Politics and the evolution of Takfeer in Yemen

Published on Oct. 12, 2013 on The Atlantic Post

By Sama’a Al-Hamdani and Afrah Nasser

I was declared an apostate at the end of April 2013 because of a political seminar on women’s empowerment hosted at my college in Taiz. In this gathering, I stated that Islam’s most stringent provisions – whether in the Qur’an or the Sunnah – are meant to refine rather than to terrorize. A radical cleric twisted my words and said that I called the Prophet Mohammed a liar and based on it, I was labeled a Kafir (apostate).  - Sally Adeeb, age 21, law school student.

Since the overthrow in Yemen of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011, 11 people have been accused of apostasy (see chart 1 below) in the practice referred to as Takfeer. One of them, Jamal al-Junid, was detained by the police in May 2013 for 15 days and finally was released after the staging of several protests. Another accused “apostate” is Ahmed Al-Arami, a literature and arts lecturer who was labeled a “secularist” in April 2013 and subsequently fled the country because of serious threats and the possibility that he might be executed. The sensitivity of offending religion is a stumbling block in the quest to return Yemen to stability.

NDC and the Evolution of Takfeer

Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference (NDC), which was launched in March 2013 and is part of a Gulf Cooperation Council plan for a negotiated transition for Yemen, has been targeted for accusations of apostasy by one of the country’s leading clerics. Abdul Majeed Al-Zindani, Yemen’s influential Muslim Brotherhood/Wahhabist cleric who is also listed as a “specially designated global terrorist” by the United States Treasury Department in 2004, recently released a YouTube video in which he condemned the current NDC political process. The video presentation discussed the framing of the state’s legislation being managed by “the State Building Committee” and claimed that the majority of the committee’s members had voted that Islam is “the state’s main source of legislation” instead of “the state’s only source of legislation.”

Al-Zindani is a non-official politician who influences the Yemeni masses by claiming the custodianship of the Shari’ah, or Islamic law. He established an non-profit religious university, Al-Iman, in 1993 and has claimed to have invented a cure for HIV/AIDS and to have found scientific proof that women cannot speak and remember at the same time.

In July 2013, Al-Zindani’s office, which is managed by his son, issued an official statement announcing the names of 37 NDC members who are allegedly “fighting Islam” and asserting that the named individuals “reject the Islamic Shari’ah and are the enemies of Islam.” The statement is believed to be a warrant and could become a Takfeer fatwa pointing to these aforementioned members as apostates. The action prompted an urgent press conference held by the NDC that condemned publication of the list or the issuance of any such destructive fatwas.

The dispute reflects not only the struggle for dominance between the traditional religious base and the newly-emerging civil power in the decision-making process; it is also a critical factor in the evolution of the nation’s potential new identity. As of yet, it remains uncertain whether or not Shari’ah will be the only source of legislation in Yemen.

Takfeer has long been a key tactic used by radical political Islam to silence its critics. Given its importance to Yemen’s ongoing transition, it is useful to look more closely at the nature of Takfeer in Yemen, who is mainly affected by it, who implements it and how it might be ended.

