Politics and the evolution of Takfeer in Yemen

Published on Oct. 12, 2013 on The Atlantic Post

By Sama’a Al-Hamdani and Afrah Nasser

I was declared an apostate at the end of April 2013 because of a political seminar on women’s empowerment hosted at my college in Taiz. In this gathering, I stated that Islam’s most stringent provisions – whether in the Qur’an or the Sunnah – are meant to refine rather than to terrorize. A radical cleric twisted my words and said that I called the Prophet Mohammed a liar and based on it, I was labeled a Kafir (apostate).  - Sally Adeeb, age 21, law school student.

Since the overthrow in Yemen of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011, 11 people have been accused of apostasy (see chart 1 below) in the practice referred to as Takfeer. One of them, Jamal al-Junid, was detained by the police in May 2013 for 15 days and finally was released after the staging of several protests. Another accused “apostate” is Ahmed Al-Arami, a literature and arts lecturer who was labeled a “secularist” in April 2013 and subsequently fled the country because of serious threats and the possibility that he might be executed. The sensitivity of offending religion is a stumbling block in the quest to return Yemen to stability.

NDC and the Evolution of Takfeer

Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference (NDC), which was launched in March 2013 and is part of a Gulf Cooperation Council plan for a negotiated transition for Yemen, has been targeted for accusations of apostasy by one of the country’s leading clerics. Abdul Majeed Al-Zindani, Yemen’s influential Muslim Brotherhood/Wahhabist cleric who is also listed as a “specially designated global terrorist” by the United States Treasury Department in 2004, recently released a YouTube video in which he condemned the current NDC political process. The video presentation discussed the framing of the state’s legislation being managed by “the State Building Committee” and claimed that the majority of the committee’s members had voted that Islam is “the state’s main source of legislation” instead of “the state’s only source of legislation.”

Al-Zindani is a non-official politician who influences the Yemeni masses by claiming the custodianship of the Shari’ah, or Islamic law. He established an non-profit religious university, Al-Iman, in 1993 and has claimed to have invented a cure for HIV/AIDS and to have found scientific proof that women cannot speak and remember at the same time.

In July 2013, Al-Zindani’s office, which is managed by his son, issued an official statement announcing the names of 37 NDC members who are allegedly “fighting Islam” and asserting that the named individuals “reject the Islamic Shari’ah and are the enemies of Islam.” The statement is believed to be a warrant and could become a Takfeer fatwa pointing to these aforementioned members as apostates. The action prompted an urgent press conference held by the NDC that condemned publication of the list or the issuance of any such destructive fatwas.

The dispute reflects not only the struggle for dominance between the traditional religious base and the newly-emerging civil power in the decision-making process; it is also a critical factor in the evolution of the nation’s potential new identity. As of yet, it remains uncertain whether or not Shari’ah will be the only source of legislation in Yemen.

Takfeer has long been a key tactic used by radical political Islam to silence its critics. Given its importance to Yemen’s ongoing transition, it is useful to look more closely at the nature of Takfeer in Yemen, who is mainly affected by it, who implements it and how it might be ended.

Chart 1: People Declared Apostates in Yemen since 2011 

Name	Gender	Job	Date	Reason for Takfeer	Consequences/ Legal Action
Fikri Qassim	Male	Writer and playwright	Jan. 2012	Commenting about replacing Gods on Facebook	Death threats
Bushra Al Maqtari	Female	Journalist & novelist (YSP)	Jan. 2012	Controversial article	Legal suit
Mohsin ‘Ayed	Male	Journalist	Feb. 2012	For posting an intimate picture of him with his wife on Facebook	Death threats and wife asked for divorce after the fatwa
Mohammed Al-Saeidi	Male	Researcher and writer	Dec. 2012	Research on Qu’ran	Tried and found innocent after a huge pressure campaign
Samiah Al Aghbari	Female	YSP member & journalist	Feb. 2013	Speech on the death of Jar Allah Omar	Legal suit
Ahmed Al Soufi	Male	Writer	March 2013	Authoring a book that encourages infidelity	Received fatwa asking him to apologize; otherwise he’ll face death.
Sally Adeeb	Female	YSP member	April 2013	For comments on Sunnah and Qu’ran	Dropped
Jamal Al Junaid	Male	Employee at Yemen’s Justice Ministry	May 2013	Constant objection over corruption cases carried out by Islamist groups in the Ministry	Imprisoned for 15 days after a trial
Sulaiman Al Ahdal	Male	Lawyer	May 2013	Filing a lawsuit over looted land	Escaped prosecution after fleeing from Hudaidah city with his family
Ahmed Al Tares Al ‘Arami	Male	Lecturer, poet & critic	May 2013	Suggested a provocative reading-list for students	Escaped to Egypt after receiving death threats
Nabeel Saif Al Komaim	Male	Journalist	2013		Threatened to revoke nationality

What is Takfeer and Who Does It? 

Takfeer is the process of identifying and labeling a person an apostate from Islam. The objective of the process is to reprimand people who break fundamentalist norms, and it penalizes them on two levels. First, it publicly shames an individual by labeling him or her an “infidel” for “religious” purposes. Second, and on a more personal level, the individual becomes an “apostate” and his or her views are renounced as heresy. The “apostate” can be punished through social and/or legal ostracism, or even in some cases by execution through official or mob action. The Takfeer process effectively coerces the society to conform to a single ideology and is a means of enforcing a certain “norm.” Ultimately, the objective is to restrict creation of a pluralistic society.

The incidence of Takfeer is wholly political and can be traced back to the Abbasid Caliphate, where the targets were primarily influential thinkers, writers and philosophers, such as Al-Tabari, Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes).

The modern Takfeeri movement tends to target marginalized individuals and women, because the wealthy and influential elements in the society tend to use the process themselves as a means of maintaining their position.

Declaring women infidels is not a new trend in the Middle East and is not unique to Yemen. For example, in Egypt, there was Nawal Al Saadawi and in Kuwait Laila Al Othman and Aliyah Al-Shouaib, among many others. The recent Takfeer attacks in Yemen have not been against corrupt individuals who were economically powerful or belonged to an affluent tribe. Marginalized groups and women simply constitute the easiest targets to be attacked.

The main centers of impetus for Takfeer have been the Hanbali school of Sunni Islam associated with, but not necessarily endorsed by, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wahhabist faction (commonly referred to as Salafism). Salafism is a Sunni movement that calls for the practice of Islam in the way that the Salaf (“predecessors” or “ancestors”) did. Technically, both Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabis are Salafis; however, in the Arab world, the term Salafi usually refers to Wahhabis only. In Yemen, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis are at times grouped together due to the lack of general understanding of their differences and to their resemblance in political perspectives.

