicians first? Are they representatives of their party or of women? Yemen’s “democratic” transition has played out as an exclusively political process through which women are incentivized to champion ideas that oppress other women. Unified by gender but divided by politics, women in the National Dialogue will frame gender issues like women’s security, economic poverty and illiteracy as political issues. Based on political divisions, the methodology of dealing with these topics will vary. Religious parties like Islah, Ansar Allah (Zaydi), Al-Haq (Zaydi and Hanafi) and Al-Rashad (Salafi) would approach women’s issues from a Shar’iah perspective, but ideological differences are likely to cause disagreements. Socialist groups, independents and even Ba’thist will advocate non-religious reforms or a mixture of both. A single group of unified women is much more powerful than smaller groups of women that are at odds. These political issues will polarize the women’s agenda and make it susceptible to the principle of divide and rule. Second, the same tactics used to question the legitimacy of the dialogue can be used to challenge solutions proposed to promote women’s rights. Any “feminist” agenda could be quickly dismissed as part of a Western conspiracy, since the dialogue itself is viewed as a foreign initiative rather than the result of a grassroots national process. Like several Arab Spring nations, Yemen is witnessing a rise in Islamic fundamentalism. Four religious parties will participate in the dialogue, and since Islah gained more influence beginning in 1994, female judges were dismissed as “incompetent in Islamic Law” and public schools were gender segregated after the sixth grade.[5] A narrow implementation of Islamic Shari’ah is expected. In Yemen, female equality is argued as a social liberalization process antithetical to religion, which could guarantee its failure. In Yemen’s conservative culture, religion dominates politics. The prevalence of early marriages in Yemen provides a revealing case. When Islah gained influence in Saleh’s government, the marriage age of 15 was abolished[6]. Since 2007, several governmental and non-governmental campaigns were launched in hopes of mandating a marriage age, but none of them succeeded. Radical interpretations of Islam were used to manipulate and limit the scope of female self-determination. The problem of child marriages still persists. According to Amal Basha, the spokesperson of the TPC, it has been a struggle to add the issue of underage marriage to the agenda of the National Dialogue. Eventually, TPC members “unanimously agreed to give it social priority.” Addressing child marriages, again, as a social issue with the same political actors makes it hard to fathom how social transformation can emerge through the National Dialogue. If previous methods proved futile, Yemeni women need to seek alternatives. Gender Strategies Outside the Social Realm

To improve women’s conditions, women need to frame their arguments outside of politics. A strategy that separates women’s issues from traditional values could prove successful in Yemen. Currently, 54% of Yemeni women are married before they reach the age of 18.[7] By tackling the “side effects” of child marriages, Yemenis can limit its social prominence without causing an overwhelming social backlash. About 58% of Yemeni women are illiterate.[8] Educational policies put in place by the government can assure that more girls are going to school. In Yemen, marriage means being a full-time homemaker, and if more girls are going to school, then they are less likely to marry or having children at a young age. Other strategies can tackle the same problem. Innovative health policies can produce substantial changes in reducing the high maternal and infant mortality rates.[9] Poverty alleviation programs are another method through which women can lobby for reform. Since 44% of the Yemeni population is acutely malnourished[10], financial incentives can promote the use of contraceptives[11] to control population growth and address food scarcity. It is unlikely that women’s issues will receive special attention, since Hadi’s administration has been preoccupied with more pressing issues like security and military reforms. With soaring inflation and an unemployment rate at 42.5%[12], the nation is facing several challenges. Therefore, women need to address their needs by mobilizing collectively. Between Sa’dah’s six wars and Al-Qaeda’s occupation of Abyan, 50% of Yemen’s Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are between 5-17 years old[13]. Only a quarter of IDPs from all age groups return to their homes[14]. These challenges impose damage on the female body. Displacement can also lead to rape, gender violence, human trafficking, and prostitution. Women as a group need to realize that protecting their gender is feasible through security programs. Another collective concern is the deteriorating economy. In March, Friends of Yemen pledged around 7.5 billion dollars[15] in assistance to Yemen. While the majority of the money is allocated to development programs, the government must assign a portion of it to specifically empower female entrepreneurship Without change, the nation will continue to be the lowest ranked country in the world in gender equality. Increasing female participation in the labour market can decrease harmful social traditions. Using women as agents of economic reform can result in the creation of a new workforce that facilitates the self-determination of women. Conclusions

The national dialogue promoted the inclusion of women in the transitional process, but this inclusion does not guarantee a transformation of reality in Yemen. Previous tactics, like addressing women’s issues as social concerns, could lead to political manipulation. Also, these measures have been proven ineffective. The dialogue is still in its infancy. Until a clearer picture of the Dialogue’s trajectory emerges, women will not be able to formulate a viable strategy. The National Dialogue is attempting to address numerous concerns at once, while struggling to maintain unity and reform a corrupt political system. For the time being, women need to advocate through each of the nine working committees. The female members of the dialogue are responsible for tackling women’s issues strategically from every possible front, because the obstacles facing them are not independent of each other, but are closely related and must be treated as such. To restrict the harmful consequences of tradition, non-social solutions should be considered. For instance, increasing female participation in educational programs, health programs and in workforce can alleviate problems such as child marriage. If more girls are going to schools then less of them are available for marriage. Affordable and accessible health care can reduce early deaths amongst young mothers and infants. Economic opportunities for women can provide families with additional income. While it is challenging to demand equality in a conservative culture, it is reasonable to demand equal access to health, education and economic opportunities. For the full emancipation of women, Yemen’s constitution must clearly delineate women’s rights, otherwise laws will continue to sanction the oppression of women. Women in the dialogue need new methods and must remain cautious of political ploys. Gender equality is difficult to achieve, but it will only become possible once we are aware of alternative options.

________________ [1] A 31-member Committee commissioned by President Hadi to decide on the size of participants, the rules for eligibility and for the mechanisms used during the dialogue. [2] Laws do not dictate but rather permit discrimination. For example, the Personal Status Law on wife’s obedience sanctions marital rape and restricts women’s freedom of movement. [3] Committees are divided based on Issues: Southern Issue, Sa’dah Issue, National Issues, State-building, Good Governance, Military & Security building, Independent Agencies, Rights & Freedoms, and Comprehensive Development. [4] President of the Dialogue is President Hadi. [5] Molyneux, Maxine, “Women’s Rights and Political Contingency: The Case of Yemen, 1990-1994.” Middle East Journal 49.3 (1995): 418-31. [6] Khalife, Nadya, How Come You Allow Little Girls to Get Married?: Child Marriages in Yemen. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2011. [7] “Yemen: A Wake Up Call to Early Marriage.” Oxfam International Blogs. Oxfam, 30 August 2012, retrieved on-line 15 March 2013. [8] According to World Bank Indicators, 2010. [9] “Yemen: A Wake Up Call to Early Marriage.” Oxfam International Blogs. Oxfam, 30 August 2012, retrieved on-line 15 March 2013. [10] Burki, Talha, “Yemen’s Hunger Crisis.” The Lancet 380.9842 (2012): 637-38. [11] Only 9.3% of Yemen’s population uses a modern form of contraception. USAID Country Health Statistical Report, Rep. Washington DC: Bureau of Global Health, 2009. [12] The Second National Millenium Development Goals Report. Sana’a: United Nations Development Fund and the Republic of Yemen, 2010. [13] The Republic of Yemen. Operational Unit for IDPs Camps. Information Center.Summary Showing the Number of Households by the Orginal District and Governorates. Sana’a: ROY, 2013. [14] Ibid. [15] Andersen, Inger. “Friends of Yemen: World Bank Vice President Inger Andersen Urges Support for Yemen’s Transition.” Friends of Yemen: World Bank Vice President Inger Andersen Urges Support for Yemen’s Transition, The World Bank, 7 March 2013 retrieved on-line 14 March 2013.

