Why Abyan? and What to do?

Watch Al Qaeda in Yemen on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

Image via Ibtimes

Image via Yemen Online

In the waning days of Saleh's regime, unconfirmed reports claim that military leaders purposefully withdrew their forces in order to destabilize the region. Within weeks, the governorate of Abyan fell under the control of Ansar Al Shari'ah (Al-Qaeda affiliated group). Their control over Abyan lasted from March 2011 to June 2012. During this time, it was declared an "Islamic Empire".



After Ansar Al Shari'a were forced out, on June 19, 2012, U.S. officials including the US ambassador, Gerald Feierstein, and USAID administrator, Rajiv Shah, visited the war ravaged areas of Abyan. In September, they released this assessment. In this trip, USAID pledged to provide an extra 52$ million dollars of assistance to Yemen. Some humanitarian assistance began in Abyan; however, no concrete reforms can be felt.

Before Ansar Al Shair'ah, Abyan had high unemployment rates, poor educational opportunities and was economically deprived. Government presence there was almost nonexistent. Now, not much has changed. Since 2012, there are tribal popular committees that were instrumental in evicting Ansar Al Shariah from the region much like Al-Sahwah tribal committees in the Anbar province in Iraq who helped end the war in Iraq. Government presence is still weak. The return of Ansar Al-Shariah is still a possibility as they are hiding in the neighboring regions. Ironically, some claim that a few members of the tribal popular committees are in fact members of Ansar Al Shariah. The question that comes to mind is why Abyan? and what to do?

Abyan is a vast lawless area with a harsh terrain that lacks government authority and institutions.  Low levels of education made the area ripe for extremist infiltration. Prior to the unification of Yemen, and in the context of the cold war,  Saudi Arabia and the US supported Islamic extremists (Mujahidins) to combat the spread of communism in Afghanistan and in the South of Yemen. When Osama Bin Laden visited Yemen in 1989 (his only vist there), he brought Jihadis from Afghanistan to Southern Yemen. Also, Yemen was one of the few countries they could go. In the brief Civil War of 1994, former president Saleh used these returning warriors to help him win the war against those who declared secession. It was part of Saleh's strategy to spread the Jihadi, Salafi and Muslim Brotherhood movement in the South. 

Historically, Abyan is known for adopting radical thoughts (for example; the Qarmatian movement (which is a Shi'i Ismaili group lead by Ali ben Fadhl Al Qormoti started in Jabal Khanfar in Ji'ar, Abyan. Also, Sufi extremist groups flourished there). Furthermore, in the past 20 years, most political and ideological movements in Abyan failed miserably  So, the community felt that the "return to religion" is the only option to combat the problems facing them. The Jihadi/Salafi ideology is one that revolves around the concept of life after death, where things could be better. 

Although people in Abyan are primarily considered Shafi'i, Sunni. In the past 20 years, Salafism (Jihadi- Wahhabism in particular) dominated Abbyan. In 1994, Abyan was the first area to convert a movie theater into a mosque. Also, in 1998, the first attack on tourists in Yemen was committed by Jaish Adan Al Islami (Aden-Abyan's Religious Army). This "army" was created in 1992 and participated in the previously mentioned Civil War with Saleh. They hold the messianic belief that their role in the Arabian Peninsula will bring Yom Al-Qiyamah (day of resurrection), based on the following hadith: 

"An army of twelve-thousand will come out of Aden-Abyan. They will give victory to Allah and His messenger; they are the best between myself and them".

The Aden-Abyan army wants to reinstate Islam as it was during the times of the Prophet Muhammed (PBUH). However, as we saw in their seize of Abyan, they were authoritarian and demanded absolute obedience. AQAP has become a rallying cry to many, but not out of conviction. Many people are not fond of Al-Qaeda, but like the saying "the enemy of my enemy is my friend"; because AQAP stands up to the government that neglected them, they follow suit.  

Currently, conditions in Yemen are substandard, and almost each region needs its own transitional plan. People in Abbyan need special attention (like other governorates) in order to revive their economy. Unfortunately, without any felt improvements, fighting jihad in order to go to heaven seems like a feasible venting method. Right now, people in Abyan are distressed and life is gruesome. The goal in Abyan is to lower the distress of these human beings. So what is needed is good governance and economic assistance in order for us to observe any real transformation in the region. 

Yemen’s National Dialogue: The Country’s Critical Test for Stability

My latest piece published on Fikra Forum, January 17, 2013. 