Most Takfeeris belong to either one of these two factions, but it is essential to note that not all Muslim Brotherhood members or Wahhabis endorse the practice. In fact, several imams have denounced the Takfeer process as unethical; for example, the late Yemeni Islamic scholar, Muhammad al-Shawkani, who had supported Takfeer in his early years as a scholar, subsequently recanted and issued public condemnations of it. Another contemporary and moderate Islamic scholar, Habib Ali al-Jifri, also condemns Takfeer.

What Do Takfeeris Want?

As it is often a reflection of the nation’s underlying political trends, Takfeer is frequently an evolving process. It is primarily a means of keeping people’s attitudes in check through the manipulation of public opinion; as Takfeeris long for a theocratic state, the process of Takfeer, especially in a transitional situation such as now exists in Yemen, is likely to be reactionary rather than progressive.

During Yemen’s Revolution in March 2011, Yemeni radical cleric Abdulmajeed Al Zindani stated, “The revolutions happening in the Arab world are introductions to establishing an Islamic Caliphate.”

A modern day Caliphate would be a centralized religious dictatorship. Advocates such as Al Zindani are seeking to influence, dominate and restrain the masses. They romanticize and glorify the time of the caliphates and use propaganda to tarnish the prospect of a civil state by claiming it would corrupt faith. Takfeeris are radicals who reject compromise and claim to hold absolute truths through the exploitation of religion.

As is true of other Takfeeri groups in the Middle East, Yemeni Takfeeris seek to change and dominate the “norms” of the societies in which they operate. Takfeeris exhibit their political and religious affiliations through outward appearances such as dress and social rituals and attempt to force these on society as norms.

For instance, Yemeni women no longer wear colorful dresses but instead are covered in black. Women who do not follow this norm are easily identified and could be targeted. Such an obvious outward expression of adherence allows the group to measure its success: the more people comply to the uniform, the more authority they gain. This distinction facilitates an impression of greater cohesion. In turn, the Takfeeris have successfully created a binary community in Yemen where people are divided into “us” versus “them.”

Takfeer also is a means of suppressing dissent and effectively silencing the “enemy.” In a pious society such as Yemen’s, once God is added to the equation, individuals of faith are fearful to stand on the opposing side. The innate injustice of this situation is expressed in the quintessential proportionality argument; bringing God into a political or an ideological argument is equivalent to fighting a defenseless village with machine guns.

Takfeer in Yemen

Historically, Takfeer in Yemen has not been limited to Sunni Islam. The earliest record of mass-Takfeer traces to 1205 CE when the Zaydi (Shi’a) Imam Abdullah Bin Hamza declared as apostates a faction of Zaydis known as Al-Matrifiyah, an action that precipitated a bloody massacre in the governorate of ‘Amran in 1213 (610 Hijri).

The use of mass-Takfeer against political opponents was more recently on display during Yemen’s Civil War of 1994, when Al Zindani and ِAbdulwahab Al Dailami, Minister of Justice during Yemen’s Civil War in 1994, invoked it to legitimize war against secessionists.

Al Dailami issued a fatwa to that effect, and went so far as to legitimize the killing of civilians, accusing them of being weak Muslims for allowing the secessionists to be “shoved” among them.

Al-Dailami’s fatwa against people in Yemen’s south during the 1994 Civil War is considered one of the causes of the killing of thousands of people in the south. In the post-war era, Al-Dailami and Al-Zindani denied that they had issued any fatwa during that war.

Years later, during Sa’dah’s string of six wars that began in 2004, the beliefs and practices of the Houthis (now called Ansar Allah) were questioned, and some clerics labeled Zaydis as heretics.

During Ali Abdullah Saleh’s rule (1978-2012), the Takfeeri movement targeted not only political opponents, but also journalists, artists and writers, as well as anyone else who had the potential to influence people’s minds (see timeline below for detailed information). Most of the Takfeeri fatwas issued in Yemen over the past 33 years were mandated by Wahhabi clerics.

The declaration of women as apostates is often part of the larger “us” versus “them” mentality; women who refuse to adhere to the Takfeeri dress uniform of a very conservative veil (norm) are considered “western” and therefore associated with the enemy (them). Also, women who do not adhere to the prescribed doctrines governing female behavior are considered “anti-social” to conservative norms.

Women facing Takfeer frequently are independent thinkers and are likely to have closer ties to youth movements rather than being associated with traditional political parties. The objectives of such women are usually wider than merely fighting marginalization and extend to the sort of defamation and baseless threats that are usually a part of being singled out as an apostate.

For their part, Takfeeris tend to view women as a homogenous group. Inspired by the domino theory, Takfeeris believe that if one woman leader is terrorized, other emerging women leaders would become silent. The same theory applies to other marginalized groups.

Acceptance of Takfeer 

In the past 20 years, Yemenis have experienced a crisis of governance and have come to consider Takfeeri movements as a shift from the former regime, a lesser of two evils. Moreover, religious groups were the only opposition entities allowed to operate freely under Saleh’s regime, which saved him from being targeted as an “enemy of Islam.”

Operating in such a relatively free environment for the past 23 years, the Takfeeri groups have had plenty of time to assimilate into Yemeni society, and their level of organization has been enhanced as well by funding received from individuals residing in Saudi Arabia. Unlike other political movements in the country, their ideology is easy to articulate and powerful. The current transitional period in Yemen offers a fertile ground for their continued rise to power.

The increasing prominence of Takfeeris reflects a concomitant deterioration of ijtihad, the process of independent reasoning within Shari’ah, or Islamic law. It also highlights the domination of Sunni Takfeeri trends in the nation’s intellectual milieu and hints at an underlying confusion (because of the fragile religious scholarship in the country) in the ability to distinguish between what is ‘Aib(disgraceful/dishonorable) and what is Haram (forbidden/taboo).

Indoctrination, ignorance and political aspiration are the main reasons that Yemenis accept the process of Takfeer. Illiteracy in Yemen is 40 percent (around 70 percent for women) and the population depends heavily on the guidance of jurists. In the last two decades, Yemen gave precedence to Al ‘Ilm Bil Deen (religious studies) over Al ‘Ilm Bil Donya (scientific and technical studies). Yemeni society remains interdependent and it is easy to gain public support. Others fear being labeled irreligious. It is important to remember that most Tafkeeris genuinely believe they are carrying out God’s wishes on earth.

Takfeeris should be made aware that declaring people apostates will silence some individuals but is not a long-term solution of eliminating all opposition. The practice of Takfeer has no roots to the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Muslims and Islamists will benefit from a message that Islam is a tolerant and a rational religion. Atonement was and should be an option for “sinners,” especially when the sin is narrowly defined by a particular sect. Yemen desperately needs an Islamic critique on the use of Takfeer.

It is also essential that human rights, and especially those for women, be codified in the new Yemeni constitution. Members of the National Dialogue need to ensure that future jurists selected for the drafting process are aware of the need for a detailed consideration of people’s rights of expression to prevent future strife.