Why Abyan? and What to do?

Watch Al Qaeda in Yemen on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

Image via Ibtimes

Image via Yemen Online

In the waning days of Saleh's regime, unconfirmed reports claim that military leaders purposefully withdrew their forces in order to destabilize the region. Within weeks, the governorate of Abyan fell under the control of Ansar Al Shari'ah (Al-Qaeda affiliated group). Their control over Abyan lasted from March 2011 to June 2012. During this time, it was declared an "Islamic Empire".



After Ansar Al Shari'a were forced out, on June 19, 2012, U.S. officials including the US ambassador, Gerald Feierstein, and USAID administrator, Rajiv Shah, visited the war ravaged areas of Abyan. In September, they released this assessment. In this trip, USAID pledged to provide an extra 52$ million dollars of assistance to Yemen. Some humanitarian assistance began in Abyan; however, no concrete reforms can be felt.

Before Ansar Al Shair'ah, Abyan had high unemployment rates, poor educational opportunities and was economically deprived. Government presence there was almost nonexistent. Now, not much has changed. Since 2012, there are tribal popular committees that were instrumental in evicting Ansar Al Shariah from the region much like Al-Sahwah tribal committees in the Anbar province in Iraq who helped end the war in Iraq. Government presence is still weak. The return of Ansar Al-Shariah is still a possibility as they are hiding in the neighboring regions. Ironically, some claim that a few members of the tribal popular committees are in fact members of Ansar Al Shariah. The question that comes to mind is why Abyan? and what to do?

Abyan is a vast lawless area with a harsh terrain that lacks government authority and institutions.  Low levels of education made the area ripe for extremist infiltration. Prior to the unification of Yemen, and in the context of the cold war,  Saudi Arabia and the US supported Islamic extremists (Mujahidins) to combat the spread of communism in Afghanistan and in the South of Yemen. When Osama Bin Laden visited Yemen in 1989 (his only vist there), he brought Jihadis from Afghanistan to Southern Yemen. Also, Yemen was one of the few countries they could go. In the brief Civil War of 1994, former president Saleh used these returning warriors to help him win the war against those who declared secession. It was part of Saleh's strategy to spread the Jihadi, Salafi and Muslim Brotherhood movement in the South. 

Historically, Abyan is known for adopting radical thoughts (for example; the Qarmatian movement (which is a Shi'i Ismaili group lead by Ali ben Fadhl Al Qormoti started in Jabal Khanfar in Ji'ar, Abyan. Also, Sufi extremist groups flourished there). Furthermore, in the past 20 years, most political and ideological movements in Abyan failed miserably  So, the community felt that the "return to religion" is the only option to combat the problems facing them. The Jihadi/Salafi ideology is one that revolves around the concept of life after death, where things could be better. 

Although people in Abyan are primarily considered Shafi'i, Sunni. In the past 20 years, Salafism (Jihadi- Wahhabism in particular) dominated Abbyan. In 1994, Abyan was the first area to convert a movie theater into a mosque. Also, in 1998, the first attack on tourists in Yemen was committed by Jaish Adan Al Islami (Aden-Abyan's Religious Army). This "army" was created in 1992 and participated in the previously mentioned Civil War with Saleh. They hold the messianic belief that their role in the Arabian Peninsula will bring Yom Al-Qiyamah (day of resurrection), based on the following hadith: 

"An army of twelve-thousand will come out of Aden-Abyan. They will give victory to Allah and His messenger; they are the best between myself and them".

The Aden-Abyan army wants to reinstate Islam as it was during the times of the Prophet Muhammed (PBUH). However, as we saw in their seize of Abyan, they were authoritarian and demanded absolute obedience. AQAP has become a rallying cry to many, but not out of conviction. Many people are not fond of Al-Qaeda, but like the saying "the enemy of my enemy is my friend"; because AQAP stands up to the government that neglected them, they follow suit.  

Currently, conditions in Yemen are substandard, and almost each region needs its own transitional plan. People in Abbyan need special attention (like other governorates) in order to revive their economy. Unfortunately, without any felt improvements, fighting jihad in order to go to heaven seems like a feasible venting method. Right now, people in Abyan are distressed and life is gruesome. The goal in Abyan is to lower the distress of these human beings. So what is needed is good governance and economic assistance in order for us to observe any real transformation in the region. 

Discussion with Al-Dawsari: Tribal Governance and Stability in Yemen

Part I of II

Image via Rutgers

Nadwa Al-Dawsari, a Yemeni woman working in Washington DC with Partners for Democratic change, wrote a research paper about Yemeni tribes. In Al-Dawsari's opinion, tribes are an indispensable stability agent in Yemeni society. Her paper was published by Carnegie Endowment center for International Peace and her article can be found here.

Al-Dawsari begins her paper by stating that;

"The role of tribes in Yemen is often overlooked or misrepresented in Western and sometimes Arab media and policy analyses alike. The common wisdom often holds that Yemen is a lawless country where tribes, defined as small political units, have resisted the presence and extension of the state into their territories. These tribes are frequently described as “fiercely independent” to signify their aversion to the state and are often said to prevent the development of state institutions in their territories. It is often argued that the state is weak because the tribes resist it. Contrary to this traditional assumption, the strong presence of tribes in Yemen is due to the corruption and weakness of the state institutions there. The tribes in Yemen provide social order outside the formal system. Tribes and tribal law act, in the words of political scientist Daniel Corstange, as “second-best substitutes for an absent or weak state.” People approve of the tribes because they provide basic rule of law in the form of conflict resolution and regulation".

Here is more on Al-Dawsari and Yemeni Tribes.

Question: You recognize that some sheikhs were “corrupt” and “traded the needs of their people for political influence”. Would you describe the northern influential tribes as “principled”? 