On November 23, 2011, Yemen’s revolution subsided with an agreement brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), enacting a two-year transitional government led by President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi. According to this agreement, a national dialogue is scheduled to take place by the end of February or the beginning of March to decide the formation of the new government and its constitution. However, the transition appears to be dawdling, causing many Yemenis to lose faith. Delays can be attributed to Yemen’s complex ethnic and tribal affiliations and interests, a deteriorating security situation, and Hadi's meticulous oversight, with a careful intent to avoid aggressive backlash and to maintain the nation's stability. Nevertheless, the national dialogue is progressing, the success of which will be critical in determining the future stability of the country.

Planning the National Dialogue

In July 2012, a technical committee was chosen to determine the overall nature and logistics of the dialogue. From August to December 2012, the technical committee, led by Yemen’s former Prime Minister, Dr. Abdulkarim al-Eryani, held 65 meetings, each followed by a press release and updates to the official Facebook page. The committee concluded its meetings with a report that was presented to President Hadi.

As a result of the technical committee’s report, the dialogue will have a total of 565 members. Around 40% of these seats are designated to political parties (not including new parties), while 35 seats are dedicated to Houthis, and 85 to Hirak Southern Separatist Movement members. The political parties must select their delegates according to the following stipulations: 50% of their seats must be assigned to people from the South of Yemen, 30% to women, and 23% to the youth. Furthermore, 160 seats are allocated to non-partisan groups: 40 for independent youth, 40 for independent women, and 80 for civil society organizations (2 members from each organization). Each category will be selected by seven technical committee members. The deadline for non-partisan applications is January 19. Overall, the aim of the committee is to host a dialogue that will be equally divided between Northern and Southern Yemenis.

Complicating matters further, the final list of the national dialogue attendees must include Yemen's tribal leaders, jurists, religious minorities, businessmen and women, young or new political parties, and those with special needs. The selection process for these groups remains unclear, though President Hadi has the right to nominate these individuals or create a special committee that will select them.

The moderator of the dialogue is still undecided, but two options are available. Either the president and the technical committee will appoint a person, or the national dialogue members will recommend individuals and vote. The national dialogue will most likely be held in Sana, however, the technical committee agreed that if security permits, other meetings should be held in Aden. Working teams will also operate in the following cities: Aden, Taizz, al-Mukalla, Sadah, and al-Hudaydah.

The national dialogue budget is 7.7 billion rials, none of which is provided by the Yemeni government. The technical committee’s report concludes that a portion of the budget will provide transportation, housing, and food during the expected dialogue period of six months. Finally, a special television channel and radio will be dedicated to broadcasting all of the national dialogue events. While the money has been pledged to Yemen by GCC countries, it has yet to be received, revealing the GCC’s lack of confidence in Yemen’s decision-making.

What to expect

A recent meeting on January 14 between President Hadi and those involved in the transitional phase (the national dialogue technical committee, political figures, and ten foreign ambassadors) is revealing as to the intricacy of Yemen’s current situation. Though the dialogue is supposedly “national,” international agencies and actors are heavily involved in supervision. The Houthi representative, Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, refused to attend the meeting because the U.S. Ambassador was present. This is an indicator of what could happen during the dialogue if international actors attempt to partake rather than observe.

All Yemenis, regardless of their political opinions, must be represented in this dialogue; otherwise, the dialogue will fail and the country will be paralyzed. So far, the Southern Hirak has not released their party list and independent applicants from the South are hesitant to apply, seemingly discouraged to join. Recently, in a first step toward transitional and restorative justice, Hadi assigned two committees to address land disputes and forcible job expulsions that occurred in Yemen’s southern provinces of following the 1994 civil war. If this effort fails, the southerners will continue to feel persecuted and will demand secession.

The deteriorating security condition in Yemen makes it nearly impossible for the national dialogue to operate in various cities. Even in Sana, there are major security concerns. On December 22, 2012, three westerners were kidnapped in the heart of Sana and have yet to be released. Earlier this week, an AQAP cell was discovered in the capital. Aware of these security challenges, the technical committee, now called the preparatory committee, has dedicated a portion of the national dialogue budget toward special security.