Shari’ah is presently the only source of legislation in Yemen. If this simplistic and vaguely defined body of law remains, it will be important to identify which schools of Islamic law will be followed and the specific jurists who will be issuing fatwas. Strict criteria also will be required on who can be an Islamic jurist in the future (perhaps graduates of Al-Azhar University or those who hold a Ph.D. or M.A. in Islamic studies). All of this needs to be done without restricting Yemen’s Islamic diversity.

Finally,  mandatory education must be enforced to help individuals make informed decisions. The Yemeni educational system, which is currently being revamped, needs to give equal importance to scientific education (learned knowledge over memorized knowledge). More importantly, the people need to be aware of the influence of religious imperialism from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, Egypt and Turkey. When it comes to governance, people need to understand that there are modes of governance other than religious orthodoxy or failed “democracy.”

Sama’a Al-Hamdani writes the blog Yemeniaty, which covers a range of topics on Yemen, focusing specifically on women’s issues. You can follow her @Yemeniaty.
Afrah Nasser is a blogger from Yemen living in Sweden and co-founder of the @YemeniSalon in Stockholm.

NDC: An exchange of Ideas

This post is a bit lengthy but is beneficial to those who are curious about Yemen's National Dialogue. In response to an article I wrote in regards to transparency in the National Dialogue, I received comments from Samira Ali BinDaair, who holds a Masters in Education from the University of Manchester,U.K. She is a lecturer and has worked with UNFPA, OxfamGB, UNIFEM and IPEC. She has several publications on Education. The following exchange occurred:

Dear Sama'a, 

It was nice seeing you and talking to you and a pleasure to see the little girl I once knew blossom in to a beautiful and smart young lady. 

I agree with some of the points you raised about the NDC but here I would like to clarify to you as to why the dialogue is as it is  but also to make a general comment on the dialogue.

First of all, about the dialogue being too fast I do not agree….On the contrary, the majority of Yemenis think it is dragging on and on and this fact is not to the advantage of the dialogue.The Yemeni public is getting impatient and the initial enthusiasm for the dialogue is beginning to wan, especially seeing that the talks have not been accompanied with the implementation of transitional justice and restitution of the loss of people's rights.

I agree with you that the NDC suffers from a lot of flaws but are all these shortcomings due to the points you raised... lack of transparency choice of attendees outside political parties etc. 

I would like to argue that the stage had already been set for either the success or failure of the NDC and goes beyond these logistics.  I think most of the reasons that may stand in the way of its success are structural and lie within the socio-political structure of yemen that goes back to decades. The power centers in yemen that have prevailed since the revolution of 1962 in north yemen and independence in south yemen are difficult to dislodge even at this stage (after the spring)  and even Abdurabo Mansur would not have survived to oversee the process of the NDC had he attempted not to include them as the major players in the NDC. The whole purpose of the NDC is to get these power centers to dialogue and accept the concept of power sharing  and diffuse the underlying dynamite to start with. It would be naïve to expect more than that at this stage in yemen. The civil state that we dream of is going to take time and will need a lot of hard work in the near future and despite the bleak outlook at the moment there is hope . The rewriting of the Constitution may be an important step but in the end it is a piece of paper that may lack credibility if mechanisms for implementing the different clauses are not effectively defined. Therefore we need to look beyond it and as to how we can achieve social justice.

Revolution is a process not an event and the best type of change is change that starts from the bottom up and is gradual not drastic change that leads to social upheavals. Therefore we have to accept some of the negative aspects in order to lead to the positive in future. (We cannot afford armed confrontation in yemen)  These power centers will gradually filter away and outdate themselves if they do not do their homework if we are to believe the lessons of history.. As Ibn Khuldoon says in his Preface about  the reasons for the rise and fall of empires as  prevailing from within (ie internal flaws). People have woken up and become aware and we cannot go back to the past since the chains of silence have been   broken. Indeed what is the alternative to dialogue imperfect as it may be? I have yet to see anyone delineate this alternative…. if I were to conduct a random survey about what should have been done at this stage within the prevailing circumstances in yemen I doubt I would get a convincing answer. I notice that we Yemenis or Arabs in general (and this is not about your article Samaa) tend to make sweeping statements about everything without focusing on a specific issue or criticizing a specific point about a phenomenon. I have heard people who are involved in the NDC make statements like "we don’t know what is happening it is all a mess" etc etc. Surely all this effort that has been made for people to sit on the table and discuss issues is not all negative? The reason why there is dialogue is because there are many differences of opinion which is inevitable in any society.

To come back to your points  regarding transparency etc….some of the proceedings were shown on yemen tv but I do not think it would be in the interest of the dialogue to show the different actors thrashing out the issues when the process is incomplete that might lead to more loss of confidence in the dialogue within the general public. Isn't it better to publicise results once synthesized? We should not compare yemen with western countries which have experimented with democracy for decades and built institutions that support it. The variables here are different and we cannot jump stages in the process.

About the Yemeni public being made aware of the assistance from the world bank you said etc….what is the significance of that and in what way will it contribute to the success of the dialogue or achieve transparency? In fact it could work in the opposite direction because people are already disenchanted with the US due to many reasons one of them being the unmanned drones that cause havoc to civilians. The world bank /IMF are at the moment pressurizing the Yemeni gov. to remove subsidies from petrol and gas thus putting the govt in a very awkward situation considering the suffering of the people at present from high rates of inflation. Thus it will further antagonize the public to know about the involvement of the world bank in the dialogue. Honestly I have yet to read a complete success story about the structural adjustment package of the WB/IMF in any third world country.  Yemen is in a weak position at the moment and all these regional and international forces dictate their terms. Where is the money that the "friends of yemen" promised to get us out of the economic emergency situation? The answer for yemen lies in attracting investment as partners in future to get us out of this position of "beggars" that the regime has got us into for the last three decades.

Further on in your article you rightly criticized the involvement of foreign experts and the money being wasted on them…..but then considering the fact that the gulf initiative has been transacted by the gulf the UN and the foreign partners this is inevitable. All these international partners are waiting for a pretext to demonize yemen…..and as the Arabic saying goes:"if your hand is under a huge stone remove it gently lest you break it"Much as we resent their interference we have to know the rules of the game and play it right. Moreover publicizing the nitty gritty of daily expenditures of the NDC will not necessarily set a precedent for accountability to the public but publicizing the returns from oil and gas and gov. expenditure and how budgets are spent is going to achieve that starting from now. I believe civil society organizations and the general public should demand that from the government.