Answer: I think there is a great deal of stereotyping and misunderstanding of tribes in the both mainstream media and “intellectual” analysis. I think the description of “northern influential tribes” is misguiding. What we had over the past 35 years is a patronage network of individuals including tribal sheikhs who utilized their influence and status in exchange of some incentives from the former regime. The vast majority of tribal people in the Northern areas remain marginalized and the tribal areas remain underserved and cursed with tribal conflicts.

The notion of tribe is also changing. The tribe as a social unit has been dramatically disintegrating and the systems and structures that kept the tribes strong for centuries have been increasingly deteriorating over the past two decades. The fact that certain tribal leaders were part of the regime’s patronage network is one of the major reasons behind the deterioration of the tribal structures and systems and hence to increasing tribal conflicts. Tribal leaders no longer have the same influence and control over tribesmen. Unemployed and marginalized youth engage in violence as a means release frustration but also to make money.
I think it is important that we urban elite question our bias against the tribes and try to understand the complex issues that affect tribes and tribal areas and find better answers to the challenges we are facing. The easy simplistic answer will be to blame the “northern tribes”.

Furthermore you mention tribesmen of Marib, Al-Jawf, Shabwa and Al-Bayda as upstanding and are “eager to see legitimate and functioning state institutions in their areas”, do they expect to have a political role in the transitional government or future governments? If yes, does that mean that their sons will have to take over after them? If no, What role do you expect these sheikhs to have? The scenario of a federalism seems less likely to happen now.

Well, the tribal structure is not hierarchal. Sons do not automatically inherit “sheikhs positions” from their fathers. You are recognized as a sheikh only when you prove of help to your community. All that you need is for the community to come to you asking for help in order to be recognized as a sheikh. There is no ceremony or anything of that sort. There are cases in which communities ignored what is supposed to be their “original sheikh” and choose other well respected individuals in their communities to help them resolve problems and conflicts. As a consequence those individuals became recognized as sheikhs. Again people tend to talk about tribes as if they were solid political entities which is not the case. Tribes are rather social entities and the structure is not hierarchal. Moreover, the tribes are disintegrating rapidly which gives room to more conflicts and undermines security.

Men, women, youth, NGOs, political activists, sheikhs, religious leaders and others that I have worked with in tribal areas are eager to take part in the transition and to have a political role in the future, not as tribes but as citizens who live within the geographic boundaries of their country, Yemen. They’ve been marginalized for decades and they see this as opportunity to voice out their needs and influence the decisions that affect them and their country. Tribal people long to see a legitimate government with strong state and rule of law institutions to help address the many complex issues they face in their communities including tribal conflicts and lack of development.

Question: At the moment, there is a dichotomy between the reality of the urban Yemeni citizen and the Yemeni tribal one; in terms of lifestyle, education, goals, etc. How do we bring the two worlds together without compromising the experience of either one?

Answer: I don’t think there is a dichotomy to start with. Tribal people face the same challenges that marginalized rural citizens in Taiz and Hodeidah which are not tribal face whether it’s poor education and health services, poverty, unemployment or other developmental problems. Tribal people have strong tribal identify only because the tribe offered them social security and protection. It is the tribe that have helped prevent and resolve conflicts over resources and services. It is the tribal values that make it an obligation under tribal law for members of the tribe to look after each other. But as I said this is changing. The tribal system cannot offer the services it offered as effectively anymore. There aren’t enough better-off people to look after the poor in their communities especially with increasing poverty and minimal opportunities. The younger generation in tribal areas are facing some kind of identify dilemma. The tribe is not offering them what it offered to their ancestors and at the same time the state is not providing for them.

In my work over the past 8 years I have seen tribal people working very well alongside people from urban areas around issues that concerns everyone in the country including fighting corruption, elections monitoring, women empowerment and promoting the participation of civil society. So I don’t think that there are two worlds. Like citizens across the nation, tribal people suffer from the same inconveniences and aspire for better future. They certainly haven’t expressed any desire to be treated differently based on their “tribal” merits.

Question: In the 21st century, Yemen lags behind the world in many ways. You promote the idea of incorporating tribal law into the formal law system; however, in the past the majority of Yemenis chose to take their issues and solve them in a strictly tribal order. This has, in turn, weakened the formal law system, and to maintain a legitimate exterior, the court system passed the Arbitration law in 1992. While Yemeni tribes have held the country for years, incorporating tribal law into the formal system would encourage tribal tradition to exist in Yemen forever. If Yemen succeeds in raising the literacy rates and providing better economic opportunities to their citizens, dependence on the tribe would decrease. What would happen to the Yemeni judicial system? Are you suggesting to preserve tribalism in Yemen? Some may argue that incorporating tribal tradition should only be a temporary compromise.

Answer: First of all, incorporating tribal law into formal law is necessarily a problem. On the contrary I see it as the perfect solution for a country that has very weak state and somehow effective indigenous traditions that governed large areas of the country for centuries. I think the tribal law continued to exist in Yemen because the state was never there so it was sustained out of necessity. My own experience but also research showed that tribal leaders and citizens are eager to see functioning state and rule of law institutions. They are tired of conflict that have pretty much interrupted their lives and undermined every effort to bring development to their areas. But the big obstacle is that there was never a political will to build state institutions. I think the absence of that political will rather than the tribes is the reason behind the weakness of state institutions.

Secondly, I think people mix between tribal law or tribal conflict resolution systems and negative practices that some tribal people have done in the past including kidnapping and road blockage. These practices are in fact considered “black shame” in the tribal law. Corruption and patronage that have governed Yemen over the past 35 years have led to these practices. But tribal law in its true essence has over the centuries prevented and resolved community conflicts. It has helped contained conflicts that would have otherwise escalated and caused regional wars in the country.

Incorporating the tribal law into the rule of law system does not mean that it will substitute it. It means that it will complement it. Let’s face it. We will probably not see functioning rule of law institutions in Yemen for the next decade. It is a long term process. What is the alternative? And wait a minute? Why do we have to give up indigenous traditions that have worked for Yemenis for centuries? The most important thing in my opinion is that this should be done with a strong commitment to building state institutions. Almost all the tribal people I worked with and talked indicated that they want to see functioning state institutions. Check the research that Partners Yemen did in 2011 or the previous one that was conducted by NDI in 2006 on this issue. So I think that commitment will not be an issue as long as the process is transparent and credible. The West is moving into the direction of community mediation and conflict resolution processes to help reduce pressure on formal court system. You know what? We have that right here at home tested and been working for people for centuries so let’s take pride in what we have and use it to make this transition a success.

End of Part I

Should Yemeni Women Govern the Transitional Period?

I stumbled upon this op-ed by Abdullah Mahwari and I needed to share it. For the Arabic version, click here.  For a loose translation of the article, look below.  