Chart 1: People Declared Apostates in Yemen since 2011 

Name	Gender	Job	Date	Reason for Takfeer	Consequences/ Legal Action
Fikri Qassim	Male	Writer and playwright	Jan. 2012	Commenting about replacing Gods on Facebook	Death threats
Bushra Al Maqtari	Female	Journalist & novelist (YSP)	Jan. 2012	Controversial article	Legal suit
Mohsin ‘Ayed	Male	Journalist	Feb. 2012	For posting an intimate picture of him with his wife on Facebook	Death threats and wife asked for divorce after the fatwa
Mohammed Al-Saeidi	Male	Researcher and writer	Dec. 2012	Research on Qu’ran	Tried and found innocent after a huge pressure campaign
Samiah Al Aghbari	Female	YSP member & journalist	Feb. 2013	Speech on the death of Jar Allah Omar	Legal suit
Ahmed Al Soufi	Male	Writer	March 2013	Authoring a book that encourages infidelity	Received fatwa asking him to apologize; otherwise he’ll face death.
Sally Adeeb	Female	YSP member	April 2013	For comments on Sunnah and Qu’ran	Dropped
Jamal Al Junaid	Male	Employee at Yemen’s Justice Ministry	May 2013	Constant objection over corruption cases carried out by Islamist groups in the Ministry	Imprisoned for 15 days after a trial
Sulaiman Al Ahdal	Male	Lawyer	May 2013	Filing a lawsuit over looted land	Escaped prosecution after fleeing from Hudaidah city with his family
Ahmed Al Tares Al ‘Arami	Male	Lecturer, poet & critic	May 2013	Suggested a provocative reading-list for students	Escaped to Egypt after receiving death threats
Nabeel Saif Al Komaim	Male	Journalist	2013		Threatened to revoke nationality

What is Takfeer and Who Does It? 

Takfeer is the process of identifying and labeling a person an apostate from Islam. The objective of the process is to reprimand people who break fundamentalist norms, and it penalizes them on two levels. First, it publicly shames an individual by labeling him or her an “infidel” for “religious” purposes. Second, and on a more personal level, the individual becomes an “apostate” and his or her views are renounced as heresy. The “apostate” can be punished through social and/or legal ostracism, or even in some cases by execution through official or mob action. The Takfeer process effectively coerces the society to conform to a single ideology and is a means of enforcing a certain “norm.” Ultimately, the objective is to restrict creation of a pluralistic society.

The incidence of Takfeer is wholly political and can be traced back to the Abbasid Caliphate, where the targets were primarily influential thinkers, writers and philosophers, such as Al-Tabari, Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes).

The modern Takfeeri movement tends to target marginalized individuals and women, because the wealthy and influential elements in the society tend to use the process themselves as a means of maintaining their position.

Declaring women infidels is not a new trend in the Middle East and is not unique to Yemen. For example, in Egypt, there was Nawal Al Saadawi and in Kuwait Laila Al Othman and Aliyah Al-Shouaib, among many others. The recent Takfeer attacks in Yemen have not been against corrupt individuals who were economically powerful or belonged to an affluent tribe. Marginalized groups and women simply constitute the easiest targets to be attacked.

The main centers of impetus for Takfeer have been the Hanbali school of Sunni Islam associated with, but not necessarily endorsed by, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wahhabist faction (commonly referred to as Salafism). Salafism is a Sunni movement that calls for the practice of Islam in the way that the Salaf (“predecessors” or “ancestors”) did. Technically, both Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabis are Salafis; however, in the Arab world, the term Salafi usually refers to Wahhabis only. In Yemen, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis are at times grouped together due to the lack of general understanding of their differences and to their resemblance in political perspectives.

Most Takfeeris belong to either one of these two factions, but it is essential to note that not all Muslim Brotherhood members or Wahhabis endorse the practice. In fact, several imams have denounced the Takfeer process as unethical; for example, the late Yemeni Islamic scholar, Muhammad al-Shawkani, who had supported Takfeer in his early years as a scholar, subsequently recanted and issued public condemnations of it. Another contemporary and moderate Islamic scholar, Habib Ali al-Jifri, also condemns Takfeer.

What Do Takfeeris Want?

As it is often a reflection of the nation’s underlying political trends, Takfeer is frequently an evolving process. It is primarily a means of keeping people’s attitudes in check through the manipulation of public opinion; as Takfeeris long for a theocratic state, the process of Takfeer, especially in a transitional situation such as now exists in Yemen, is likely to be reactionary rather than progressive.

During Yemen’s Revolution in March 2011, Yemeni radical cleric Abdulmajeed Al Zindani stated, “The revolutions happening in the Arab world are introductions to establishing an Islamic Caliphate.”

A modern day Caliphate would be a centralized religious dictatorship. Advocates such as Al Zindani are seeking to influence, dominate and restrain the masses. They romanticize and glorify the time of the caliphates and use propaganda to tarnish the prospect of a civil state by claiming it would corrupt faith. Takfeeris are radicals who reject compromise and claim to hold absolute truths through the exploitation of religion.