Other important issues relating to security remain unanswered. Currently, a committee has been tasked with restructuring Yemen's Ministry of Interior. The goal is to mimic the structure of Jordan's Ministry of Interior, but the transformation will not be easy. In the next month, President Hadi is expected to announce the names of the commanders assigned to the seven armed forces that were newly reformed through his December 19 decree calling for the restructuring of the military. As long as this effort remains unrealized, security will be a constant threat to Yemen's successful transition.

Following President Hadi’s decree, many wonder what will happen to Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, former leader of the First Armored Division. Mohsen, though demoted, remains an influential military figure, and may participate as an advisor to the tribal members of the dialogue. Meanwhile, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh is still considered the president of the General People’s Congress (GPC) party, though he is sick and needs medical treatment. The national dialogue technical committee did not specify any restrictions against Saleh’s attendance, but if Saleh decides to attend, the majority of participants will withdraw, ruining any real chance of dialogue.

The remaining influential figures worth noting are Hamid al-Ahmar, a businessman and leader of the Islah party, and Abdulkader Hilal, mayor of Sana. Al-Ahmar is a powerful man, with many loyalties among the Salafis, and even jihadis. He will likely attend the dialogue and he might even run for presidency int 2014. Hilal has also been rumored to be a presidential candidate. Like Mohsen and Saleh, he is from Sanhan, and he is a military man. On December 12, 2012, he successfully led a clean up campaign called “Sharik” to fix Sana’s streets, winning him much public acclaim.

The role of the U.S.

The U.S. government’s policy toward Yemen has been primarily concerned with counterterrorism. The American Ambassador in Yemen has been criticized in the past for not listening to the demands of the Yemeni people.  Yet, the ambassador meets with Hadi, Mohsen and al-Ahmar regularly. As previously mentioned, the Houthis are not happy with the presence of the U.S. Ambassador in national meetings. Therefore, during the dialogue, it is best that the international community observes and advises the national dialogue rather than partake in it.

Over the past two years, the increase in drone attacks has led directly to an increase in anti-American sentiment. For the first time in Yemen, the average Yemeni citizen views America as an adversary rather than a friend. However, cooperation between the Yemeni government and the U.S. is at an all-time high. This is mainly due to the fact that the U.S. and the international community are at the backbone of Hadi's strength in Yemen.

The best strategy toward tackling this newfound hostility is to adopt a different policy in Yemen, one that is not solely based on counterterrorism, and to listen to the demands of the Yemeni people. Furthermore, public recognition of the progress toward peaceful transition in Yemen will show support and encourage other non-violent transformations.

Questions for Ambassador Barbara Bodine: What's next for Yemen?

These questions were directed to Ambassador Barbara Bodine following the NCUSAR event (read more about it below). The following day, on June 27, ambassador Bodine was one of the experts who signed a letter directed to president Barack Obama urging him to change US policy towards Yemen. You can read the letter here.

*Ambassador Bodine's Biography is attached at the end of the interview. 

Q. Ambassador Bodine, you have signed a letter addressed to President Obama on June 25, 2012 urging him to change US policy towards Yemen. Yemeni pessimists believe that this letter would not change anything. Do you believe that US policy will change towards Yemen if Obama remains as president? If in a few months former governor Romney wins the vote, will policy towards Yemen change? Also, the letter mentioned recommendations that suggested an increase in foreign aid however how would the US insure that the aid is going to the right place or people? 

I don’t think any of those involved with the letter believe that it will, in and of itself, change policy. It is not that simple.  Nor do we believe the views and recommendations are at great variance with the views and recommendations of some, at least, within the Administration. We do hope that by adding our voices to the debate we can help shape it over the long term. A second audience for the letter is also the American people who have a rather narrow view of US interests in, policy toward and options on Yemen, given the media’s tendency to cover only the most dramatic of events and security issue.

Policy toward Yemen has changed already over the past few years from almost entirely security-centric to security-dominated but clear efforts to broaden the scope.  The US is active in the Friends of Yemen and has significantly increased its economic and other assistance as evidenced by US Agency for International Development Administrator Shah’s recent visit. This increased assistance has however come at the same time as a sharp increase in the use of drones,  expanded authority on targeting  and other steps. The letter recommends that efforts toward recalibrating the focus and attention of US policy and programs be strengthened and expanded.

I would not presume to predict what further changes might be possible during the last months of or a second term for President Obama, which will be driven both by events on the ground and non-military resources available. Similarly, I could not presume to know what a President Romney might do.  Much may depend on his views on economic and governance assistance, development assistance and the use of diplomacy in the furtherance of US policy.