You mention engaging the Yemeni public or the lack of it ….but how do we do this beyond the field teams that are supposed to have gauged opinion limited as it may be? I agree that to some extent the NDC has excluded some important independents but then in the end how many people can be included in a dialogue without it turning into a circus? I think it might be a good idea to find a way of including peoples opinions and presenting results of research of experts to the NDC to be included in the final draft of the working groups. I think Dr.Waheeba Fare has tried to do this through her academic group of experts but a way has to be found to effectively transmit this to the NDC before it is too late. There may be other forums who may also be doing this and I am sure that in future there will be a lot of opportunities for expressing public opinion on different matters.  In the past this was not possible and even if youth inclusion in the dialogue has been limited in future I believe they will make the changes for better or for worse. Social movements take time to grow and mature and create leadership and this will happen slow as it may be. There are many  smart young people like yourself in whom we have hope for the future. We have to be positive and we need some idealism that will spring people into action and believe the picture is not all negative. It is healthy to criticize provided we are objective and offer alternatives.

Abdurabo Mansur is in an unenviable position and considering many facts about the present situation which we all know he has managed to achieve some results even if slowly but there are so many challenges to contend with and the old regime is not letting go yet and is doing everything to disrupt the process of rapprochement and national stability. The main mistake he made was to ignore the southern issue and not go there sooner to dialogue with the southern movement and thus the vacuum has led to the forces inside and outside yemen to capitalize on this state of affairs  and incite the more rigid section of the Hiraak to create the explosive situation prevailing in the south. The southern issue is a core issue and will determine the nature of the future state and it has to be taken very seriously and secession is not at all to the interest of yemen. However there are genuine demands that have to be met before this is done.

Unfortunately yemen has suffered from too many armed confrontations in the past….in the north the educated and good leaders like abdulrahman aliryani,Abdullah salaal and alhamdy did not last long and since Ali took over we have not seen much progress and with all the outside assistance should yemen have the lowest human indicators in the region next to Somalia? But people have short turn memories and want him back some from sheer ignorance and others with vested interests. This is a transitional stage and we cant have miracles overnight.  In the south too the good leaders like Qahtan Alshaaby and Salim Rubaya ali were knocked off by the more extremist socialists and armed conflict also has led to the destruction of the country and alienating some of the best people who could have made a difference. Now we need to move forward and start creating the stage for a different yemen and how we will do that depends very much on keeping our heads above water and think of solutions to different problems rather than drown in the sea of troubles and become paralysed  negative and defeatist and repeat platitudes like it’s a big mess and we are heading for disaster nothing can prevent it. Maybe I am one of the lucky few who always see the silver lining in the cloud and half the glass as full rather empty. I would suggest looking at some of the positive things in yemen and remain optimistic and take it from there. 

 I know I have not entirely focused on your article and have digressed but all these issues are interrelated.I do hope however I have managed to clarify some of your doubts even if you are not convinced I am ready to be convinced by you when we meet and discuss.

Have a good day and keep up the good work.         

In response, I wrote: 

I am thrilled to see such a response! Thank you for sharing all of these points. I agree with several points you make but first, I want to let you know that I am restricted in my writing (especially when I have a 1500 word limit). I need to focus on a specific topic. In this article it was transparency.
It's hard to present my entire opinion on the dialogue in one article. So, I write on specific topics in little doses. Second, I really enjoyed the points that you raised and I would like to share it in my blog with your permission of course. Unfortunately when we met, we did not have a chance to speak longer. I appreciate that you took the time to write this and I delighted to see that you mentioned Ibn khaldun and use Yemeni quotes. I am one of those who fully understand that Yemen is not part of the West.

Now, I stand by what I wrote in regards to transparency. I think we tend to underestimate the Yemeni people. While many are illiterate, they deserve to know what is happening in the dialogue. Especially when it was promised to them. Perhaps the only way to get the dialogue participants to respect the transitional process and their duties is to publicize their irresponsible behaviors. Since the number of participants is very big, cutting participants out (who are not working towards a resolution) would solve two problems: 1) members who are not serious and are there to play can be removed and 2) the dialogue would look more credible because it is not tolerating child play. I know this will never happen and I am being idealistic here but it's unfortunate to see that we like to fool and undermine the worth of the average Yemeni citizen. The original flaw lies in the selection process but now it is too late to fix.

I recently started to hear about the work of dr. Wahiba Farea. While her process is not officially adopted by the national dialogue, it seems to be operating better. She selected academics who are capable of drafting solutions and I look forward to exploring this process further soon. Again, this process and similar parallel processes highlight the flaw in the selection process of the NDC: giving seats to please and occupy all of Yemen's influential figures.

As for the process of reconciliation, this is the subject of my next/current project. Without it, the dialogue would not be able to produce long term solutions. I look forward it sharing it with you soon.

As for the speed of the conference, It is possible that the transitional process seems slow to you because the dialogue has failed to move according to plan because its not managed well. Moreover, so many people outside of the dialogue are continuing to make other plans (like separatists, Islamists, etc), it is in the interest of Yemen to reach solutions soon. There is pressure building inside the dialogue and I sympathize with all of the participants who are pouring their hearts and souls into this process. That being said, the only way to calm the Yemeni people is to provide them with services like water, electricity, etc. This would relieve them of their anguish and foster trust in the future Yemeni government. The dialogue failed in providing a temporary economic solution to Yemen. The NDC process is purely political. On the bright side, it succeeded in providing temporary jobs to 565 individuals.

Each transitional process needs to be custom made to the country undergoing transformation and in Yemen's case, the structure of the dialogue could be described as "too sophisticated". At times the structure of the 9 committees and the large number of participants created an obstacle in the path of political progression. Many of the subjects intersect and the second general plenary meeting failed to achieve anything. All our hopes are now in the hands of the final and third plenary meeting.

I definitely agree that the decisions that the committees come up with will need implementation. Without it, all of this hard work would go to waste (& this is a possibility).

Finally, my argument on the subject of transparency is based on the fact that the NDC promised something that they didn't deliver. I was just following through. Also, It is hard for a single person like me to provide solutions to such grave problems. I think my criticism in this particular article is just a cry for better transparency so people like me, who are not members of the dialogue, can feel that we are somehow included.  At the moment, I am still waiting to get my badge to go to the NDC. I think I will have a better picture then

Thank you for reading what i wrote, for sharing your thoughts and for your encouragement.

Best,
Sama'a

She then added: 

In addition to what I wrote you yesterday (as I said I couldnt type long from my fon with one finger its so slow thus I couldnt reply to all your points I am more comfortable now using my laptop) I forgot to mention to you that I hope my point about the yemeni public not following every little point of the dialogue did not indicate my considering the fact that they are illiterate that they cannot understand whats going on.....that would be terribly patronizing  what I meant is that as it is there is so much frustration that this will only add to their frustration which is not to the advantage of the NDC because the reaction from the public could be really fierce .We cant afford whats happening in egypt right now and added to the fact that yemenis are armed to the teeth. Transparency could be achieved by transmitting the outcome of the discussions at different stages of the talks which I think is being done from what I read in the papers and also on yemen tv and radio. I think a list of people who left the talks and people who were replaced has also been publisized if I am not mistaken .