As is true of other Takfeeri groups in the Middle East, Yemeni Takfeeris seek to change and dominate the “norms” of the societies in which they operate. Takfeeris exhibit their political and religious affiliations through outward appearances such as dress and social rituals and attempt to force these on society as norms.

For instance, Yemeni women no longer wear colorful dresses but instead are covered in black. Women who do not follow this norm are easily identified and could be targeted. Such an obvious outward expression of adherence allows the group to measure its success: the more people comply to the uniform, the more authority they gain. This distinction facilitates an impression of greater cohesion. In turn, the Takfeeris have successfully created a binary community in Yemen where people are divided into “us” versus “them.”

Takfeer also is a means of suppressing dissent and effectively silencing the “enemy.” In a pious society such as Yemen’s, once God is added to the equation, individuals of faith are fearful to stand on the opposing side. The innate injustice of this situation is expressed in the quintessential proportionality argument; bringing God into a political or an ideological argument is equivalent to fighting a defenseless village with machine guns.

Takfeer in Yemen

Historically, Takfeer in Yemen has not been limited to Sunni Islam. The earliest record of mass-Takfeer traces to 1205 CE when the Zaydi (Shi’a) Imam Abdullah Bin Hamza declared as apostates a faction of Zaydis known as Al-Matrifiyah, an action that precipitated a bloody massacre in the governorate of ‘Amran in 1213 (610 Hijri).

The use of mass-Takfeer against political opponents was more recently on display during Yemen’s Civil War of 1994, when Al Zindani and ِAbdulwahab Al Dailami, Minister of Justice during Yemen’s Civil War in 1994, invoked it to legitimize war against secessionists.

Al Dailami issued a fatwa to that effect, and went so far as to legitimize the killing of civilians, accusing them of being weak Muslims for allowing the secessionists to be “shoved” among them.

Al-Dailami’s fatwa against people in Yemen’s south during the 1994 Civil War is considered one of the causes of the killing of thousands of people in the south. In the post-war era, Al-Dailami and Al-Zindani denied that they had issued any fatwa during that war.

Years later, during Sa’dah’s string of six wars that began in 2004, the beliefs and practices of the Houthis (now called Ansar Allah) were questioned, and some clerics labeled Zaydis as heretics.

During Ali Abdullah Saleh’s rule (1978-2012), the Takfeeri movement targeted not only political opponents, but also journalists, artists and writers, as well as anyone else who had the potential to influence people’s minds (see timeline below for detailed information). Most of the Takfeeri fatwas issued in Yemen over the past 33 years were mandated by Wahhabi clerics.

The declaration of women as apostates is often part of the larger “us” versus “them” mentality; women who refuse to adhere to the Takfeeri dress uniform of a very conservative veil (norm) are considered “western” and therefore associated with the enemy (them). Also, women who do not adhere to the prescribed doctrines governing female behavior are considered “anti-social” to conservative norms.

Women facing Takfeer frequently are independent thinkers and are likely to have closer ties to youth movements rather than being associated with traditional political parties. The objectives of such women are usually wider than merely fighting marginalization and extend to the sort of defamation and baseless threats that are usually a part of being singled out as an apostate.

For their part, Takfeeris tend to view women as a homogenous group. Inspired by the domino theory, Takfeeris believe that if one woman leader is terrorized, other emerging women leaders would become silent. The same theory applies to other marginalized groups.

Acceptance of Takfeer 

In the past 20 years, Yemenis have experienced a crisis of governance and have come to consider Takfeeri movements as a shift from the former regime, a lesser of two evils. Moreover, religious groups were the only opposition entities allowed to operate freely under Saleh’s regime, which saved him from being targeted as an “enemy of Islam.”