How assistance is programmed must be done in cooperation with the Yemeni government, concerned and appropriate NGOs, and other partner states and organizations. One assumption I do want to clarify – assistance is not a check presented to the government, any government. Assistance is done through programs, projects and activities. Regrettably, there will never be a level of assistance great enough to match Yemen’s needs and there will be places and issues that are underfunded if funded at all.  That is why working toward sustainable economy is  better goal.

Q. At the NCUSAR event, you emphasize the importance of using Aden's port as an international trade point. As a professor at Princeton University, you have worked with a group of students on a Development Plan for Greater Aden. This plan depends on stability. When do you think this plan will take place? who would be in charge of this effort? There are coordinations pending with the Aden Development Council, but when will the plan be public? 

The plan for Greater Aden was developed by a group of graduate students last year.  “Plan” may be too strong a word. It is more a proposal or an outline, not a blueprint or a timeline.  It does not including funding estimates, a critical element but beyond the scope of the students’ work.

Of course implementation depends on a level of stability, as well as Yemeni political will and international involvement, both donor and private sector. But just as development requires stability, stability requires development. The trick is how to advance on one in support of the other.  The proposal had no timelines but in sketching out a structure strongly recommends that the Yemeni government – both the central government and the Aden government in partnership – be in charge. It includes a structure provisionally called “The Aden Development Council” but I am not aware of any steps taken so far to establish the Council.  I would caution against the assumption that the students prepared a detailed blueprint ready for immediate implementation.

Q. You are a firm believer that Aden is capable of becoming an important economic center with a free zone. The port will gain benefit from the transportations to and from the Suez Canal with Bab-al-Mandab as a main source. Can you please elaborate more on this idea? Also, due to Aden's proximity to Africa, many of the refugees enter Yemen through Aden, how does the problem of refugees pose a threat to this project. Furthermore, is it possible that this port be hijacked by AQAP in the future if their strength proves to be more durable? Talking about spoilers, how do you make sure that corruption, which is prevalent in Yemen, does not take over this project? 

There are a lot of questions here.  The basis of the proposal refers back to Aden’s once pre-eminent position as a major shipping hub, a tradition that pre-dates the British in fact. The fundamentals remain, most significantly one of the best natural harbors in the world at an ideal location. Other advantages are land suitable for urban growth, the beginnings of a Free Zone, potential to handle containers, cargo and fuel, an existing airport and a large labor force.  The downsides are a lack of sustained and coordinated investment in infrastructure – the port, the free zone and the international airport; lack of a trained workforce; inadequate water and electricity and security.  While those downsides are significant, none are insurmountable.  Labor can be trained; water can be desalinated; electricity can be generated; and, security can be enhanced, for example through an expanded Yemeni Coast Guard.

There is the theoretical risk that AQAP could take over the port, but this development proposal is a long term effort. If AQAP threatens the port area, it could derail efforts at any stage, just as the 2000 attack on the USS Cole set back efforts to develop the port. That potential however need not stop detailed planning on what will be a long term, incremental and staged effort.

This is a proposal to do more than expand the current container port. The broader vision is the development proposal is for the greater Aden area.  If it were successful, if it were able to provide employment and economic stability, that would also help blunt the appeal of groups like AQAP.

Finally, this is a comprehensive proposal. It includes a look at governance issues, judicial frameworks and obviously the question of corruption. Corruption is not, regrettably unique to Yemen nor limited to Aden. A concerted plan to control corruption is needed more broadly in Yemen.  However, planning and initial steps toward comprehensive regional development need not wait, and could in fact help fuel governance reform. 

Q. "Yemen has a large number of workers however they are not skilled": in NCUSAR, you briefly mentioned that due to unemployment, it is easy to find employees who are willing to work, but they lack skills. How easy would it be to train them? how long will it take? 

Yemen has a large and underutilized work force that lacks many of the skills needed.  Training need not be lengthy or complicated, depending on the task required. One model used in a number of countries, both developing and developed, is a partnership among private sector investors, both Yemeni and international, and  training providers.  Brazil has been particularly successful at this.  Training of mid and upper level managers as well as skilled labor force is also needed.  While reform of the education system may be necessary and worthy, we do not need to start with current 5 year olds in creating a skilled workforce.  There are unemployed young Yemenis – some without basic skills, some with experience abroad, and some with higher education – all of whom can be trained in relatively short time to take on new tasks.  The key is be sure there is a link between the training provided and the skills needed.