Leave the Power to Women

By Abdullah Mahwari 

Monday, August 6, 2012 

All political sheikhs, party sheikhs and fatawa sheikhs must leave the political arena and take an open ended vacation and a comprehensive period for recovery and  self-reflection, away from the spotlight. They should leave the political arena to the Yemeni woman, the granddaughter of Queen Bilqis and Arwa,  and let her take charge on all fronts, for the interim period only. This is in order to allow male politicians (of all parties mentioned above) to arrange their papers, organize their files and hone their brave men for the upcoming elections.

Give women this critical transitional period because you, gentlemen, are not good at it at all. "May God bless a man who knows his limitations", believe me you will never regret this. For once in your lifetime confess that you are "futile with excellence" in crisis management and that you are not capable of this responsibility at the present time.

Admission of guilt is a virtue. We, the men, on the land of Bilqis (May she rest in peace) are unfit to rule. This is the truth that is obvious for everyone to see and it does not require intelligence to realize. Withdraw from political life! all of you with beards, guns and empty minds and leave the political ring for those who deserves it.  You who are futile with excellence, history will write that you are the worst rulers of Yemen over all the previous centuries. The Yemeni politician, and I mean the man, is money oriented who does not serve the country but rather his benefactor.  He is also selfish and lacks nationalism. We want a Yemeni woman to govern us; we want originality, sincerity, loyalty and honor  to lead us.  We want our leader, our teacher and our  symbol of pride among the nations to be a woman.

O men, disappear from the political scene and get out of the ministries and the parliament. Do independent work and form associations where you can trade lies and hypocrisy out of the political arena. Sell each other outside the country, and feed on each other outside of our homes and in private rather than on our audio-visual media. Do not ruin our children as you are not fit to be anyone's role model. Do not spoil our tastes with your ruddiness. We are done with your boring appearances, your yelling, your wars and your display of power on each other. We are fed up with your  meekness, your clock and dagger activities, you lack of chivalry, and your betrayal. You who are futile with excellence, disappear from our view.  

There are two ways to read this article; either this man appreciates the efforts of women, or he is attempting to insult men by telling them that women can do it better. I do not know the background of Abdullah Mahwari, so I cannot tell you where he stands. For those who choose to believe that he is flattering women, then this man is excellent in the politics of flattery. Most women, especially those who are actively involved in Yemeni politics, will feel honored by his words. I feel sincerity in Abdullah's frustrations with the Yemeni politicians, but I can not get over this line: "[men] should leave the political arena to the Yemeni woman and let her take charge on all fronts, for the interim period only". So, consider this a freudian slip. 

If you are one of those who consider his article a sarcastic stab at the guts of men, then he is making fun of women too. 

When the Yemeni revolution first took off, women took to the streets with men. They slept in tents, shouted the same slogans and protested the same nuisances as men. It was a period of uncertainty. While I watched from abroad, I could not predict what was to come. My biggest fear was that all of these women, who exerted a lot of time and effort for the sake of democracy, will be confronted by the same realities that the Egyptian women are facing now (not a single woman was appointed as a minister). I was exceptionally delighted when three women were chosen as ministers and many others were appointed on various advisory committees. My anxiety for women decreased and I worried about other things; effectively increasing women's participation in the parliament, education and the labor force. Although Abdullah Mahwari's article is dubious, I can't help but wonder if women are only doing the heavy lifting temporarily. So wise up women! and make sure that whatever you do in the following two years will carry into the future. 

Yemen’s Interim Government: Now What?

Yemen’s Interim Government: Now What?

Published on 10 May 2012 in Report: Yemen Times
Sama’a Al-Hamdani (author)

In February 2012, Yemen held presidential elections with Abdu Rabuh Mansour Hadi as the sole candidate. The aim of post-revolution Yemen is to be more democratic after being ruled by the same man for the past 33 years. Thus, the new system must be inclusive and engage seriously in negotiations with a broad set of stakeholders.

Furthermore, the new government must remain committed to the understanding that it is a government by the people, and for the people. Hadi’s elections have been followed by some gradual s reforms; the new cabinet, known as the unity government, includes members from various political parties and the former president’s allies in the military are slowly being replaced.

Unfortunately, every day brings news about how unstable the situation in Yemen is.  So far, the country has proved tenacious against all odds—but how long can it last if the situation persists as it is?

The current interim government is considered to be in the first phase of three phases of post conflict governance to be undertaken. In most transitional governments, this period is usually about three years long, however Hadi is slated to step down in February of 2014. Overall, the interim government will need about 10 years for full recovery.

This first phase is considered the most crucial because it is a period of stabilization where social inclusion and capacity development need to be established in order to avoid a relapse into instability or, worse, full-fledged war.

In Yemen’s case, the government will need to measure its needs carefully in order to determine how best to proceed. So far, many people are criticizing the new government as ineffective; however, Hadi and his government are contending with formidable challenges and have thus far held the country from falling into state failure.

The biggest political challenge of this interim government is gaining legitimacy, and the longer the country is at a standstill, the less trust there is. Politically, the country has its hands full with constitutional reforms, inter-party cooperation and anti-corruption efforts. The government must also face the reality of near-constant intrusions of spoilers in the South as well as loyalists of the former government found all over the country

No development without security  

First and foremost, security is paramount as it is the foundation of the other two facets mentioned earlier. A Yemeni government official once said, “You cannot provide development without security and you cannot provide security without development.” Without security, the nation will continue to be unstable and donors will be afraid to invest their wealth in the country.

From a positive perspective, enhanced security would not only help Yemen attract foreign capital, it would also bring about a reduction in the flight of Yemeni capital.

Yet, in order for change to be realized in the long run, the people of Yemen need to stop being “leader-centric,” with people supporting personalities rather than political programs, so the country can avoid repeating the dilemma of its recent decades.

Moreover, civil society can play a major role in overcoming dictatorship as it fills the gap left by the lack of a strong government. In Yemen, as in all other countries, civil society is heterogeneous, with any group that is not a state actor able to participate. While these groups can work on rule of law, justice, civic education and promotion of democratic values, they can also act as covers for politicians without a party, or can be hijacked by the elite in efforts to gain monetary support. Therefore, it is ideal for the populace of Yemen to rely on the current interim government.

Civil Society involvement

Having said that, the government must practice a good deal of self-reflection in this process because this interim period will function as Yemen’s new foundation. Also, the government must not amplify the pressure placed on the country by international actors who are impatient and do not fully trust the current process. Administratively, the country must seek sovereignty, and share power based on electoral results. Definitively, the country should never settle for “good-enough” governance where functionality is back to normal but not improved. The new government will continue to be limited by its tribal and traditional practices as well as economic conditions, but the trick lies in working inside the box in order to build outside of it.