On the contrary yemenis are very politicised and very aware and as I said in my article "Yemeni spring nipped in the bud - where do we go from here" it does not take a university degree to know that one is dispossessed of one's most basic rights. I believe my grandmother had far more wisdom and awareness than a lot of Ph.D holders who may be qualified in a specific field  but not necessarily aware.....I had also pointed out the process that Paulo Freire the latin american educator had undertaken in raising the consciousness of the oppressed in his revolutionary adult education programme.(Pedagogy of the Oppressed)  This is also possible in yemen but not through the NDC....I still maintain that the NDC is not the panacea to resolving all the problems in yemen....on the contrary it has quite a limited function which as I said before is to get these power centers to agree as a first step because whether we like it or not they wont let go at this stage and   their lack of agreement could be threatening to yemen. We also hope some of the good people(I am sure there are many despite our doubts) in the dialogue would also act as a neutralizer in some way. I think the real work of nation building will start when the NDC ends and then the role of the people will come in. I have heard people say that once the NDC is over and the big guys concoct the articles of the new constitution their own way  then the game is over. This is not true because there are technical experts who have given their input and are still doing so and whats more important is the nature of lines of accountability that will be established where officials are concerned including the President and the type of political system i.e. parliamentary (the way it is now) and how will decision making powers be delineated between cabinet parliament and president . I am sure you know that there are many types of sytems where the president could be a figure head and prime minister have more power or like the old regime president is the be all and end all of yemens existence and so on and so forth. Let me give you an example about the old constitution which clearly stated matters concerning human rights, women's rights, etc but did we have the mechanisms for ensuring its implementation and define the checks and balances. I agree that once things are in the constitution they are binding but still we  have to go beyond this formality to the more important issue of specifying all these other matters and I think a kind of opinion poll needs to be done before it is concluded. There could be many other mechanisms for ensuring public opinion is included in the process but the most critical issue at stake at the moment is resolving the southern issue and understanding the demands of the houthis and other forces which might threaten the very stability of yemen and turn the country into small warring factions and provinces. I am not saying we need to compromise to save the country but there are some serious issues  that we have to take into consideration  since the situation in yemen is not idealand not to demand the impossible so as to pave the way for the possibilities in future.. The spring has achieved something but it will take time and effort to achieve all the aspirations of those who initiated the process and the rest of the public. I sincerely hope that we will have more honest people in future who will run the country and who will put the interests of yemen and the people before their own. Now that the public is more aware they will be more proactive in keeping a watchful eye and expressing their opinions on issues that concern the welfare of the yemeni people.

As it says in the Holy Qoran"
فأما الزبد فيذهب جفاءاً و أما ما ينفع الناس فيمكث في الأرض

So I am hoping that what is now not obvious to the eye all the precious jewels of yemeni wisdom and goodness the people who are the unknown soldiers ...the independents if you like or call them whatever you will ....all those who did not have a voice will have it soon.....it does take time for things to crystallize institutions to be built and institutionalised corruption to be purged but what is two years in the life of the nation. I think we have made a start and the process will continue.

Yemen's National Dialogue Behind Closed Doors

This post was originally posted at MENA source by the Atlantic Council

Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference (NDC), which began on March 18 and just reached the halfway point of its six-month mandate, was conceived as a core part of the transition process and is intended to bring together Yemen’s diverse political, social, geographic, and demographic groups to address the most critical issues plaguing the beleaguered country. Unfortunately, the way the dialogue was developed, designed, and directed created intrinsic flaws that may undercut its success. Some argue that the large number of participants and the lack of genuine representation outside of political parties are the reasons it is doomed for failure. Others feel that the process is advancing too quickly, leaving honest reconciliation out of the equation. One of the other major concerns is the lack of clear communication with the Yemeni public, transparency of the proceedings, and oversight of expenditures. 

Although some Yemen experts remain pessimistic about the future of the country, they refrain from critiquing the dialogue because the outcome is still unclear and many perceive the dialogue as the only way to prevent a descent into civil war. Particularly because the process is opaque and because there is genuine skepticism about the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) transition agreement and the dialogue itself, the NDC should pro-actively report on all working group and plenary proceedings, publish all records and modifications, and disclose all financial contributions and allocations. This is the time to measure the discrepancy between the dialogue’s stated intention and the reality on the ground, if there is hope for effective progress.

The Technical Committee of the National Dialogue clearly stated in a December 2012 statement that the NDC will have its own radio and television channel; however, this promise was never fulfilled. Instead, the NDC opted for the use of modern social media sites like Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, catering exclusively to the international community and the less than 15 percent of Yemenis who use the internet. Since March 18, not a single Facebook NDC post received more than nine comments.

Although the Dialogue’s Secretariat has tried to provide some information on its website, there is a tendency to understate or leave out important details that relinquishes crucial information to the interpretations of partisan media outlets. While some facets of the dialogue are downplayed, others are entirely omitted. For instance, the final reports of the nine working committees remain unofficial; some reports have surfaced, but only because they have been leaked. Also, there is no updated official list of participants available on the website or elsewhere since approximately thirty members of the NDC withdrew and/or were replaced. Likewise, there is no official record of all organizations and agencies “supporting” the NDC, like the United Nations (UN), World Bank, and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The lack of disclosure raises many important questions regarding the nature and amount of support that international organizations are providing. For example, the high-end Movenpick Hotel is the official NDC venue and it is reportedly packed with foreign governance experts and consultants who are being handsomely compensated, but little is known regarding the affiliation of these experts, what technical assistance they are offering Yemenis, or whether their role is beneficial and effective. With no answers in plain sight, it is easy to accuse the NDC of the selective concealment of facts.

This shortage of information and lack of community is still at times blamed on budget constraints even though the NDC’s official website reports that a total of 138 computers, thirty-five laptops and 225 cell phones were purchased. The initial budget for the NDC was an estimated $35 million dollars and according to more recent reports, $29 million has already been utilized. It is public knowledge that members of the NDC residing in Sana’a are compensated $100 per day and those residing outside of Sana’a are compensated a $180 per day. Millions are being spent on honoraria for members of the dialogue, compensation for foreign expertise, and the administrative expenses of the day-to-day operations; yet there is no easily accessible source of information regarding these expenses and the overall budget for the dialogue. This transparency is important not only for the NDC, but also because such practices would set a positive precedent as a possible blueprint for how the next Yemeni government will budget, spend, and monitor its public funds. Without budget transparency, the average Yemeni has little reason to trust the dialogue, the transitional process, or any future government.  