Operating in such a relatively free environment for the past 23 years, the Takfeeri groups have had plenty of time to assimilate into Yemeni society, and their level of organization has been enhanced as well by funding received from individuals residing in Saudi Arabia. Unlike other political movements in the country, their ideology is easy to articulate and powerful. The current transitional period in Yemen offers a fertile ground for their continued rise to power.

The increasing prominence of Takfeeris reflects a concomitant deterioration of ijtihad, the process of independent reasoning within Shari’ah, or Islamic law. It also highlights the domination of Sunni Takfeeri trends in the nation’s intellectual milieu and hints at an underlying confusion (because of the fragile religious scholarship in the country) in the ability to distinguish between what is ‘Aib(disgraceful/dishonorable) and what is Haram (forbidden/taboo).

Indoctrination, ignorance and political aspiration are the main reasons that Yemenis accept the process of Takfeer. Illiteracy in Yemen is 40 percent (around 70 percent for women) and the population depends heavily on the guidance of jurists. In the last two decades, Yemen gave precedence to Al ‘Ilm Bil Deen (religious studies) over Al ‘Ilm Bil Donya (scientific and technical studies). Yemeni society remains interdependent and it is easy to gain public support. Others fear being labeled irreligious. It is important to remember that most Tafkeeris genuinely believe they are carrying out God’s wishes on earth.

Takfeeris should be made aware that declaring people apostates will silence some individuals but is not a long-term solution of eliminating all opposition. The practice of Takfeer has no roots to the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Muslims and Islamists will benefit from a message that Islam is a tolerant and a rational religion. Atonement was and should be an option for “sinners,” especially when the sin is narrowly defined by a particular sect. Yemen desperately needs an Islamic critique on the use of Takfeer.

It is also essential that human rights, and especially those for women, be codified in the new Yemeni constitution. Members of the National Dialogue need to ensure that future jurists selected for the drafting process are aware of the need for a detailed consideration of people’s rights of expression to prevent future strife.

Shari’ah is presently the only source of legislation in Yemen. If this simplistic and vaguely defined body of law remains, it will be important to identify which schools of Islamic law will be followed and the specific jurists who will be issuing fatwas. Strict criteria also will be required on who can be an Islamic jurist in the future (perhaps graduates of Al-Azhar University or those who hold a Ph.D. or M.A. in Islamic studies). All of this needs to be done without restricting Yemen’s Islamic diversity.

Finally,  mandatory education must be enforced to help individuals make informed decisions. The Yemeni educational system, which is currently being revamped, needs to give equal importance to scientific education (learned knowledge over memorized knowledge). More importantly, the people need to be aware of the influence of religious imperialism from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, Egypt and Turkey. When it comes to governance, people need to understand that there are modes of governance other than religious orthodoxy or failed “democracy.”

Sama’a Al-Hamdani writes the blog Yemeniaty, which covers a range of topics on Yemen, focusing specifically on women’s issues. You can follow her @Yemeniaty.
Afrah Nasser is a blogger from Yemen living in Sweden and co-founder of the @YemeniSalon in Stockholm.

Yemen’s Quota: Success for International Community or Yemeni Women?

This article was originally published through Fikra Forum on Sept. 27, 2013

On September 15, Yemeni President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi wrote his first-ever op-ed in hopes of reassuring the Yemeni people of the current political transition’s progress. The article, published in Yemen Times and available only in English, highlights the role of women during the transition and praises the status of women in Yemen. More importantly, the President indirectly endorses the proposed 30% quota; he writes, “To ensure these voices are heard, a new coalition of influential women held a press conference today advocating for national support for at least, a 30 percent quota for female [representation] in all branches of government.”

Without a doubt, women’s participation in the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) has been powerful, with women representing almost 28% of all participants. Female representatives chaired three of the nine working committees. They also formed alliances within and outside the dialogue to champion women’s rights; yet in spite of these efforts, they could not reach a unanimous decision regarding the 30% quota. Regardless, it appears that Yemen’s NDC will pass the 30% quota for women in all three branches of the government, but is this success due to the persistent efforts of Yemeni women, or is it in order to make Yemen look more democratic?