The international community seems not completely convinced of the stability of the current government although they publicly support it. For example, during the revolution US foreign aid was decreased from $134 million to $64 million. Hadi’s policy must decide which is more important: gaining domestic or international legitimacy? If things go as planned, in the long run, both objectives will be realized, but for now there is a need for a strategic approach.

Economic revival

Economic reconstruction that is felt by Yemenis on the ground is the best immediate way forward. Yemen’s economy is no longer determined by the usual laws of supply and demand. It is rather determined by a monopoly of the revolution. The people of Yemen will not support the country knowing that the current policies are designed for the servitude of the people since 2 percent of Yemen’s population holds 80 percent of the wealth.

For starters, economic reconstruction can mean many different things to different people, but in Yemen’s case, it must not resemble a “face-lift” — it requires a complete overhaul. Rebuilding Yemen’s economy as it was before would be hazardous because the previous system was not stable. Reconstructing the economy in the 21st century and especially in 2012 is very different than doing it in 1998.

Just last January, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation declared that the country will need approximately $15 billion to stabilize.

Inclusiveness

Policies regarding the economy need to memorialize a compromise; meaning that they need to gain the acceptance of all parties involved. Furthermore, Yemen’s instability is at risk of intra-state conflict rather than interstate. Many of the previous economic reconstruction policies focus on the latter.

Furthermore, in today’s globalized world, non-state actors play a major role in development. Therefore, the country must map out an accurate and in-depth economic analysis of the conditions since the start of the revolution in order to determine the exact needs of the country. For example, only one in ten Yemenis describe local economic conditions as good, while 42 percent said that they experienced extreme difficulty buying food for their families.

The new government working together will determine Yemen’s future, and while this trust is placed on everyone, extra efforts will be placed on the shoulders of Murshed Al-’Arashani (Minister of Justice), Mohamed Al-Saadi (Minister of Planning and International Cooperation), Sakhr Al-Wajeeh (Minister of Finance), Amat Razaq Humad (Minister of Social Affairs and Labor), and Sa’ad Aldin Ben Talib (Minister of Trade and Industry) for immediate recovery.

These Ministers must take Yemen through the first steps of reform. As a matter of priority, these institutions must promote accountability and transferability. Without functioning courts, nothing else can function. The country must develop a strong and independent judiciary. The people and the government must know that there are consequences for not obeying the law.

Institutionalization

While most economists emphasize the role of the private sector, efforts at present must focus on building public sector institutions, as they are considered investments in Yemen’s future rather than expenditures. Many villages in Yemen do not have access to clean water, hospitals or electricity. Improving these areas not only improves the lives of Yemenis but it helps decrease the high and rising unemployment rates.

If these plans are not in process within the next two years, then the people of Yemen have the right to believe that the government is useless.

At present the country’s economy is on life-support, which is not surprising given what the country has been through. For the first six months (through August 2012) the main needs of the government are to provide food, clothing, shelter, fuel and medical services to affected individuals.

By the end of Hadi’s rule (by February 2013) the country needs to rely less on humanitarian aid and transition towards sustainable development in domestic resources.

This vision needs to shift from the macro-level to the micro-level. With respect to the latter,   it is essential that the country does not privatize things too quickly after the revolution, as the people who have the most financial capability right now are the ones who benefited illegally from Yemen’s deteriorating conditions. Furthermore, the government must all agree on the needs of the country so that the objectives of international and national NGOs can be aligned with domestic goals.

Economic self-dependence

Ultimately, Yemen will only be able to take responsibility for it once the economy is empowered by the domestic sector. Additionally, the country cannot survive for long if its reliance on foreign aid for humanitarian needs lasts for more than the initial period. First, the money would not be in the hands of the government, making the government less accountable and legitimate, while also risking another collapse.

Yemen cannot control the timing at which these funds are released, the amount of aid, and the gap between pledge and delivery. Raymond Gilpin, Director of the Center for Sustainable Economies at the United States Institute for Peace explains that “the relationship between donor countries and conflict-affected countries is like a bad marriage, where both parties know that the other is cheating but no one wants a divorce.”  Also, at times when funds are released rapidly, the country’s institutions may not be able to absorb the funds or spend it prudently. It might be a better idea to use money to stabilize the currency rather than use it for expenditure.

On top of that, there needs to be a clear tax system. Of course, the people will object to this, but the people of Rwanda, to take one example, were convinced to pay taxes because they trusted the government and felt that it was their national duty to help rebuild their country.

Collecting taxes this year or the next is not an option, but a plan needs to be developed for the future. A tax administration must be carefully selected and all of the government’s institutions need to be 100 percent transparent in order for this process to be accurate.

More importantly, the tax base needs to be broad, and the tax burden needs to be shared if it is to be sustainable. For the meantime, Yemen can increase revenues through indirect taxation. Besides, the unity government should not be afraid of deficits because, at times, a deficit is a reflection of an investment in the future.

The new country should not be afraid to engage the youth. The government should be transparent about its plans and offer the youth a chance to participate in this process. This includes listening to their ideas about innovative ways of re-building society. After all, the torch will only be passed on to them. The efforts of the unity government need to focus on goals that can be achieved in 10 to 15 years so that Yemen does not have to go through this process again while expecting different results. It is all about practicality — if Yemen doesn’t invest correctly and generously in the short term, there may be no long term.

Without the right steps forward, these people do not stand a chance alone. All Yemenis should work together to make this a best case scenario where Business Monitor International explains it as a period with “some potential for a resumption of growth in 2012. Backed up by inflows of foreign aid from the Gulf Cooperation Council and elsewhere, a new government would likely have the resources to be able to increase spending and protect the economy’s export infrastructure.” 

من أجل ضمان التعافي والتحول في اليمن: أولويات ورؤى

سماء خالد الهمداني

http://www.newsyemen.net/contents/Articles/2012/195/3878.htm

أجرى اليمن انتخابات رئاسية في شهر فبراير من هذا العام 2012 بوجود مرشح واحد هو عبد ربه منصور هادي، حيث يهدف يمن ما بعد الثورة إلى ممارسة ديمقراطية أكبر بعد أن ظل تحت قيادة رجل واحد طوال الثلاثين عاماً الماضية. لذلك لابد أن يكون النظام الجديد منفتحاً ويرحب بالحوار، وأن تضع الحكومة نصب عينيها أنها صنيعة الشعب وعليها أن تبقى من أجله. وقد بدأت عملية من الإصلاحات التدريجية عقب الانتخابات، حيث شمل حكومة الوفاق الوطني، حيث ضمت أعضاء من مختلف الأحزاب السياسية، بينما بدء التخلص التدريجي من حلفاء الرئيس صالح في الجيش واستبدالهم بعناصر جديدة. ويتحتم على الحكومة ممارسة الحكم الراشد وتطبيق القانون إن أرادت اكتساب الشرعية والقدرة على حكم وإدارة البلاد.