Just like the dialogue, transparency is a process, and in the NDC’s case, it is one that needs constant cultivation. The main facilitator of the GCC initiative and UN’s special envoy to Yemen, Jamal Ben Omar, asserts that the NDC is the most successful transitional process in the Arab World and the only transparent process that will provide real outcomes. Yet, in several interviews, he had to dismiss rumors claiming that the outcome has been predetermined or that the solutions will be determined by the old ruling elites outside the NDC process. These assertions gain steam among the public because of the obscurity surrounding the NDC; the only way to ensure a successful transitional process is to engage the Yemeni people – openly, actively, and with a genuine spirit of inclusivity. Transparency does not guarantee the success of the dialogue, but it is a fundamental requirement to gain the trust of the Yemeni people.

Fazli Çorman on Education Reform in Yemen (Part II)

Over the past few years, it became very apparent that the Turkish government is strategically strengthening its ties in Yemen through educational projects and programs. Yemen now has three Turkish schools, one in the capital Sana’a and two in the cities of Aden and Taiz. Furthermore, since 2013, the Turkish embassy announced that 22 scholarships will be given to 22 students, each from a different governorate in Yemen. This is one of many costly educational projects that Turkey has taken on board. Mr. Çorman states that the Turkish involvement with the Yemeni educational system is not something new and goes further by suggesting that the “new model” of the Yemeni educational system will be influenced by Turkey:

“There is a huge demand in Yemen for students to study in Turkey. Therefore, we organized an “Education Fair” from the 3-4 March in Sana'a and the 5-6 March in Aden. The new 22 extra scholarships for the best student of each governorate that you mentioned in your question were announced as a support to Yemen by the Rector of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan University located in Rize, during this Education Fair.
We’re regularly providing more scholarships every year for Yemeni students to study in Turkey. For instance last year, there was record number of 1,700 Yemeni applicants to the Turkish scholarship. A delegation came from Turkey and they conducted more than 200 interviews with the best candidates. Fifty of them were selected and now they are studying in Turkey.

Yemeni Ministers, like Minister of High Education H.E. Hisham Sharaf Abdullah, Minister of Education H.E. Abdurrezzak Yahya Al-Ashwal and Minister of Technical and Vocational Training H.E. Dr. Abdulhafiz Numan are very cooperative with in developing the educational system in Yemen together. Hereby, I would like to thank them for showing this cooperation and for participating in the opening ceremony of the Education Fair. On a separate note, we furnished the Yemeni-Turkish Technical and Vocational Training Institute in Sanaa for 2.6 million Dollars. We are searching possibilities to open a Yemeni-Turkish University”.

- You can follow the Turkish Ambassador @FazliCorman

On Drones: Yemeni Americans, Yemenis and Americans

This Monday, Aljazeera Stream held a conversation with journalist Jeremy Scahill to discuss his latest book, "Dirty Wars: the World is a Battlefield". The book is over 615 pages and "focuses on America's expanding covert wars and the White House claiming the legal authority to kill U.S. citizens". Anwar Al-Awlaki, an American/Yemeni clerk, was killed in a drone strike in Yemen and is a central figure in Scahill's book. He is the third American killed in Yemen by a drone, the other two are: Samir Khan and Abdulrahman Al-Awlaki, Anwar's 16 year old son.

After our conversation, it became apparent that the US has no intention of "capturing enemies" because they wouldn't know what to do with them. It is now a war of drones. Evan Cinq-Mars, a fellow speaker on the Stream, asked how this war will end. This is the question that everyone needs to be asking, because the use of drones is only helping AQAP recruit sympathizers which will lead to the use of more drones, and so on...

                                 

From left to right: Al-Awlaki's cousin, Activist Bushra Al Maqtari, and Rabyaah

There are obvious consequences to this policy (death, terror, etc) but, there is unrecognizable damage that could lead to sustained nonphysical conflict. There is a clash of cultures and Yemeni Americans are in the midst of it. They are rejected by association; in the US for being Arabs and maybe "terrorists" and in Yemen for being Western and for supporting "terrorists". The struggle within them is a reflection of the increasing tensions between the two countries.

The US and increasing tensions:

Due to the current economic recession, the US is only able to focus on anti-terrorism/security efforts in Yemen. The diplomats at the American Embassy in Yemen are restricted in movement to a small portion of Sana'a where they don't actually meet the real/average Yemeni. It is understandable why Americans would be cautious, especially after the shameful attacks on the US Embassy in Libya and the resulting assassination of the Ambassador there. However, the primary role of embassies is to practice diplomacy and with so many restrictions, it is illogical to expect sincere communication between the two countries.

Prior to 1990, the US was primarily focused on its security. Its foreign policy included countering the former USSR (the South of Yemen, a separate country prior to 1990, was Marxist and an ally of USSR). After unification in 1990, the US focused on some development and educational/cultural exchange programs. There are two challenges facing US-Yemeni relations.

First, the development programs were concentrated on the Northern parts of Yemen while the majority of the drone strikes and AQAP activity is carried out in the South. The role of the US prior to the Arab Spring focused on supporting leaders in the Middle East who, in Yemen's case, weren't interested in the overall welfare of their people. To Southern separatists, former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, is an ally of the US but the main enemy. Currently, Southern separatist leaders are snubbed by the Yemeni government and the drone strikes carried out by the US in Southern regions of Yemen exacerbate the tensions.

It appears to some Yemenis that the US continues to support regimes rather than the people. To make matters worse, the US educational exchange programs haven't increased and their efforts are upstaged by several other countries who are providing better opportunities to Yemenis. Furthermore, it is near impossible for Yemenis to obtain visas for travel to the US. Every male over the age of 18 is treated like a suspect and until proven innocent, he will remain in Yemen.

To be a Yemeni in America: 

Some Yemenis live in communities, close to each other and maintain a traditional lifestyle, but others, like me, like to integrate into American society. Over the past seven years, I have come to love this country. Throughout several interactions, it became clear that many Americans don't know anything about Yemen but that the country harbors terrorists. I have been examined carefully because I look and behave in a similar manner. Some would say: "You don't look like a Yemeni!" but since they don't know much about the country, no Yemeni will look like one.

Yemeni-Americans have to challenge the "terrorist" stereotype on a daily basis. This stereotype is harsh and Yemenis in the US are burdened with the responsibility of representing all Yemenis, not just themselves. When disaster strikes in the US, Yemenis across the world, but more specifically in the US pray that the attacker is not Yemeni, nor has ties to Yemen. Yemenis in the US don't need that kind of attention. So we spend our lives telling Americans about our architecture, our coffee, our sky-rises and our queens. But all of that doesn't matter when an event like the Boston Marathon bombing takes place. Reporting on the incident, Chris Matthews proves that stereotypes persist:

"To be blunt and not be into political profiling or racial profiling but when you look at a picture that we’re looking at now are there people in the FBI in the investigative world that can look at the picture, study it ethnographically and figure what the odds are on a fellow like that being from different parts of the world say YEMEN…”

While Yemenis are offended and angry, it is not an option to be so. They have to restrain their anger and accept it for the sake of their heritage. As Americans they love America and don't want it to get hurt. Finally, Yemenis in America, like other Americans, are just as terrified of AQAP.