While the participation of women in the NDC is impressive, the dialogue remains completely detached from the realities of Yemeni women on the ground. The transitional process, which was meant to conclude on September 18, continues to be strongly supported by the international community. This begs the question of how successful the process is likely to be in the long term if its goals are achieving international approval as opposed to true engagement and impact on the ground.

The 30% Quota 

According to the NDC process requirements, at the initial stage, an article must receive 90% of the vote among the committees in order to pass; otherwise it is sent to the Consensus Committee, which was established to oversee the dialogue process in order to maintain harmony. If the Consensus Committee modifies the article and sends it back to the committees, it must then receive 75% approval or it is returned again to the overseeing body. Finally, a modified draft must be passed by 55% of the committees. If it is not passed by the committees, the Consensus Committee and the dialogue president make the final decision on whether or not to move forward with the article.

The State Building, Good Governance, and Rights and Freedoms committees in the NDC all convened to discuss the women’s quota, which, if passed, would require 30% of officials to be women across all branches of government. The State Building Committee was the only committee that managed to pass the initial required 90% consensus, though this was only due to the fact that some members withheld their vote on the assumption that it would lower the consensus rate. The other two committees did not reach the required votes so, according to dialogue procedures, the matter was transferred to the Consensus Committee before August. At that time, it was reasonable to assume that the subject would be transferred back to the working committees where women would have to form alliances and work hard to get the required 75% consensus to pass the article.

If the women and the youth groups were to unite their votes to win consensus in the committees, they would still likely fall short with only 50%. From there, it would be extremely challenging to gain the remaining required votes, especially considering that several men who publicly endorsed the 30% quota later rejected it when it was time to vote. The traditional powers in Yemen publicly opposed the idea of a 30% quota, and even the “liberal” parties of Yemen opted for a 15% quota rather than the proposed 30%. However, after the president’s op-ed, several party members in the dialogue shifted their tone. The Consensus Committee then agreed that women should be represented in all three bodies of the government, thereby postponing the discussion of a women’s quota until the final plenary session.

Assessing the Quota

The women’s quota is based on the idea that it will improve women’s participation in governance, thus advancing women’s issues, through a top-down approach. First, this is based on the assumption that the creation of a 30% quota for women ensures that it will be implemented, when in reality, there are no guarantees that this will occur. Then, there is the assumption that the women selected or elected will put women’s rights ahead of their party’s political agenda. The real question is whether or not this quota can truly make a difference in transforming the deteriorating conditions of women’s health, illiteracy rates, unemployment, and economic status. It certainly can, but only if women politicians and government employees work hard for these rights.

Several men argue that women are not ready to have the 30% quota because too few women are qualified, either based on education or professional experience. This argument, however, is invalid. Many male officials are placed in their positions for their social connections rather than their qualifications. Another argument is that 30% is too high a quota, especially since men are the main providers for their families. This argument is also weak because figures have shown that women who make more money spend their wealth on their families. Furthermore, if Yemen embraces federalism, new local governments will lead to new positions and jobs so women will not “steal” any of the available jobs.

There are two main legitimate concerns regarding the quota: first, that the quota will not be implemented; and second, that the women selected through the quota will promote their party’s agenda rather than a women’s agenda. In either case, it is possible that the 30% quota is setting Yemeni women up to fail, but it is a risk that Yemen’s women should be willing to take.

Yemeni women have worked very hard since the early 1990s for every right that they have. If the quota is passed, then women should use it to their advantage as an opportunity to continue their good work of improving the status of women in society. The quota for women is not the only solution, but rather one of the many ways in which women can influence politics. Unfortunately, Yemeni women were seen as symbols of democratic change in the 2011 Yemeni uprising, but they have not so readily been approached as serious influencers of the political process. If the women’s quota is viewed by the international community and the Yemeni government as a primary benchmark of “success” of the current political transition without a serious commitment to supporting its implementation, the quota, like the dialogue, will merely be a process involving the upper echelons of society and will have no real impact on the reality on the ground.