تعتبر هذه الحكومة الانتقالية في أولى ثلاثة مراحل للحكم في فترة ما بعد النزاع. و بينما يمتد طول هذه الفترة إلى حوالى الثلاثة أعوام في معظم الحكومات الانتقالية، إلا أنه من المقرر أن يتنحى الرئيس هادي عن الحكم في شهر فبراير من العام 2014. وتحتاج الحكومة الانتقالية إلى عشرة أعوام حتى تحقق البلاد تعافياً تاماً. تعتبر هذه المرحلة الأكثر حرجاً بالنسبة للحكومة الانتقالية إذ يقع على عاتقها مهمة إعادة الاستقرار، وضرورة تحقيق الإدماج الاجتماعي وتعزيز القدرات في المجالات المختلفة لتجنيب البلاد خطر العودة إلى ما كانت عليه أخيراً أو، أسوأ من ذلك، حرباً أهلية واسعة. لا بد للحكومة الانتقالية من تقدير احتياجاتها بتبصر وحكمة حتى تتمكن من تحديد وجهتها التي تريد. ويوجه العديد من الناس النقد للحكومة الانتقالية واصفين إياها بالعجز وعدم الجدوى، ومهما يكن من أمر فإن الرئيس هادي وحكومته يقفون موقف التحدي أمام إرث ثقيل، ليس أقله النجاح في إيقاف البلاد من السقوط في هوة الدول الفاشلة. إن أكبر تحدي سياسي يواجه الحكومة الانتقالية الآن هو اكتساب الشرعية، وكلما طالت فترة الركود التي تمر بها البلاد الآن كلما قلت ثقة الشعب بها. هنالك العديد من الأمور التي تشغل البلاد اليوم بما فيها الإصلاحات الدستورية والتعاون بين الأحزاب وداخلها والجهود الرامية إلى القضاء على الفساد. كما تواجه الحكومة الانتقالية ايضاً المعارضين في الجنوب وأعوان النظام السابق الذين ينتشرون في كل بقاع البلاد.

ومما لا شك فيه أن الأمن تفوق أهميته ما عداه إذ يقوم مقام الأساس لما سبق ذكره آنفاً. وفي هذا المقام نسترجع ما ذهب إليه مسؤول حكومي قائلاً: " لا تستطيع توفير تنمية بدون أمن، ولا أمن بدون تنمية". ففي غياب الأمن ستستمر حالة عدم الاستقرار وهذا ما يجعل المستثمرين الأجانب يحجمون عن وضع أموالهم في البلاد. ومن وجهة نظر إيجابية، فإن تحسن الوضع الأمني لن يساعد اليمن في جذب الاستثمارات الأجنبية فقط، بل سيؤدي أيضاً إلى بقاء رأس المال الوطني داخل البلاد. أن نفترض أن مسار اليمن نحو تحقيق الحكم الراشد سيكون سهلاً ليس إلا توهما، فالظروف الراهنة تشير إلى أن الطريق قد لا يخلو من عوائق وعثرات. وعلى اليمنيين والمراقبين الدوليين التخلي عن الاهتمام بدقائق الأمور في تناولهم لمسارات العمل التي تتبناها الحكومة الانتقالية حالياً، وتشجيع الجهود التي يقوم بها الرئيس هادي بدلاً عن ذلك. تقع المسؤولية تجاه الحكم الراشد على المجتمع بأكمله، وفي الواقع فإن الفرصة مواتية الآن تحت ظل حكومة الوفاق لتأسيس نظم حزبية في وضع ما بعد الصراعات. وتستطيع الجهات الأخرى الإفادة من فترة العامين لتركيز برامجها واكتساب مزيداً من الشرعية وتوثيق روابطها مع المجتمع، إضافة إلى تطوير أيدولوجيات واضحة وتعبئة مواردها المالية. ويجب على الشعب اليمني ترك سياسة التركيز على الزعامة ودعم شخصيات بعينها بدلاً من برامج سياسية، لئلا تعود البلاد إلى تكرار معضلة العقود القليلة الماضية.

فوق ذلك، فإن المجتمع المدني يمكنه لعب دور كبير في التغلب على الحكم المطلق وتسلط الدولة اللذان عادة ما يملآن الفراغ في غياب حكومة قوية. وفي اليمن، كما هو الحال في جميع البلدان، تستطيع أي مجموعة لا تنتمي إلى حزب سياسي ان تصبح جزءً من المجتمع المدني. وبينما تستطيع هذه المجموعات العمل في مجالات حكم القانون وتطبيق العدالة والتعليم المدني والدفاع عن القيم الديمقراطية، تستطيع أيضاً أن تؤدى دور الستار الذي يعمل من ورائه أولئك الذين لا ينتمون إلى أحزاب بعينها. وقد تتعرض هذه المجموعات للاحتواء من قبل الصفوة في محاولة للحصول على قدر من الدعم النقدي. ولذلك، فلا بد للسواد الأعظم الاعتماد الكامل على الحكومة المؤقتة الحالية.

ينبغي على الحكومة التفكير بترو في هذه العملية حيث أن الفترة الحالية تشكل منطلقاً لليمن نحو مقبل الأيام. كما يجب عليها أيضاً أن لا تضخم الضغوطات التي يفرضها عليها المجتمع الدولي الذي لا يتذرع بالصبر ولا يضع كامل ثقته في العملية الراهنة. ومن وجهة إدارية يجب على الدولة العمل على تأكيد سيادتها وتقاسم السلطة وفقاً للنتائج الانتخابية. وبشكل بات فعلى البلاد أن لا تقنع بمستوى وشكل من الحكم يعيد الأمور إلى ما كانت عليه في السابق بدون تحقيق التحسن والتقدم المرجوين. ستواصل الاعتبارات القبلية والتقليدية تأثيرها على الحكومة وتحد من قدرتها على الأداء بالفاعلية المطلوبة، ولكن يجب على الحكومة توخي الحيطة والحذر والعمل وفق استراتيجيات استباقية وليس بردود الأفعال.

إن تحقيق الحكم الراشد يتطلب العمل عن قرب مع العديد من الشركاء الدوليين والمنظمات العالمية وغير الحكومية. ويشمل هذا التعاون التزام كل من مجلس التعاون الخليجي ومنظمات عالمية بتقديم المساعدات التي لم يتم وصولها بعد. وعلى الرغم من تصريحات المجتمع الدولي بدعمه للحكومة المؤقتة، فإن الواقع يشير بعدم قناعته التامة باستقرار الوضع في ظلها. فعلى سبيل المثال، انخفضت المساعدات الحكومية الأمريكية لليمن أثناء الثورة من 134 مليون دولاراً إلى 64 مليون دولاراً. يبقى على سياسات الرئيس هادي تحديد الأهم: اكتساب الشرعية الوطنية أم الدولية؟

ولو سارت الأمور على ما هو مخطط لها، فسوف يتحقق كلا الهدفين في الأمد البعيد – بيد أنه في هذه اللحظة تبدو ضرورة إتباع نهج استراتيجي.