The Role of Yemen:

In the early 1990s, the Yemeni government promised to care for its people. Prior to that, and after only a few years of ruling in the North, former President Saleh had the key to remain in power for what seemed like a lifetime. Democracy and free elections continued to be a notion that Yemenis talk about but not really experience especially since none of the neighboring countries were democracies (mostly monarchies or dictatorships).

With globalization and the advancement of technology, many things in Yemen changed. Regardless, Saleh continued to rule. The Yemeni government took responsibility for the first drones used against AQAP; not to make the US look good, but rather because Saleh knew that he was betraying his own people. Some accuse Saleh's regime of fostering terrorist groups in order to fill his pockets. Others accuse him of feeding Americans false intelligence in order to attack his own rivals. While these accusations may or may not be true, the fact was that the government was no longer responsible for what goes on in its own land with its own people.

Today, President Abdurabbu Mansour Hadi is expected to meet the demands of the Yemeni people. While he needs to deal with the economic recession, poverty, famine, lack of security, etc. He is still expected to protest the excessive use of drones in Yemen (at least against signature strikes). In a separate conversation, a fellow Yemeni pointed out that president Hadi doesn't have a lot of leverage with the US because they are his main "backers", leaving his hands tied. Still, Scahill's statement resonates with me: "We need to hold our own government accountable"...

To be an American in Yemen:

My last trip to Yemen was in August of 2012 and anti-American sentiments were at an all time high. It was clear that the majority of Yemenis felt let down by their own government but even clearer that they were more so by the US. To them, liberal voices in the United States are silent on the killings carried out by drones on innocent lives. In turn, the liberals in Yemen, abandoned their American counterpart.

When Yemeni-Americans go back to Yemen, they become responsible for representing the values of America in Yemen. In his testimony on drones before congress, Farea' Al-Muslimi states:

"I went to the U.S. as an ambassador for Yemen. I came back to Yemen as an ambassador of the U.S."

When Yemeni-Americans are in Yemen, they feel the need to represent America well. They explain to Yemenis that what they see is a product of fear. Yemenis need to realize that these reactions do not reflect the sentiments of the American people. What Yemenis view as the US is nothing more than the implementation of a policy decided by branch within the US government: not even the entirety of the US government agree on it. However, these facts become harder to swallow as the heedless use of drones continues to increase.

The solution:

American Diplomats in Yemen are in a tough place. President Hadi is in a tough place. People in the US are scared of terrorism and Yemenis are scared of drones. 

No one can predict the end of this "war". The current tactics are futile; they are short term responses that postpone a real solution. To end these conflicts, we need to suspend militaristic realism, and we need to employ empathy and communication to foster amity in the long term. Finally, I have endless gratitude for Yemeni-Americans and Americans in Yemen who inspire peace rather than promote fear.

Female Agency in the Yemeni Transition

This is published in the International Training Programme for Conflict Management (ITPCM) and can be found online here.

For the first time since unity in 1990, Yemeni women are challenging tradition. Breaking curfews, participating in political activities after nightfall, reciting folkloric poetry and shouting revolutionary slogans became common during and after the Revolution. For women, the Revolution was truly exceptional. They participated in sit-ins and addressed mixed crowds. The decoration of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Tawakkul Karman underscored the activism of Yemeni women around the world. Yemeni women were featured in numerous magazines, websites and newspapers as champions of civil society. During the uprising, women were equally as influential as men. In essence, women initiated a revolution within a revolution. The presence of Arab women in the public sphere during the Arab Spring misled many observers to believe that a women’s right movement was underway. Others were skeptical, warning that once political regimes began to collapse, the status quo would be restored. Only a few bothered to ask: what do women want from their Revolution? Yemeni women cannot uniformly answer this question because their experiences are not monolithic. The political dichotomy of the North and South produced alternate realities for women, especially as the North is more conservative and tribal than the South. After the unity in 1990, these realities continued to change based on the location, affluence and heritage of a woman’s family. Coupled with Yemen’s patriarchal and conservative culture, it was difficult to establish a unanimous movement for women. The current transitional government has three women Ministers out of 35. The Technical Preparatory Committee (TPC)[1] for the National Dialogue was composed of 19% women. One female out of 301 members is a parliamentarian and two women are members of the Shura Council. These political positions, none of which are decision-making, give the impression that women in Yemen have a greater role in the executive branch. The term “feminism” in itself remains controversial, and gender issues must be handled with care. In a system that is discriminatory in its legislation[2] against women, “feminist” objectives can be sidelined. Since women’s freedoms were restricted after Saleh’s fall, it became apparent that some of the women who participated in the uprisings were merely pawns for opposition parties. Despite these setbacks, there have been minor improvements to women’s political participation. On March 18, the National Dialogue began, leaving the fate of Yemen’s entire female population in the hands of a few women from various political backgrounds. Their goal is to simultaneously advocate on behalf of their parties and organizations, as well as women more broadly. As of now, existing accommodations made for women are insufficient, making it difficult for the National Dialogue to facilitate gender equality. Women must lobby for their rights outside of politics, and approach the problem from a different perspective to see results. As Feminists or as Politicians at the National Dialogue?

Current president, Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, made a point of advocating a 30% female quota in the National Dialogue. The conference will separate members into nine working committees.[3] Members have submitted their committee choice to the President[4] of the dialogue and his six deputies, none of which are women. Soon, these committees will begin their deliberations. Even though women’s issues deserve broader representation across the board, the topic will be examined under the eighth committee, “Rights and Freedoms”. Constitutional reform will be discussed in a separate committee, “Good Governance”. The structure of the dialogue does not support wholesale changes to the status of women’s rights, and it is not evident that discussion of women’s issues will make it into questions concerning constitutional reform. The status of women and their inability to affect change through the Dialogue are exacerbated by two problems. First, some of the women selected to participate are at a crossroads: are they feminists or politicians first? Are they representatives of their party or of women? Yemen’s “democratic” transition has played out as an exclusively political process through which women are incentivized to champion ideas that oppress other women. Unified by gender but divided by politics, women in the National Dialogue will frame gender issues like women’s security, economic poverty and illiteracy as political issues. Based on political divisions, the methodology of dealing with these topics will vary. Religious parties like Islah, Ansar Allah (Zaydi), Al-Haq (Zaydi and Hanafi) and Al-Rashad (Salafi) would approach women’s issues from a Shar’iah perspective, but ideological differences are likely to cause disagreements. Socialist groups, independents and even Ba’thist will advocate non-religious reforms or a mixture of both. A single group of unified women is much more powerful than smaller groups of women that are at odds. These political issues will polarize the women’s agenda and make it susceptible to the principle of divide and rule. Second, the same tactics used to question the legitimacy of the dialogue can be used to challenge solutions proposed to promote women’s rights. Any “feminist” agenda could be quickly dismissed as part of a Western conspiracy, since the dialogue itself is viewed as a foreign initiative rather than the result of a grassroots national process. Like several Arab Spring nations, Yemen is witnessing a rise in Islamic fundamentalism. Four religious parties will participate in the dialogue, and since Islah gained more influence beginning in 1994, female judges were dismissed as “incompetent in Islamic Law” and public schools were gender segregated after the sixth grade.[5] A narrow implementation of Islamic Shari’ah is expected. In Yemen, female equality is argued as a social liberalization process antithetical to religion, which could guarantee its failure. In Yemen’s conservative culture, religion dominates politics. The prevalence of early marriages in Yemen provides a revealing case. When Islah gained influence in Saleh’s government, the marriage age of 15 was abolished[6]. Since 2007, several governmental and non-governmental campaigns were launched in hopes of mandating a marriage age, but none of them succeeded. Radical interpretations of Islam were used to manipulate and limit the scope of female self-determination. The problem of child marriages still persists. According to Amal Basha, the spokesperson of the TPC, it has been a struggle to add the issue of underage marriage to the agenda of the National Dialogue. Eventually, TPC members “unanimously agreed to give it social priority.” Addressing child marriages, again, as a social issue with the same political actors makes it hard to fathom how social transformation can emerge through the National Dialogue. If previous methods proved futile, Yemeni women need to seek alternatives. Gender Strategies Outside the Social Realm