Sama’a Al-Hamdani is a Yemeni researcher and writes on the blog Yemeniaty.com. You can follow her on Twitter @Yemeniaty. 

Ben Omar & Al-Wartalani: Yemen's Revolutionary Architects

Ben Omar with Gen. Ali Muhsen
Image via Yemen Fox

Over night in 2011, Yemen had a new savior; the Moroccan Jamal Ben Omar, the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy to Yemen. He acted as a mediator to facilitate Yemen's peaceful transition and to establish the National Dialogue (ND) that is endorsed by Gulf Corporation Council (GCC). On March 18, Yemen held the Opening Ceremony of the ND as media sources continue to describe Yemen's transition as "unprecedented", the truth is, a similar, yet distinct, situation existed in 1948 in the North of Yemen. 

In 1947, Al-Fadheel Al-Wartalani, an Algerian, came to Yemen under the claim of launching a branch of an Egyptian ground transportation agency, but instead created the blueprint for a coup against Imam Yehya in 1948. He is not the only man from the Maghreb who traveled to Yemen in order to aid in the liberation of Yemenis from their dictator. Al-Wartalani and Ben Omar had roles that evolved from simple mediators to influential decision makers due to a vacuum in Yemeni leadership. 

Operating in Yemen 63 years apart, Ben Omar and Al-Wartalani, poles apart in their politics, have much in common. They are Yemen's revolutionary symbols who behaved on the surface as impartial outsiders. In reality, the were essential mediators and charismatic opportunists. 

Many Yemenis to this day are unaware that Al-Wartalani is a foreigner due to his popularity amongst the Muslim Brotherhood networks. He was sent to Yemen as an envoy by the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan Al Banna, to help launch a chapter in Yemen. Therefore, Al-Wartalani arrived to Yemen via Aden, networked and created strong alliances within the Imam's opposition and was a key participant in the Yemeni coup against him. 

Due to Al-Wartalani's charismatic personality, he was able to give various speeches at Mosques and schools. He began building alliances with influential Yemeni figures like Abdul Rahman Al Iryani, Zayid Al- Moushki, Ahmed Al-Shami, and Hussein Al Kebsi, to name a few. Al-Wartalani's advantage over other foreigners was his Arab ethnicity. The cultural similarity helped him understand Yemen's political circumstances better than the average spectator. 

Al-Wartalani deciphered Yemen's complex coalitions and discovered that Yemen's opposition was unorganized and lacked the presence of a visible leader.  Ironically, his second advantage is that he isn't Yemeni; he is not considered part of any of the clashing political factions in Yemen. Overtime, Al-Wartalani masterminded the National Charter (Al Mithaq Al Watani) and was able to unite Al-Zubairi and Noman with Al-Moushki and Al-Shami. 

Outside of Yemen, Al-Wartalani had contacts with the Saudi Monarchy and tried to gain the support of the Arab League (who never entirely supported him as much as they do with Ben Omar). Ultimately, he transformed himself, with the support of Yemenis, from an international actor to a national actor. 

Front row from the right: Hussein Ben Ali Al-Waisi, Al Fadheel Al Wartlani and Abdullah Al Iryani
Back row from left: Mohammed Al Emad, Mohiye AlDin Al 'Ansi, Ahmed Al Horesh, and Zayed Al Al-Moushki
Last row: Ahmed Abdo Nasher *

In Ahmed Ben Mohammed Al-Shami's Memories, Yemen's Winds of Change/Riyah Al-Taghyeer fee Al-Yaman, he expresses Al-Wartalani's importance in Yemen at that time: 

"In my opinion, the Algerian Jihadi Mr. Al-Fadheel Al Wartalani, is the one who changed the course of history in Yemen during the 4th Century when his feet landed on Yemen's Soil. As if he pressed on a button that turned the wheel of history into a new round of a new direction. The Revolution of 1948 is all Al-Wartalani's construction"

Al-Wartalani's Revolution in Yemen failed. As a consequence  Al-Wartalani and Co. were sentenced to death. While this sentence was carried out on Yemeni citizens, Al-Wartalani was able to flee and eventually settled in Lebanon. He never had to suffer the consequences. 