إن إعادة تشكيل الهياكل الاقتصادية ذات الأثر المباشر على أفراد الشعب اليمني هي مستهل الطريق إلى التنمية الشاملة. ولم يعد الاقتصاد اليمني يُحدد وفقاً للقوانين التي تحكم العرض والطلب، بل تحدده بالأحرى القوى التي تتمكن من احتكار الثورة. وسوف لن يدعم الشعب اليمني دولة تقوم على استعباده، إذ أن ثمانين بالمائة من ثروة البلاد تتركز في يد أثنين بالمائة فقط من أفراد الشعب. قد يعني التأهيل الاقتصادي أشياء مختلفة لأناس مختلفين، أما في الحالة اليمنية فيجب أن لا يمثل "عملية تجميل"، بل إصلاحاً شاملا ومتكاملاً. إن إعادة بناء الاقتصاد اليمني كما كان عليه سابقاً سيكون محفوفاً بالمخاطر؛ فذلك بناء تم في ظل نظام غير مستقر. وإعادة بناء اقتصاد اليمن في القرن الحادي والعشرين سيكون حتماً مختلفاً، ويزداد ذلك تعقيداً أمام التحديات الجسام التي تواجهها البلاد اليوم. ففي شهر يناير/كانون الثاني الماضي فقط قدرت وزارة التخطيط والتعاون الدولي احتياجات اليمن لتحقيق الاستقرار بحوالي 15 بليون دولاراً أمريكياً.

تستطيع الحكومة الجديدة تحديد مستقبل البلاد إذا عملت بكل أجهزتها بتوافق وتفاهم. وبينما تقع المسؤولية على جميع أجهزتها، فإن العبء الأكبر منها في تحقيق التعافي العاجل يقع على السيد العرشاني (وزير العدل)، والسيد السعدي (وزير التخطيط والتعاون الدولي)، والسيد الوجيه (وزير المالية)، والسيدة أمة الرزاق علي حُمد (وزيرة الشؤون الاجتماعية والتعاون) والسيد بن طالب (وزير الصناعة والتجارة). إن قضايا الاقتصاد اليمني متداخلة ومتشابكة بحيث تصبح معالجة أي منها على حدة أمراً شاقا إن لم يكن مستحيلاً. ويتطلب بناء اقتصاد معافى حوالى سبعة عشر عاماً ونصف العام في المتوسط، يجب خلالها تقليص الاعتماد على المساعدات والعون الخارجي. كمي يجب على الوزراء المذكورين آنفاً الأخذ بيد البلاد لعبور أولى مراحل الإصلاح، والعمل على تعزيز المساءلة والانتقالية. وفوق ذلك تأتي أهمية المحاكم الفاعلة التي لن يتم إنجاز أي عمل آخر في غيابها. ولن يتأتى ذلك إلا إذا عملت الدولة على إقامة سلطة قضائية قوية ومستقلة ونزيهة تحظى بتقدير الدولة واحترام الشعب ورضائه.

على الحكومة أن تواصل السير بتريث في نهج معتدل حيث أن لا أحد في اليمن حقاً يعرف ما هي الخطوة التالية. وليس هنالك فائزون أو خاسرون في الثورة اليمنية – ولذلك فلا بد لعملية السلام أن تبتكر آليات أكثر ذكاء. ولابد أن تكون السياسات الاقتصادية أكثر واقعية بحيث تأخذ في الاعتبار التجارب السابقة بما فيها من نجاحات وإخفاقات، إضافة إلى توازن يجعلها تجد القبول لدى كافة الأحزاب. يُضاف إلى ذلك، أن الاستقرار في اليمن يتعرض اليوم للخطر الداخلي أكثر من الخطر الخارجي. وقد ركزت معظم سياسات إعادة بناء الاقتصاد في السابق على مواجهة المخاطر الخارجية. وفي عالم اليوم الذي تحكمه العولمة، فإن العديد من الجهات الفاعلة غير الرسمية تلعب دوراً مؤثراً في التنمية. ويستوجب على الحكومة إجراء مسح اقتصادي شامل ودقيق لتحديد الاحتياجات المختلفة للبلاد منذ بدء الثورة. ففي استطلاع للرأي تم حديثاً، أجاب واحد من بين كل عشرة يمنيين أن الوضع الاقتصادي جيد؛ بينما ذكر أثنين وأربعين بالمائة أنهم يعانون بشدة في توفير لقمة العيش لأسرهم.

ومن واجب الحكومة أن تحدد أهدافها التنموية بوضوح، إضافة إلى احتياجاتها وأولوياتها حتى يكون الشعب والمجتمع الدولي على دراية بذلك. وبينما يؤكد معظم الاقتصاديين ما للقطاع الخاص من أهمية في التنمية والنمو الاقتصادي، فمن الأفضل حالياً أن تُركَز الجهود على إعادة بناء مؤسسات القطاع العام، حيث يمثل ذلك استثماراً بعيد المدى أكثر منه مصدراً للنفقات فقط. تفتقر العديد من القرى والمناطق الريفية في اليمن إلى الخدمات الأساسية مثل مياه الشرب والمراكز الصحية والكهرباء. إن تنمية هذه المناطق لا يُحِّسن من مستوى معيشة اليمنيين فقط، بل يعمل على خفض معدلات البطالة المرتفعة والآخذة في الازدياد. وإذا لم تشهد البلاد تقدماً في تحسين هذه المجالات خلال العامين المقبلين ستفقد الحكومة مصداقيتها أمام الشعب.

إن اقتصاد اليمن في الوقت الراهن يعتمد على التغذية الوريدية وهذا ليس بمستغرب إذا وضعنا في الاعتبار ما مرت به البلاد في الشهور القليلة الماضية. وستظل مسؤولية الحكومة في الشهور القادمة توفير المأكل والمشرب والملبس والمسكن والعلاج للمتأثرين جراء الأحداث الأخيرة. وبنهاية ولاية الرئيس هادي يستوجب على البلاد أن لا تعتمد بشكل كبير على المساعدات الإنسانية، وأن تبدأ في التحول نحو التنمية المستدامة في الموارد المتاحة لديها. ويجب أن تتحول هذه الرؤية من الاقتصاد الكلي إلى الاقتصاد الجزئي. وبما يتعلق بالأخير، فمن الأساسي أن لا تتسرع الحكومة في تطبيق سياسات الخصخصة بعد الثورة حيث أن هذه الخطوة ستعود بالنفع على الذين تتركز الثروات بأيدهم خاصة، وهم ذات الذين أَثْروا بطرق غير مشروعة في ظل الأوضاع المتدهورة للبلاد. وسيساعد تحديد الحكومة لأولويات البلاد واحتياجاتها الملحة والمتوسطة الأمد، المنظمات الدولية وغير الحكومية على توجيه مواردها ومساعداتها الفنية بثقة لرفد جهود التنمية في البلاد.