Q. When expert Charles Schmitz mentioned that the US needs to pressure the Gulf and Saudi Arabia into accepting Yemeni laborers as a way to fix Yemen's economy and increase remittances, you shook your head briefly. Can you tell us why? what is the best way to improve Yemen's economy (some people can argue that because Yemen has the 2nd most growing population in the world, no matter how much the economy improves in Yemen, it will never be able to absorb all of the population)?

I do not think that it is realistic to depend on a return to the days of massive expatriate labor in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia to solve Yemen’s economic problems.   First, Yemen labor was critical to the construction of the Kingdom and the Gulf states, but the labor tended to be unskilled or semi-skilled. The labor requirements now a more sophisticated. Yemeni workers need the correct skill sets to be competitive.  Second, major projects in the Gulf states won by Chinese, Indian, Korean or other firms often include as part of the package the provision of labor, recruited by the company or a subcontractor, a broker, housed and managed by the same, and then returned to their country of origin when the project is complete. Finally, while I agree that any measure that relieves the unemployment pressures and increases the remittance levels in Yemen is good, remittances can create another form of “rentierism” – unearned and unproductive income.  While remittances do help raise the standard of living of family members and can drive the consumer goods sector, they are often not available or used to create productive infrastructure, enterprises and employment.  Thank back to Yemen’s own experience with the return of workers in the early 1990s.

Q. You mentioned briefly the importance of preventing a proxy war in Yemen between Saudi Arabia and Iran. To some, this war is already in play. How much worse can it get? Could this situation in any way be similar to the proxy war that occurred between Saudi Arabia and Egypt in Yemen? Is it possible that the US would support Saudi Arabia in this war considering that Iran is a common opponent? 

This has yet risen to the level of a proxy war commensurate with Saudi Arabia and Egypt in Yemen in the 1960s and do not think it helpful to theorize on what steps the US would take should the level of competition raise to that level. The first priority, however, would be the integrity and survival of Yemen as a state, as it was in 1994.

Q. What would you recommend be Yemen's main short-term, mid-term and long term goals? what should Yemen do about other non-terrorism or economy related needs like child marriages, famine, displacement, etc?

It is for the Yemeni government and Yemeni people to decide on short, medium and long term goals and how best to get there.  You have alluded to many goals I assume are widely shared just in the nature of your questions and the nature and goals of the uprising over the past 18 months – a stable, responsive and legitimate government, a sustainable economy and a reasonable level of personal and state security. Those are the goals of virtually any peoples in the world. The challenge is prioritization and sequencing…and patience that does not slip to passivity and commitment that does not slip to dogma.

Biography

The President announced on September 2, 1997 his intention to nominate Barbara K. Bodine, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen. She was confirmed on November 5, 1997.

After initial tours in Hong Kong and Bangkok, Ambassador Bodine has spent her career working primarily on Southwest Asia and the Arabian Peninsula. She has twice served in the Bureau of Near East Affairs' Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, first as Country Officer for the Yemenis, then as Political-Military officer for the peninsula. She later served as Deputy Office Director. Ambassador Bodine has also had assignments as Deputy Principal Officer in Baghdad, Iraq, and as Deputy Chief of Mission in Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion and occupation in 1990. She was awarded the Secretary of State's Award for Valor for her work in occupied Kuwait.

Following Kuwait, Ambassador Bodine was the Associate Coordinator for Operations and later served as the Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism. She went on to serve as the Dean of Professional Studies at the Department's Foreign Service Institute. She has worked on the secretariat staff of Secretaries Kissinger and Vance, and as a Congressional Fellow in the office of Senator Robert Dole. Most recently, Ms. Bodine spent a year as the Director of East African Affairs.

Ambassador Bodine was born in 1948 in St. Louis, Missouri. She earned her B.A. in Political Science and Asian Studies, and graduated magna cum laude from the University of California at Santa Barbara. She received her Master's degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Massachusetts. She also studied at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Department of State's Language Training Field Schools in Taiwan and Tunisia. She is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and serves on the Board of Directors of the UCSB Alumni Association and on the Advisory Council to the Program on Southwest Asian and Islamic Civilization Studies at the Fletcher School. She was the recipient of the UC Santa Barbara Distinguished Alumni Award in 1991. 

Appointment Date:  11/07/97
Oath of Office:  12/10/97