Yemenis naively welcome outsiders as they are not tainted with political motives like insiders. Outsiders who are looking for influence find in Yemen the ripe circumstances for political manipulation and personal transformation. It is not a secret that Yemen is a tribal and religious country with high rates of illiteracy. Sixty years passed, and Yemen remained almost the same. Tribal expert Nadwa Al-Dawsari explains that it is part of Yemen's culture to seek a "neutral" arbitrator, as we truly believe they are unprejudiced.  

Yemen's revolution of 2011 is the innovative equivalence of the 1948 revolution, in that Yemen is still a political play ground for external agents. Today the GCC and the UN Security Council is akin to 1948's Saudi Arabia and the Arab league. While Saudi Arabia and the Arab League decided to abandon Al-Wartalani's plans, it is unlikely that the GCC reassesses their support for Yemen's transition. 

On February 5,  in an interview to BBC News, Jamal Ben Omar stated 

"Its the first time that politics is being made by the people and not just from backroom deals between political elites". 

Ironically, in 2012, Rathiyah Al-Mutawakil and Majid Al-Mathhaji resigned from the technical committee of the National Dialogue because Ben Omar interfered with the committee's decision making process. He made a "backroom" deal with some members from the technical committee of the National Dialogue and other opposition political figures to decide the mechanisms needed for selecting the participants of the National Dialogue. Not only that, but he announced these decisions to the media himself, bypassing the authority of the technical committee. Journalist Jumanah Farhat questioned Ben Omar's intentions and accused him of arranging fragmentary meetings with controversial politicians. 

Currently, Yemeni politicians who are in opposition with each other agree to communicate solely through Ben Omar, giving him great leverage over Yemen. A recent statement by the president of the Security Council warned Ali Saleh (Former President) and Ali Al-Beedh (Former Vice President and current Southern Hirak leader) of interfering in Yemen's transition. While the Security Council called out spoilers, it displayed favoritism towards those who were not called out, like Ali Muhsen and Hameed Al-Ahmar. Not only that; several confidential sources suspect that Ben Omar will continue to function as Yemen's main leader as long as he continues to manage the entire political process. 

Prior to becoming Yemen's revolutionary protagonists, both, Al-Wartalani and Ben Omar, had a murky past. Both were considered extremists; however on the other end of the spectrum, Al-Wartalani was a conservative (extreme right) and Ben Omar is a liberal (extreme left). Throughout their lives, they struggled with success in their own countries but found glory in Yemen. 

On a final and separate note, activist Atiaf Al-Wazir posted on her facebook that "no one will solve Yemen's problems but the Yemenis themselves". For Yemen's revolution to succeed, it needs to be respected as a grassroots evolution, otherwise we may find ourselves sixty years from now, looking for a new foreign hero. 



*N.d. Photograph. Hajr Al 'lim Wa Ma'aqileh Fee Al Yemen. By Ismail Ben Ali Al-Akwaa. Vol. 4. Lebanon: Dar Al Fikr, 1995. 2397. Print.

A Voice for People with Special Needs: Samah Al Shaghdari

Samah Al Shaghdari is an activist, poet and journalist. What sets her apart, is her drive to achieve more when odds are against her. Samah heads a foundation known as Voice (Sout) that focuses on people with special needs (the mentally ill or the physically handicapped) and other minorities in society. 

Samah Al Shaghdari - Right

Just a few years ago, she participated in a workshop with the Youth Leadership Center to learn how to construct an organization. While Voice is now a small organization educating society on the subject, Samah has a plan to expand it into a radio that caters to the needs of minorities in Yemeni society. Her dream is to have the first Arab channel dedicated to people with special needs within 10 years. She aims to create programs and documentaries that raise awareness of the conditions that minorities are living in. While Samah's dreams are ambitious, she is realistic and knows that only hard work and dedication will make her plans fruitful. Before creating a channel, she aims to negotiate a weekly (or even monthly) show with a local television channel on people with special needs. 