وفي نهاية الأمر فإن اليمن سيكون قادراً على تحمل مسؤولياته فقط عندما يتم تمكين الاقتصاد الوطني ويشتد عوده بقطاعيه العام والخاص. يضاف إلى ذلك أن اليمن لن يستطيع الاعتماد على المساعدات الإنسانية الخارجية إلى أبعد من الفترة الانتقالية الراهنة. كما أن هذه الموارد غالباً لا تكون تحت تصرف الحكومة المباشر، وبالتالي صعوبة تحديد المسؤولية وعلى من تقع المحاسبة. وهذه من شأنه إضعاف شرعية الدولة وسيادتها والمراهنة بانهيارها. ولا يخفى تلك الصعوبات التي تواجه البلاد في إدارة هذه الموارد، مثل تحديد مقاديرها ومواعيد الإفراج عنها، والتأخير المترتب على الفترة التي تفصل بين تاريخي الالتزام والإفراج من جانب الجهة المانحة. ويلخص ريموند جيلبين، مدير مركز الاقتصادات المستدامة بمعهد الولايات المتحدة للسلام ذلك في قوله: "إن العلاقة بين الدول المانحة والدول المتأثرة بالصراعات كالزواج الفاسد، فبينما يعلم كلا الطرفين بعدم إخلاص الطرف الآخر، لا يريد أي منهما الطلاق". وقد تفرج الجهات المانحة عن مساعداتها في وقت لا تكون فيه مؤسسات البلاد في وضع يمكنها من امتصاص تلك الأموال وتوظيفها على النحو المرجو. وقد يكون من الأفضل للبلاد حالياً توظيف ما لديها من موارد مالية لثبيت العملة بدلاً من تكريسها في أوجه الإنفاق العام.

ومما يُوْسف له أن اليمن قد دخل في التزامات مسبقة وأبرم عقوداً مع عدد من الشركاء في قطاع النفط والغاز الطبيعي، ولولا ذلك لأمكن تأميم هذا القطاع وغيره من الموارد والثروات حتى يفيد الشعب من عائداتها. يفتقر اليمن حالياً للتقنيات والأيدِ العاملة المؤهلة في مجال تكرير النفط. وهناك خطط لتوسيع مشروعات الغاز الطبيعي المُسال في بلحاف ومعبر والحديدة، ولعلها تكون فرصة مواتية لتأميم بعضاً، مع قلته، من الثروات الوطنية. وفوق ذلك هنالك الحاجة الملحة لإعادة النظر في ووضع نظام ضرائبي واضح. وسيواجه هذا النظام حتماً بالنقد والمعارضة الشعبية. ولكن يجب أن لا يثنى هذا الدولة عن إدخاله وتطبيقه بالتوعية والحجة. فقد أقتنع شعب رواندا بدفع الضرائب عندما وضع ثقته في حكومته وشعر أن ما يقوم به واجب وطني عليه أداءه من أجل بناء وإعمار بلاده.

إن البدء في عملية جمع الضرائب لا يعد خياراً في هذا العام أو العام المقبل، ولكن يجب وضع خطة عملية لما بعد ذلك واختيار إدارة لهذه المهمة بكل عناية. وعلى جميع المؤسسات المعنية ممارسة أقصى درجات الشفافية إذا أريد لهذه العملية النجاح. ومن الضروري بناء قاعدة ضريبية عريضة، بحيث يقتسم العبء الضريبي على شرائح المجتمع المنتجة بشكل عادل وواقعي، يضمن استدامه العائد. وحتى ذلك الحين، فبإمكان الحكومة زيادة دخلها عن طريق الضرائب المباشرة. إن حدوث عجز في الموازنة العامة للدولة يجب أن لا يكون مدعاة للقلق إذ أنه، في بعض الأحيان، قد يكون مؤشراً لاستثمار لاحق.

إن برنامج المساعدة الخاص بالحكم الراشد والإدارة الاقتصادية في جمهورية ليبريا يستحق كل اهتمام. فعند بدء هذا البرنامج كانت الأوضاع هناك لا تختلف عن مثيلاتها في دول الصومال المفككة. أما اليوم فتشهد الأوضاع في ليبريا تحسناً كبيراً يعزى إلى الحكومة الانتقالية هناك. عانت ليبريا، مثل اليمن، من الفساد. ولكن في اجتماع عقد في بدايات الألفية، ضم الدول المجاورة والمانحين بالإضافة للجهات المعنية في ليبريا، تم الاتفاق على تشكيل أدارة مشتركة للعون الخارجي من قبل الوزارات المعنية الرئيسة وممثل للمجتمع الدولي. وأوجب هذا الترتيب توقيع الوزير المعني وممثل المجتمع الدولي معاً على كل اتفاقية يتم إبرامها، إضافة إلى عقد خاص يوقعه الوزير المعني يُلزِمه بشروط الاتفاقية وأهدافها. كما أتاح إشراك المنظمات غير الحكومية والمجتمع الدولي رقابة وشفافية أكبر، وليس أقل من ذلك تعرض بعض الوزراء الغير ملتزمين بهذه الترتيبات إلى تجميد الممتلكات والسجن.

ومن حسن الحظ فليس هناك ما يستلزم ذهاب اليمن إلى أبعد من ذلك المدى، ولكن على حكومة الوحدة تركيز جل اهتمامها على الشعب اليمني وتمكينه من تحقيق أولوياته، مع إقرارها بقدرته على الرقابة الذاتية. وعليها أيضاً أن لا تنسى أنها مسؤولة عن قوة عاملة تبلغ 8.6 مليوناً من الأنفس، وأن 52 بالمائة من الشعب لا يجدون العمل، والتذكر بأنها تقف على رأس بلد يعيش 50 بالمائة من شعبه تحت خط الفقر، إضافة إلى أن الأميات يمثلن 60 بالمائة من تعداد النساء والفتيات.

وصفت صحيفة بيزنيس مونتر انترناشيونال هذه اللحظات التي يمر بها اليمن بأنها " تحمل بعض الإمكانات التي تتيح له معاودة النمو في عام 2012. ومع تدفقات المساعدات الخارجية من دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي وغيرها، فإنه من المرجح أن تتوافر الموارد المالية لدى أي حكومة جديدة لزيادة الإنفاق وحماية البنية الأساسية للصادرات". فالفرصة متاحة الآن أمام اليمن شعباً وحكومة لرسم أهداف واضحة وواقعية واتخاذ خطوات جادة وعملية حتى يتحقق لليمن الحبيب وشعبه الكريم ما يبتغيه ويستحقه حاضراً ومستقبلاً.