To improve women’s conditions, women need to frame their arguments outside of politics. A strategy that separates women’s issues from traditional values could prove successful in Yemen. Currently, 54% of Yemeni women are married before they reach the age of 18.[7] By tackling the “side effects” of child marriages, Yemenis can limit its social prominence without causing an overwhelming social backlash. About 58% of Yemeni women are illiterate.[8] Educational policies put in place by the government can assure that more girls are going to school. In Yemen, marriage means being a full-time homemaker, and if more girls are going to school, then they are less likely to marry or having children at a young age. Other strategies can tackle the same problem. Innovative health policies can produce substantial changes in reducing the high maternal and infant mortality rates.[9] Poverty alleviation programs are another method through which women can lobby for reform. Since 44% of the Yemeni population is acutely malnourished[10], financial incentives can promote the use of contraceptives[11] to control population growth and address food scarcity. It is unlikely that women’s issues will receive special attention, since Hadi’s administration has been preoccupied with more pressing issues like security and military reforms. With soaring inflation and an unemployment rate at 42.5%[12], the nation is facing several challenges. Therefore, women need to address their needs by mobilizing collectively. Between Sa’dah’s six wars and Al-Qaeda’s occupation of Abyan, 50% of Yemen’s Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are between 5-17 years old[13]. Only a quarter of IDPs from all age groups return to their homes[14]. These challenges impose damage on the female body. Displacement can also lead to rape, gender violence, human trafficking, and prostitution. Women as a group need to realize that protecting their gender is feasible through security programs. Another collective concern is the deteriorating economy. In March, Friends of Yemen pledged around 7.5 billion dollars[15] in assistance to Yemen. While the majority of the money is allocated to development programs, the government must assign a portion of it to specifically empower female entrepreneurship Without change, the nation will continue to be the lowest ranked country in the world in gender equality. Increasing female participation in the labour market can decrease harmful social traditions. Using women as agents of economic reform can result in the creation of a new workforce that facilitates the self-determination of women. Conclusions

The national dialogue promoted the inclusion of women in the transitional process, but this inclusion does not guarantee a transformation of reality in Yemen. Previous tactics, like addressing women’s issues as social concerns, could lead to political manipulation. Also, these measures have been proven ineffective. The dialogue is still in its infancy. Until a clearer picture of the Dialogue’s trajectory emerges, women will not be able to formulate a viable strategy. The National Dialogue is attempting to address numerous concerns at once, while struggling to maintain unity and reform a corrupt political system. For the time being, women need to advocate through each of the nine working committees. The female members of the dialogue are responsible for tackling women’s issues strategically from every possible front, because the obstacles facing them are not independent of each other, but are closely related and must be treated as such. To restrict the harmful consequences of tradition, non-social solutions should be considered. For instance, increasing female participation in educational programs, health programs and in workforce can alleviate problems such as child marriage. If more girls are going to schools then less of them are available for marriage. Affordable and accessible health care can reduce early deaths amongst young mothers and infants. Economic opportunities for women can provide families with additional income. While it is challenging to demand equality in a conservative culture, it is reasonable to demand equal access to health, education and economic opportunities. For the full emancipation of women, Yemen’s constitution must clearly delineate women’s rights, otherwise laws will continue to sanction the oppression of women. Women in the dialogue need new methods and must remain cautious of political ploys. Gender equality is difficult to achieve, but it will only become possible once we are aware of alternative options.

________________ [1] A 31-member Committee commissioned by President Hadi to decide on the size of participants, the rules for eligibility and for the mechanisms used during the dialogue. [2] Laws do not dictate but rather permit discrimination. For example, the Personal Status Law on wife’s obedience sanctions marital rape and restricts women’s freedom of movement. [3] Committees are divided based on Issues: Southern Issue, Sa’dah Issue, National Issues, State-building, Good Governance, Military & Security building, Independent Agencies, Rights & Freedoms, and Comprehensive Development. [4] President of the Dialogue is President Hadi. [5] Molyneux, Maxine, “Women’s Rights and Political Contingency: The Case of Yemen, 1990-1994.” Middle East Journal 49.3 (1995): 418-31. [6] Khalife, Nadya, How Come You Allow Little Girls to Get Married?: Child Marriages in Yemen. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2011. [7] “Yemen: A Wake Up Call to Early Marriage.” Oxfam International Blogs. Oxfam, 30 August 2012, retrieved on-line 15 March 2013. [8] According to World Bank Indicators, 2010. [9] “Yemen: A Wake Up Call to Early Marriage.” Oxfam International Blogs. Oxfam, 30 August 2012, retrieved on-line 15 March 2013. [10] Burki, Talha, “Yemen’s Hunger Crisis.” The Lancet 380.9842 (2012): 637-38. [11] Only 9.3% of Yemen’s population uses a modern form of contraception. USAID Country Health Statistical Report, Rep. Washington DC: Bureau of Global Health, 2009. [12] The Second National Millenium Development Goals Report. Sana’a: United Nations Development Fund and the Republic of Yemen, 2010. [13] The Republic of Yemen. Operational Unit for IDPs Camps. Information Center.Summary Showing the Number of Households by the Orginal District and Governorates. Sana’a: ROY, 2013. [14] Ibid. [15] Andersen, Inger. “Friends of Yemen: World Bank Vice President Inger Andersen Urges Support for Yemen’s Transition.” Friends of Yemen: World Bank Vice President Inger Andersen Urges Support for Yemen’s Transition, The World Bank, 7 March 2013 retrieved on-line 14 March 2013.