In 2011, Samah participated in the protests and is feeling heavy hearted about the progress that Yemen made in the past year. 

I think politics kills the mind and the heart. Yemen is suffering from a poverty of politicians, because many of them do not know their trade but found their way to it somehow. Therefore, I refuse to join any group because many of them are reactions to delirium (infi'alat), after all, the revolution was just that. 

As an activist, she let me know that ever since 2004, Yemen made it part of the law to dedicate 5% of all jobs in the private and public sector to disabled individuals. However, there are no recent statistics on whether that is the case. Studies reveal that 2 million people in Yemen are people with special needs, which is roughly 10% of the population. Part of Voice's work aims to hire lawyers in order to defend the rights of disabled individuals at work. Overall, she feels that international and domestic efforts are weak in supporting people with special needs. 

There are about 6000 organizations that are financed by the Social Fund from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (Al sondouq Al ijtima'ey), and 258 of these organizations are for people with special needs but only two stand out: 1) Markiz Al Noor managed Abdul Rabou Humaid and 2) Jam'iat Al Aman by Fatima Al 'Aqil (but she passed away). The other organizations isolate the disabled from themselves. They teach women to sew, and draw, etc but they all do it in isolation. There are only very few buildings that care about disabled people... As if this group of people is nonexistent. No one considers how people with special needs will get to the top floors anywhere even in public universities and governmental buildings. 

Samah's uniqueness as an activists is that she herself represents the community that she is fighting for. 

When I was 3 months old, I got sick with fever. My family took me to the doctor and she gave me a shot. While the doctor may have cured my fever, she gave me Nerve Atrophy. I am disabled now. Growing up, I lived my life like a normal person and I don't suffer from any complexities. This is because my father made me love life and learn how to follow my goals.
I began facing problems when my father died. Most of the women in my family got married at 15 and 16, and I couldn't study what I want, I had to fight for things. I was a little late in my career but that is because I had to practice diplomacy with my family as not to lose them. To be an example for others, you have to suffer. 

Samah studied philosophy as an undergrad in Sana'a and went to earn an MBA. She worked with a television channel. She states: 

I always wanted to be a television presenter. In 2008, I presented a documentary called Countenance (Malamih) on Saba'a channel; it focused on young artists, singers, actors, and artistic disabled people. I remember a man called Samih who was an extremely talented disabled artist that no one knew about although he won several art awards. Another amazing character is Liza, a blind journalism graduate, who was struggling in finding a job in the Media due to her disability. The show was ranked as one of the most watched shows on Saba and could have been nominated to participate in the Cairo Film Festival, however it was eventually canceled because of the lack of interest of some senior administrators within the channel.

Samah was one of the main faces in the revolution and made a short film focusing on the feminist movement during the Yemeni revolution that will be discussed in a future post. 

As a poet, Samah published a few collections. Her first collection came out in 2004 and the second in 2010.

My first collection was an experience of creative adolescence (Morahaqa ibda'iyah). It was a daring collection and I faced  many problems in society due to the subject matter it discussed.  I was a woman and I talked about praise (Ghazal), so it was hard... many people tried to use it against me by bringing it to the males in my family...
I am stubborn and I was scared to write some more, but I decided to go to prose (Nathr), which is typically shorter and more abstract, in order to make it harder for everyone to understand. In prose, however, I found myself. 

Samah's 2010 book, The Fabric of Darkness (Naseej Al-'Atma), her poetry is concise and witty. It reminded me of some of the famous quotes of American poet Dorothy Parker. Samah's poem, "A Vision" (رؤيا) is simple: 

To be able to see things,                          لأتمكن من رؤية الاشياء

I will shut my mouth                                           سأغمض فمي

As for her next book she says, 

It is not like fashion, it is not about producing every year, but rather about producing quality. I want it to have philosophical depth so when I am ready, I will produce more.